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Crises, which occur in a great variety of forms, have become an integral feature of 
modern society.  Crisis management (CM) has become an increasingly crucial part of 
successful business management in today’s fast changing and crisis-ridden environment. 
Whereas CM has been a popular and evolving area for academics and professionals over 
the past few dozens of years with lots of empirical and conceptual studies from a variety 
of perspectives, very limited attention and effort has been attempted in this important area 
in an Asian context. 
The present study has probably served as the first attempt, or at least one of the 
first few attempts, of an empirical nature to explore and examine some realities regarding 
the present CM situation among business companies in an Asian context.  Specifically, 
my study has been based on the personal interviews in two surveys with business 
managers and executives from a total of 413 business companies in Singapore and Hong 
Kong.  The study investigated and examined companies’ existing status of crisis 
preparedness, which is very essential in the whole CM repertoire.  A dozen factors related 
to organisational and environmental characteristics and people’s perceptions have been 
examined and measured for their actual association and effect on companies’ overall 
crisis preparedness in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
The findings of this empirical and exploratory study have indicated that the 
overall level of crisis preparedness among business companies in Singapore and Hong 
Kong is on the whole not up to the desirable standard, especially among the companies in 
Hong Kong.  The results of the current study have shown that very few of those factors 
under examination were capable of influencing companies’ crisis preparedness with the 
same effect across the two different regions. The government’s role and people’s crisis 
perceptions were not found to have any direct and significant impact on companies’ crisis 
preparedness in either of the two regions as initially predicted.  However, evidence from 
this study suggests there may be false security or over-confidence among managers 
and/or senior executives in both Singapore and Hong Kong.  Given that the study was 
conducted after the devastating Asian financial crisis and relatively low level of crisis 
preparedness among the companies surveyed, this overconfidence is quite surprising.  It 
 vii
can be detrimental to companies’ crisis preparedness and other CM efforts and practices.  
Therefore, my study calls for wide concern and attention from both academics and 
professionals. 
After a summary of the findings based on the data analysis and interpretation, I 
conclude by discussing the limitations of the current study. At the same time, some 
possible areas for further research in this important area of CM is also proposed and 


























 INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 Businesses abound with crises.  All organisations face crises at one point or 
another.  Nearly 90 per cent of the chief executive officers of Fortune 500 companies 
reportedly believed that a business crisis was as “inevitable as death and taxes” (Fink, 
1986).  Crises are built into the very fabric and fiber of the new information age and have 
become an inevitable and integral feature of the modern world (Mitroff and Anagnos, 
2001).   
 Organisational crises often put the integrity and survival of companies involved to 
a severe test (Cooper, 1981; Patterson, 1993).  Without proper crisis planning and 
preparation, an organisation may unfortunately end up paying an exorbitant price in the 
aftermath of an unexpected crisis.  In October 2002, Singapore Mass Rapid Transport 
encountered one major crisis.  It was covered prominently by the local news media after a 
wheel fell off a light train damaging the tracks and resulting in the break-down and shut-
down for a couple of days of its light train service operation. Despite the company’s 
efforts to resume the service operation, its insufficient preparations to respond to the 
crisis obviously resulted in company’s reputation and general public’s confidence in its 
quality services being much affected.  Numerous crises cases have pointed to the stark 
truth that crisis management (CM) has become an increasingly vital and indispensable 
part of modern business management and that sufficient planning and preparation in 
advance for crises will enable organisations to cope with and survive an unexpected crisis 
with minimum costs. 
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In Western countries, CM has been a popular topic over the past dozen years and 
academics and practitioners have conducted a great many conceptual and empirical 
studies of it from a variety of perspectives (e.g., Augustine, 2000; Barton, 1993 and 2001; 
Callan, 2002; Gonzalez-Herrero and Pratt, 1996; Lagadec, 1990, 1993; Mitroff and 
Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff, Pauchant and Shrivastava, 1988; Pearson and Clair, 1998;  
Pearson and Mitroff, 1993; Perrow, 1984; Reilly, 1987; Roberts, 1990; Schwarts, 1987; 
Shrivastava, 1993; Toigo, 2003; Weick, 1988; and Wisenblit, 1989).  Consequently, there 
has existed a prolific and evolving CM literature and a long list of books on the subject, 
which may have helped managers and practitioners in Western countries develop insights 
about the nature and impact of organisational crises as well as the importance of CM 
endeavours.  Meanwhile, it may also have helped promote the crisis awareness and CM 
practices across business and industrial sectors.   
“Crisis recognizes no boundaries” (Barton, 1993: 3) and it strikes large and small 
organisations in the West and East alike.  However, very little research has been done on 
CM in an Asian setting. We do not know much about the reality of CM perception and 
practices among companies in Asia, even after the last devastating Asian financial crisis, 
which has nevertheless served as an unforgettable and classic lesson about the importance 
of CM. 
In a cover story of Asian Business, Asian companies were generally described as 
being unprepared for crises and even reluctant to think about crises (MacKenzie, 1994).  
A reason often cited by managers for lack of crisis preparation is that there was no need 
for such planning when business was good.  Ruidl (1997) pointed out that this opinion 
goes in agreement with what Meyer (1986: xiv) noted about the “tough sell” of a crisis 
package in business boom times.  He wrote, “Most executives I have found do not like to 
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think about crises.  Those I have spoken with over the years avoid talking about the 
subject, even if it is clear that their companies have been through one.  They equate a 
crisis with bad management; things like that just didn’t happen on their watch.”  
Asia is now playing an increasingly important role in the world, economically and 
otherwise.  Amid the rapid globalisation and development of information and 
communication technologies, more and more Asian companies have moved to become 
regional and/or global players.  In a fast changing and crisis-ridden current environment, 
companies have all the more reason to initiate or strengthen their CM endeavours, 
making plans and preparations for any unexpected crisis, if they want to cope well and 
survive.  
The present study attempts to explore and uncover some realities of the present 
CM situation among business companies in Asia.  Specifically, it aims to focus on 
examining the business companies in Singapore and Hong Kong in terms of their levels 
of crisis preparedness and exploring some major factors influencing companies’ crisis 
preparedness in the two regions.1  Crisis preparedness is an essential and integral issue in 
the whole CM repertoire.  It is expected that the findings and conclusions in this study 
will be able to provide some new and helpful insights, both empirically and conceptually, 
about the importance of crisis preparedness and effective CM in an Asian context.  In the 
following sections, a rationale for selecting Singapore and Hong Kong will first be 
presented, and then follows a concise introduction of the theoretical foundations of this 
empirical and exploratory study.  Next, the research questions for this dissertation will be 
                                                 
1 Both Singapore and Hong Kong are well-known in the past decades as newly industrialized economies in 
East Asia.  Singapore is an independent country with the official full name as the Republic of Singapore, 
while Hong Kong is now the Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.  For the 
sake of convenience, a generic term “region” or “place” will be used throughout this dissertation to refer to 
both Singapore and Hong Kong. 
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described.  After that, a discussion of the expected contributions of the current study will 
be presented. 
 
1.2 Rationale for selecting Singapore and Hong Kong in present study 
  Singapore and Hong Kong are two places in Asia well known for their rapid and 
sustained economic growth in most of the past three decades and also for their increasing 
prominence as dynamic urban platforms for business and monetary activities. The former 
is a city state with a population of 4.1 million (Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2002) 
while the latter is now the Special Administration Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic 
of China with a population of almost seven million (Pritchard, 2001: 101).  Hong Kong, 
after having been under the British rule for over 150 years, was handed back on July 1, 
1997 to the sovereignty of China. 
The two places are selected for this study primarily for a number of reasons 
presented below. 
Singapore and Hong Kong have a number of prominent and interesting 
similarities as well as marked differences in several areas.  The most obvious similarities 
of the two industrialized economies include the following: 
(1) Singapore and Hong Kong have succeeded in sustaining the rapid economic 
development for more than three decades.  “Between 1960 and 1985 both 
economies grew at an average annual rate of slightly over six per cent of gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita.  In 1970 both had similarly high GDP per 
capita of about US$3,000, and both have now joined the leagues of the richest 
countries in the world” (Weder, 1999: 79). With their astonishing economic 
achievement, both have long been regarded as newly industrialized economies in 
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East Asia and ranked among the popular “Four Asian Dragons” with South Korea 
and Taiwan (Khan, 1997: 88).  Meanwhile, the two economies have been able to 
maintain a dynamic business arena driven by the mechanisms of customer- and 
market-orientation.  The two places “have also been characterized by enduring 
prosperity and entrepreneurial spirit for at least three generations (Taormina, 1998: 
474).”   Moreover, both “have developed into major regional hubs and financial 
centers and have become focal points of global economic integration” (Khor, 
1997: 136).  
(2) Singapore and Hong Kong are both dominated by the ethnic Chinese people, with 
the approximate proportions being respectively 77 per cent (Yearbook of 
Statistics Singapore, 2002) and 98 per cent (Taormina, 1998: 471).  As a 
consequence, the business companies operating in these two places will be 
influenced by the similar traditional Chinese cultural values associated with the 
so-called Confucian dynamism, as identified and defined by Hofstede and Bond 
(1988).  The term Confucian dynamism refers to the values such as persistence 
and thrift which come from the teachings of Confucius, an ancient Chinese 
philosopher (551-479 B.C.). Confucian dynamism is meant to deal with the time 
perspective in a society for the gratification of people’s needs (Hofstede, 1991).  
A high index of Confucian dynamism society is one which stresses, in addition to 
thrift and perseverance, loyalty, stability and a long-term orientation while a low 
index of Confucian dynamism society is one which emphasizes gratifying needs 
here and now and adopting a short-term orientation (Hofstede, 1991).  Hofstede 
and Bond (1988) found that the Confucian dynamism has contributed greatly to 
the remarkable economic accomplishment of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
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over the past many years.  Based on the five-dimension criteria developed by 
Hofstede and Bond (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede and Bond, 1988), the city state and 
the Special Administrative Region, together with Taiwan, are usually grouped 
into the same cluster of cultural homogeneity (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985).  That 
is, apart from the pervasive Confucian influence, the three places are generally 
characterized by high power distance, low uncertainty avoidance, high 
collectivism and modest masculinity.  
(3) Both Singapore and Hong Kong used to be trading ports under British rule for a 
century (Taormina, 1998).  The prolonged Western presence has brought the two 
places under the influence of the Western business practices and cultural values.  
The two places have usually been thought of as a bridge linking up the West and 
the East. 
(4) Singapore and Hong Kong have long aspired and competed to become the most 
advanced regional hub in a variety of areas including banking and finance, 
information, innovation and high technology, and foreign trade and investment.  
Due to their strategic geographical location, advanced infrastructure, sound legal 
system and stable environment, both places have become an attractive and 
dynamic arena for business and commercial activities by companies not only from 
Asia but also from the rest of the world. 
 
Despite their similarities as mentioned above, however, Singapore and Hong 
Kong also appear to have differences from each other in quite a few aspects. 
First of all, the role of government in the economic and business advancement has 
been regarded by many as a prominent and significant difference between the two 
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economies. In Singapore, the government is generally thought of as being more proactive 
and dominant in fostering an environment conducive to economic and business 
development in different periods of time.  The government always “plays a pivotal role in 
leading the country’s industrialization” (Vogel, 1991).  The strategies and polices the 
government put forward are often found to be particularly supportive to the growth of 
certain particular industrial enterprises for different periods of time, which is believed to 
be in the best interests of the island state as a whole in its long run.  Consequently, it is 
observed that the enterprises and the public in Singapore, when facing any economic 
difficult period (e.g. the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the economic 
recession in 2001), tend to count on the government to provide extra helpful policies and 
measures to help deal with difficulties and challenges.  Singapore government has played 
a more proactive role in fostering an environment that is conducive to doing businesses 
(Khor, 1997:136). 
In contrast, “the government influence and control in Hong Kong has been 
minimal”, as noted by Paik et al (1996:27), in their comparative study of cultural impact 
on human resources management in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.  “Hong Kong is 
known for its laissez-faire policy of minimal government intervention and regulation” 
(Khor, 1997: 136).  An Asian Business cover story once indicated that the predictable 
government minimal intervention together with a sound legal system had enabled 
business people to adapt to and capitalise on a wildly unpredictable business environment 
(Leung, 1998).  However, this special context has been considered by many people as 
being relatively conducive to cultivating entrepreneurial spirit in an effective way.   
Even though Singapore and Hong Kong have been grouped into the same cluster 
of Chinese-based cultural similarity (Ronen and Shenkar, 1996), the disparity of the two 
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within the dimension of the Confucian dynamism index values is nevertheless apparent.  
For example, in the ranking of the 22 countries for the Confucian dynamism index 
values, Hong Kong is ranked on the top scoring an index value of 96, while Singapore 
stays in the middle with the index value of 48 (Hofstede and Bond, 1988).   
Likewise, Hong Kong and Singapore are both ranked low in the dimension of 
uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) values based on Hofstede’s research and criteria, but 
again there exists a considerable difference within the dimension between the two, with 
Hong Kong having the UAI value at 29 while Singapore’s UAI at 8 (Hofstede, 1980:315).  
This dimension reflects the extent to which people feel worried or threatened by 
ambiguous situations.  A high index value indicates people’s strong risk/uncertainty 
aversion propensity, while low index value reflects people’s strong tolerance to 
uncertainty or risk situations.  All these differences in their cultural dimensions may 
possibly be reflected in the perceptions and behaviours of the people including 
businessmen in the two places. 
The news media in Singapore and Hong Kong are generally perceived to differ 
considerably in aggressiveness, coverage style, credibility and influence, social 
responsibility, government restriction and media competition.  Media relations plays an 
extremely crucial part in the success of an organisation’s crisis management and 
communication.  To many managers in Asia, it is often not a crisis until the media show 
up (MacKenzie, 1994).  Although a large part of handling the immediate crisis situation 
is in most cases dealing with the media, an intrusive press at a time of crisis is to many 
bosses the ultimate horror (MacKenzie, 1994).  “The press is 70% of our crisis plan,” 
says the public relations manager of Asia/Pacific for Hyatt International Hotels 
(MacKenzie, 1994).  A company cannot expect to be sufficiently prepared for a crisis 
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without healthy and effective communication and cooperation with the media.  In fact, 
proper practices for communicating and dealing with the news media have not become an 
indispensable part in every effective CM plan.   
The differences between Singapore and Hong Kong mentioned above and 
possibly some others yet to be uncovered will be reflected among the business managers 
in their perceptions of crises and handling of CM planning and preparation.  As a result, 
they may lead to different degrees of preparedness among companies in the two places 
for coping with crises. 
One the other hand, despite the similarities between Singapore and Hong Kong 
mentioned above, past empirical and theoretical studies in social sciences and 
management and organisational behaviour have already obtained evidence indicating that 
the two places can still produce different outcomes in many areas (Lowe, 1996; 
McDonald and Kan, 1997; Paik, et al., 1996; Siu, 2000; Taormina, 1998).  The 
conclusion based on the past studies has also helped attest to the reality that Asia is not 
monolithic in many ways, and probably not monolithic in CM and crisis preparedness 
among business companies across the region.   
All the significant similarities and differences between Singapore and Hong Kong 
discussed above have provided a prerequisite and important grounding for the current 
empirical and exploratory study.  They will enable this study to come up with some 
significant findings and insights about the crisis preparedness and CM endeavours among 
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1.3 Theoretical foundations 
Organisational crises.  It is advisable to start with a clear definition of the term a 
crisis.  Many academics and practitioners have attempted to define it in a way that best 
serve the objective from their perspective, and a classic definition by Hermann (1963), 
which is often cited as a useful starting point for a more detailed definition, provides a set 
of three characteristics of a crisis: a surprise to organisational members, a threat to high 
priority goals, and a limited time for response.  Heath (1998) points out that a crisis 
situation involves a threat to resources and people, a loss of control and visible and/or 
invisible effects on people, resources and organisation.  Pauchant and Mitroff (1992: 12) 
take on a comprehensive perspective by defining a crisis as “a disruption that physically 
affects a system as a whole and threatens its basic assumptions, its subjective sense of 
self, its existential core.”  Fink (1986: 15) simply defines a crisis as a “turning point for 
better or worse.”  Clearly, a crisis can well be regarded as “an emergency, as a condition 
or situation requiring urgent action or attention” (York, 2001: 40). 
Likewise, organisational crisis has been described by many researchers from 
various perspectives or disciplinary approaches in the past many years (Pearson and Clair, 
1998).  Weick (1988:305) defines an organisational crisis as “low probability and high 
consequence events that threaten the most fundamental goals of the organisation.”  
Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) describe it as any event that destroys or affects an entire 
organisation.  Viewing it more in terms of its consequence, Barton (1993: 2) describes an 
organisational crisis as “a major and unpredictable event that has potentially negative 
results.  The event and its aftermath may significantly damage an organisation and its 
employees, products, services, financial condition, and reputation”. 
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Looking from the perspective of crisis impact and interaction between the society 
and an organisation amid crisis, Irvine and Millar (1996) define an organisational crisis as 
a significant disruption that stimulates extensive news media coverage and public 
scrutiny that disrupts the organisation’s normal business activities.  Such a definition 
reflects the reality in many company crises, which attract extensive news coverage as 
well as wide attention from other stakeholders, as evidenced by numerous past crisis 
events. 
Interestingly, from the definitions of a crisis and an organisational crisis above, it 
is difficult to find a clear-cut boundary between the two.  The two concepts or constructs 
overlap to a very large extent in terms of their semantic denotation and likely 
consequence and implication in a real situation.  This is because crises often occur in an 
organisational context and are always embodied in organisational crises.  Hardly can we 
imagine that an organisation encounters an unwanted event that is later determined 
exclusively as an organisational crisis but not a crisis, or the other way round.  Therefore, 
the two terms will be regarded synonymously and used interchangeably throughout this 
study. 
Based on the definitions by different scholars above, some common attributes of 
an organisational crisis (and a crisis as well) can be seen clearly.  They include (1) an 
unwelcome, unexpected and ambiguous event, (2) threats to interests of the organisation 
and its stakeholders, (3) outside the organisation’s control, (4) immediate and urgent 
action required, (5) limited time for any reaction and decision, (6) wide attention from 
news media and public in most situations, and (7) large economic and social costs. 
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Viewing from the management perspective, Pearson and Clair (1998) consolidate 
the definitions by many other scholars and provide a concise and updated one of an 
organisational crisis as follows: 
An organisational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens 
the viability of the organisation and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, 
effect, and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be 
made swiftly (p.60).   
 
They have also listed different types of organisational crises as shown in Table 
1.1 below (Pearson and Clair, 1998: 60). 
Given the intimidating characteristics of an organisational crisis and its negative 
consequences, it is natural that any organisation would try hard to stay away from or 
prevent them.  Most organisational theorists agree that crises, of varying magnitude, are 
inevitable (Fink, 1986; Perrow, 1984).  The difference is in the scope and nature of the 
crisis, and how well the company is able to respond to it (Remsik, 1999).   
Previous research on organisations in the United States that have experienced 
crises has shown that over 40 per cent of the organisations hit by a serious crisis never 
resume operations.  Over 25 per cent of those that do manage to resume their operations 
again are so weakened that they close down permanently within three years (Doughty, 
2001).  An organisational crisis can be enormously destructive to organisations that lack 
CM planning and prevention. 
A crisis does not always happen all of a sudden without any signal of premonition.  
Though some crises strike suddenly and unexpectedly, others do often break out with 
early warning signals (Barton, 1993; Silva and McGann, 1995: xi).  Shrivastava and 
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Table 1.1  An Array of Organisational Crises 
 
 
• Extortion • Bribery 
• Hostile takeover • Information sabotage 
• Product tampering • Workplace bombing 
• Vehicular fatality • Terrorist attack 
• Copyright infringement • Plant explosion 
• Environmental spill • Sexual harassment 
• Computer tampering • Escape of hazardous materials 
• Security breach             - 
• Executive kidnapping • Personal assault 
• Product/service boycott • Assault of customers 
• Work-related homicide • Product recall 
• Malicious rumour • Counterfeiting 
• Natural disaster that disrupts a 
major product or service 
• Natural disaster that destroys 
corporate headquarters 
• Natural disaster that destroys 
organisational information 
base 




Mitroff (1987) point out that crises are triggered by specific low probability events that 
have high impact on a variety of stakeholders. Before a triggering event occurs, there is 
usually an incubation period in which there are several indirect warnings, and smaller 
incidents that indicate problems within the system. 
Adopting an interesting analogy with a biological model, Gonzalez-Herrero and 
Pratt (1996) compared a crisis to an organism, proposing that a crisis will pass 
sequentially through phases of birth, growth, maturity and decline or death.  With the 
intervention of proactive crisis management, a crisis might be restricted or prevented 
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from developing to its growth and maturity stages.  Furthermore, it may even be unborn 
when identified very early as an issue of potential concern.  With proactive CM, an 
organisation will become crisis-prepared, thus capable of avoiding crises before they are 
born, or restricting and minimizing their development and damage scale by provoking 
their premature decline and shortening their life cycles, argued Gonzalez-Herrero and 
Pratt (1996). 
To obtain such a desirable outcome, an organisation must make its CM proactive, 
or make adequate efforts for preventing a crisis in normal times prior to the outbreak of 
any crisis.  One important way to do so is to have sound CM planning and preparation in 
advance. 
On the other hand, crises are not always perceived as negative or threatening.  
Based on their experience and observation, some managers and researchers argue that an 
organisational crisis is best viewed as a turning point (Reilly, 1987), which is completely 
consistent with Fink’s definition mentioned earlier.  Ulmer and Sellnow (2000) contend: 
“If handled effectively, organisations have the potential to benefit from crises.”  Almost 
every crisis contains within itself the seeds of success as well as the roots of failure 
(Augustine, 2000).  Interestingly, the Chinese word for crisis is weiji, which means 
danger and opportunity. The word vividly captures the essence of CM: when handled 
well, the danger in a crisis can be averted and even turned into favorable opportunities. 
 Crisis management (CM).  Pearson and Clair (1998: 61) define CM as “a 
systematic attempt by organisational members with external stakeholders to avert crises 
or to effectively manage those that do occur”.  In many situations, CM is also the 
application of public relations (including the principles and techniques of media relations) 
to minimize harm to the organisation in emergency situations that could bring to the 
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organisation an irreparable damage (Kreps, 1986).  Effective CM is capable of preventing 
or averting the potential crises, minimizing potential risk prior to a triggering event and 
also enables the organisation involved to improvise and interact in a successful way with 
its key stakeholders during a triggering event (Pearson and Clair, 1998). 
 According to Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), regardless of the kind of crisis, 
effective CM involves managing the five distinct phases or stages: signal detection, 
preparation and prevention, damage containment, recovery, and learning, as shown in 
Figure 1.1 below. 
 
Figure 1.1  Five-Phase Crisis Management Model by Pauchant and Mitroff (1992)  
   
 
 Proactive CM     Reactive CM 
      1       2    3           4 
 
 

















Limitation  Crisi 
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According to Pauchant and Mirtroff (1992), the role and function of each phase 
are as follows: 
1. Signal Detection consists of monitoring, scanning, detecting and/or tracking 
early warning signals or symptoms of any potential crisis, and alerting 
personnel      concerned of its possible occurrence. 
2. Prevention and Preparation refers to the active probing of the organisation for 
signs of weaknesses and potential problems.  It also involves such tasks as 
designing various scenarios and procedures of measures and actions for 
anticipated crises, and trying them out sufficiently until all those personnel 
involved are familiar with their roles. 
3. Containment and Damage Limitation functions to control an on-going crisis 
and prevent it from affecting other uncontaminated parts of an organisation or 
its environment. 
4. Recovery involves developing and implementing relevant short-term and 
long-term plans and programmes for the organisation to resume its normal 
operation/business in the soonest possible time.  
5. Learning draws on critical lessons acquired from the organisation’s own crisis 
experience and those of others’ and improve upon what has been done in the 
past regarding the organisation’s competence and effectiveness in handling 
crises. 
 
The first two phases fall within the pre-crisis stages and they constitute proactive 
types of CM.  Any efforts made or activities performed in these stages are largely aimed 
at identifying and averting a potential crisis in its early stage.  If done sufficiently well, 
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the work in these two phases can succeed in preventing many crises from happening in 
the first place.  In contrast, the third and fourth phases are clearly within the post-crisis 
stages and any activities done in them are reactive or passive, with an attempt only to 
resist or control an out-breaking crisis and minimize its possible damages.  Therefore, the 
two phases are the reactive types of CM.  As for the phase of learning, it is a continual 
learning process in many cases based on bitter lessons resulting from one’s own or 
others’ crises.  According to Pauchant and Mitroff (1992), the last stage is more of 
interactive nature, as organisations at different periods of time learn lessons from their 
own experiences and others’ and incorporate them to their practices of CM. 
Whereas all the five phases as described above are important components of 
effective CM, an organisation especially successful with crisis preparations and other CM 
endeavours within the first two phases will certainly have a very high chance of winning 
the battle with crises in a more efficient way.  Silva and McGann (1995:234) asserted, 
“An ounce of preparation can provide a pound of cure once crisis strikes.”  Therefore, the 
CM in the first two phases, or proactive CM, is of special importance to all organisations 
in dealing with crises. 
Crisis preparedness.   Crisis preparedness or readiness is a construct central to 
this dissertation.  According to Reilly (1987: 80), “the forms and natures of possible 
organisational crises are countless, and bounded rationality clearly prohibits organisations 
and individuals from developing specific contingency plans for every conceivable crisis 
situation.  Crisis readiness is therefore defined broadly here as the readiness to cope with 
the uncertainty and change engendered by a crisis.” 
When we say that an organisation is crisis prepared, it means the organisation has 
“at least done everything possible to prevent the major crises from occurring in the first 
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place and to better manage those that do occur” (Pauchant and Mitroff, 1992: 1). A crisis-
prepared organisation has adequately equipped itself with both mental and physical 
preparations in advance for responding to or dealing with any emergency situation.  It is 
fully ready to handle effectively a crisis at different phases or stages.  Fundamentally 
speaking, crisis preparedness is the essence of proactive CM.  
At the heart of proactive CM is advance CM planning coupled with some specific 
and substantial arrangements or measures in terms of organisational and human 
resources.  Advance CM planning has unique and vital functions including the 
identification and examination of the possible crisis events as well as issues of potential 
concern, specification of responsiveness tactics and procedures for responding to and 
handling the issues and events, formulation of a crisis communication plan, and the steps 
and measures for implementing the plans.  Judicious crisis planning may reduce response 
time and possibly prevent missteps in an organisation’s initial response to a crisis 
(Benoit, 1997), as it is capable of eliminating confusion, specifying what needs to be 
done, and making everyone clear of his own responsibility in a crisis situation (Wisenblit, 
1989).   
Indeed, evidence has shown that those organisations without a CM plan suffered 
from a crisis 2.5 times longer than those with an effective CM plan (Fink, 1986).  
“Companies that did have a plan in place when hit by a crisis reported a shorter crisis 
duration and fewer after-effects than firms without crisis plans” (Wisenblit, 1989: 34).  
Being prepared for a crisis can mean the difference between a quick recovery period and 
irreparable damage (Lau, 1988). 
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Given the special importance of crisis preparedness in the whole system of CM, 
the present study will examine and compare the companies in Singapore and Hong Kong 
in terms of their preparedness for crises.   
Through their research, Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) have identified four critical 
layers based on which an organisation can be judged whether it is crisis prepared or crisis 
prone.  The four key layers start from the first and tangible layer at an organisation’s 
surface: 
1. Organisational Strategies:  This is the first and surface layer which comprises the 
organisation’s strategies for CM - existing plans, procedures, mechanisms for 
dealing with crises. 
2. Organisational Structure:  This is the second layer referring to the organisational 
structures dedicated for handling crises and CM repertoire. 
3. Organisational Culture: This is the next to the innermost layer.  Crises and CM 
are reflected in the beliefs, values, perceptions and rationalizations of the 
managers and employees in the organisation. 
4. Character of Individuals:  This layer, the innermost and also intangible one, 
concerns whether individual members of an organisation exhibit any defensive 
mechanisms in relation to crises. 
Clearly, an organisation’s overall crisis preparedness can be well assessed from 
the above four critical dimensions.   
A review of the CM literature also reveals that many CM academic researchers 
and practitioners have often used a series of indicators as important parameters.  Among 
the most frequently used indicators are a general plan for crises, usually at a corporate 
level, a written CM plan, a CM team/unit or task force in place, regular crisis drills for 
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employees, and company’s appropriate perceptions and initiative interaction with news 
media (Barton, 1993, 2001; Coombs, 1999; Dougherty, 1992; Dyer, 1995; Guth, 1995; 
Heath, 1998; Kamer, 1997-98; Lau, 1987-88; MacKenzie, 1994; Meyers and Holusha, 
1986; Mitroff and Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff and Pearson, 1993; Oshins, 1992; Pauchant 
and Mitroff, 1992; Reilly, 1987; Remsik, 1999; Traverso, 1993; Truitt and Kelley, 1989; 
Williams and Olaniran, 1998; Wimmer, 1999; Wisenblit, 1989).   
Specifically, a general plan for crises means that the top management of an 
organisation has a good level of crisis awareness and CM perception and reached a 
consensus for having a general CM plan at the corporate level.  The plan is usually at the 
strategic level and may identify areas inside and/or outside the organisation where a crisis 
may arise or where crisis prevention and preparation efforts and CM measures need to be 
initiated or strengthened.  These areas may include people, products/services, security, 
issues of potential concern and even possible unfavourable media coverage when a crisis 
strikes.  The company with a general CM plan is supposed to take into account those 
crucial issues when drawing up corporate level strategies and incorporate the CM issues 
into an overall plan.  Procedures and actions for effectively handling an unwanted 
emergency situation may have been well considered in advance and agreed upon among 
the top management of the organisation.  Good CM planning also includes the readiness 
to use particular tactics for dealing with specific situational contingencies existing or 
arising during the course of an emergency (Guarantelli, 1988).  It may also reflect the 
intention and readiness to formulate plans for specific anti-crisis tactics and measures and 
create a CM team once the needed situation arises. 
Having a written CM plan means that the organisation takes a big significant step 
further.  It requires a company not only to think about and treat CM seriously from a 
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strategic perspective but also to identify possible crises that may occur in certain parts of 
the organisation and then develop specific and detailed CM plans for each kind of crisis.  
This kind of plans is no longer attached as a supplementary component to the corporate 
level strategies or plans.  They are all made to serve as a stand-alone or independent 
master guideline for handling any emergency situation.  In a written crisis plan, all 
personnel involved are also designated and assigned with specific roles and 
responsibilities.  Generally, a written crisis plan will specify such important issues as how 
to determine that a crisis has occurred, how to judge the impact of the crisis on the 
company, sequential steps and actions to take under specific circumstances, chain of 
command, crisis control center, members of a CM team, ways of communicating the 
crisis to various stakeholders, media contacts, who will be a spokesman facing the public, 
contingency plans for ensuring operation continuation, etc. 
When a company has set up a CM team or CM unit or task force, it shows the 
organisation has succeeded in institutionalizing the CM operation mechanism inside the 
organisation.  Ideally, a CM team should consist of individuals representing all levels and 
departments/components of an organisation and possessing different but complementary 
knowledge and expertise.  These individuals will have the essential duties of conducting 
crisis audits, managing responses to crisis situations, identifying spokesmen, coordinating 
information flow during a crisis, assisting in crisis decision making, and working with 
media and public interest groups (Williams and Olaniran, 1998).  Moreover, the team 
should have sufficient authority to make critical decisions and commit significant 
amounts of organisational resources (Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987).  Clearly, with a CM 
team in force, the company has actually mobilized the needed organisational resources 
and advantages including human power, financial strength and institutional structure. 
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Though it is important to make efforts to draw up a CM plan and set up a CM 
team, there is no way to know how well they will function in a real situation. Therefore, it 
is imperative to test or try them out in simulations or full-scale drills with participation of 
the employees across the whole organisation.  Drills on regular basis are crucial in that 
they will expose the employees to an unusual simulated context in which they practise 
and learn how to react and behave, thus becoming increasingly familiar with their 
responsibilities in a crisis situation.  Regular drills will also help continually improve on 
the efficiency of CM mechanism as well as procedures and measures.  Regular drills will 
make CM teams more successful (Dyers, 1995, as quoted in Williams and Olaniran, 
1998).  More importantly, they will help effectively create a culture throughout the 
organisation in favour of cultivating or enhancing the desirable crisis awareness of crisis 
and support for the CM efforts and mechanism among all the employees in an 
organisation.  The favourable corporate culture will surely help members of the 
organisation, top management and ordinary staff alike, to dedicate themselves to a 
proactive CM system. 
Media relations plays a special and vital role amid a crisis situation.  The intrusive 
media are often found to either sensationalise a crisis event, magnify the negative part of 
the organisation involved or simply make it factual, consequently influencing the public 
perception of the crisis-hit organisation to a very large extent.  Media coverage has in 
many cases been found to be one of the essential factors transforming an incident into a 
crisis (Ogrizek and Guillery, 1999).  To many bosses, an intrusive press at a time of crisis 
is the ultimate nightmare, though it is exactly the time they need to communicate 
(MacKenzie, 1994).  To avoid that undesirable predicament, senior executives of an 
organisation should realise the importance of maintaining good communications with 
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news media.  They must be fully aware of media’s special and influential power at a time 
of crisis and adopt a proactive approach in dealing with them prior to any crisis event.  
Since organisational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact unwelcome event that 
threatens the viability of the organisation (Pearson and Clair, 1998), it usually gives an 
organisation very little time to think about how to react when it strikes.  It is the extent of 
preparedness that the organisation possesses prior to a crisis incident that makes 
organisations react and fare differently.   
To a large extent, those important indicators mentioned above are capable of 
reflecting an organisaiton’s overall crisis preparedness.  Meanwhile, they are also well in 
congruence with the four critical dimensions of assessment criteria provided by Pauchant 
and Mitroff (1992), as illustrated earlier.  All those indicators are concrete, tangible and 
measurable in reality and can be operationalised in the current study.  Therefore, they will 
be adopted as significant measurements or sub-variables in this study to gauge the extent 
of overall preparedness of individual business companies under study. 
 
1.4       Research questions 
Drawing from the theoretical foundation discussed above, this study attempts to 
address the following main research questions: 
1. What are the major factors associated with business companies’ crisis 
preparedness in Singapore and Hong Kong? 
2. What is the general level of crisis preparedness among business companies in 
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 1.5 Expected contributions of this study  
  This study probably could serve as the first empirical and exploratory research of 
business companies in Singapore and Hong Kong in terms of their preparations for crisis.  
As such, this study expects to have both academic and practical implications.  
Academically, it would enrich the literature on the CM as a whole, with some unique and 
significant findings based on empirical survey research in an Asian context.  Specifically, 
this study aims to examine the relationship between companies’ overall crisis 
preparedness and a number of possible factors associated with the organisations in the 
survey, their managers’ perceptions and their environment.  With the first-hand data from 
413 incumbent business managers/executives, this study tests the selected CM issues and 
concepts regarding crisis preparedness from an Asian perspective.  Furthermore, it is also 
expected to provide some insights into some issues like the impacts of government’s role 
upon companies’ crisis preparedness and the relationship between managers’ perception 
of news media’s behaviour characteristics and media’s importance for crisis 
communication and their companies’ crisis preparedness.  All these have so far seldom 
been touched on before. 
This study may also contribute to the CM literature with some findings from two 
newly industrialized economies where the Chinese population is dominant and Chinese 
culture and business practices are popular and influential.  As mentioned earlier, the CM 
studies in Asian contexts have been very limited in comparison with the prolific and ever 
evolving CM literature based on Western contexts. 
In practice, this study may also enrich the inventory of management expertise for 
business managers and executives.  The examination and findings on the proposed 10-
plus factors which are suspected to be capable of influencing companies’ crisis 
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preparedness would provide valuable reference on CM to any manager who is engaged in 
business management and activities in Asia and desires to strengthen the CM practices 
for his organisation.  That is because the analyses and findings in this study are mostly 
based on perceptions and real experience of the 413 business managers/executives from 
Singapore and Hong Kong.  Interested business people and management professionals 
could benefit from them in their own business management activities without any trouble 
or risk of their own trying.  In some way, this dissertation would serve as a useful 
reference source for numerous business managers and executives to learn about the CM 
and crisis preparations among companies in an Asian setting.  
 
1.6       Summary and organisation of the dissertation 
This chapter has attempted to provide an introductory background or foundation 
for the following chapters while introducing a theoretical framework and research 
questions. 
Chapter 2 will basically present a background review of the past evolvement and 
present situation of CM, its perceptions and practices among academic researchers, 
practitioners and business managers.  The focus of review will mainly fall within the 
Asian context centering on Singapore and Hong Kong.  It will also examine and analyse 
some relevant factors that exist in the environment under study and which are 
conceivably related to a company’s crisis preparedness and other CM endeavours.  After 
that, a conceptual framework indicating the relationship between possible predicting 
factors and a company’s overall crisis preparedness and the relevant hypotheses will be 
proposed and discussed in Chapter 3, followed then by another chapter, Chapter 4, in 
which a concise description and explanation of methodology for the research instrument 
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and methods for data collection and analysis will be unfolded and described.  In Chapter 
5, results of data analyses will be reported, discussed and interpreted.  Finally, a 
conclusion of this study, together with its limitations and suggestions for future research 





This chapter reviews the evolution and current status of CM in an Asian context, 
focusing on Singapore and Hong Kong.  Managers’ crisis perceptions and companies’ 
crisis preparedness may also be influenced by certain factors arising from the 
environment in which the companies operate and develop.  Therefore, this chapter will 
also examine some environmental factors that may directly or indirectly influence 
managers’ crisis perceptions and companies’ crisis preparedness.  Specifically, the factors 
include the influences of government and news media as well as some cultural 
characteristics related to crisis perceptions and CM. 
  
2.1 Crisis management in Asia 
A review of the CM literature reveals a paucity of comprehensive and systematic 
study of CM in Asia, in striking contrast to the rich, dynamic and multiple-disciplined 
CM research in the West.  In the past more than two decades, Asia has drawn attention 
from the rest of the world for, among other things, the “Asian economic miracle” 
achieved and sustained by some countries in the region in the past decades up to 1997 
and also for its economic setback resulting from the sweeping Asian financial crisis in 
1997-98.  The region’s political upheavals and natural disasters have also captured media 
attention.  Given the volatile economic and political environment in parts of Asia and its 
susceptibility to natural or man-made disasters, business companies should have all the 
more reason to equip themselves with sound CM planning to become prepared for any 
unexpected crisis.   
Chapter 2  Literature Review 
Some observe that CM in Asia has matured in the past 20 years (Fienberg, 1999). 
They see companies are now demonstrating that they have benefited from the difficult 
lessons of the past. Senior business executives and their financial and legal advisers have 
come to realise the importance of involving corporate communications consultants and 
public relations specialists in the early stages of corporate restructuring. “Even privately 
held concerns are beginning to incorporate communications planning into their 
restructuring processes” (Fienberg, 1999).  Ruidl (1997) notes that some Asian public 
relations practitioners with strategic mindsets have started to convince top managers that 
a crisis preparedness is simply good business. 
 However, many other western observers view Asian countries as generally not 
well prepared for crises.  Boulas (1998) suggests that to cope successfully with crises, 
chief executive officers (CEOs) in Asia must first overcome three primary challenges: 
overconfidence, a historic precedent of quick recovery, and a lack of role models.  During 
a lecture in Malaysia in 1995, Peter Drucker warned of the imminent downturn in Asia, 
citing Horace's famous admonition: “He who the gods would destroy they first bringeth 
40 years of prosperity,” (Boulas, 1998).  However, his warning seemed unheeded by 
Asian governments as well as business CEOs, as evidenced in the ensuing Asian financial 
crisis. 
In a cover story of Asian Business, a typical Asian company is described as being 
unprepared itself to cope with crises (MacKenzie, 1994).  When discussing the Y2K 
problem, Cox (1999) also commented that Asia countries, although already hard-hit by 
the financial crisis, were virtually unprepared.  “Asia has been accused of falling behind 
in Y2K preparations, and an economic crisis has raised concerns that funds will be 
diverted to more immediate needs (Business Day, Bangkok,  February 16,1999, p.1).”   
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Some specialists observe that the complacency of “false sense of security” is a 
part of the pervasive problem in Asia, where awareness of the looming disaster lags 
behind the USA and Europe (Cox, 1999).  Business people in Asia often read about other 
companies’ crisis encountering or failure with an “it can’t happen here” attitude, which 
was also common among many managers or organisations in the West (Mitroff and 
Anagnos, 2001; Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990; Wisenblit, 1989). Boulas (1998) lamented 
that lulled into a false sense of security by years of growth, many chief executive officers 
in Asia were ill-prepared for the crisis, responding slowly and ignoring critical 
weaknesses in the processes, controls, and systems needed to manage through a 
prolonged downturn.  Obviously, they were intoxicated with the successive growth their 
companies had experienced during the boom time and that kind of growth had led to “an 
illusion of invulnerability” (Janis and Mann, 1977: 130) shared among those managers.  
This kind of illusion could create over-optimism among the managers themselves and 
prompt them to take extreme risks. 
In addition, it is easy to find a common mentality throughout Asia that people, 
including businessmen, are averse to thinking of something ominous, of a danger and 
crisis in fear that it might really befall them.  This mentality also makes people clinch a 
belief in their fate, often with an attitude of resignation when confronted with something 
they find it too difficult or complicated to deal with.   
Apart from the pervasive overconfidence or false security and aversion to 
thinking about or anticipating crises, a reason often cited by managers in the past for the 
lack of crisis preparedness is that there has been no need for such planning when business 
was good, or during “the optimism of boom time”, as noted by MacKenzie (1994).  Ruidl 
(1997) believes that this view is consistent with what Meyer and Holusha (1986: xiv) 
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have said about the ‘tough sell’ of a crisis package in good times.  There are illustrations 
of the general absence of such management plans among practitioners (Henderson, 1999). 
For example, the Pacific Asia Travel Association (PATA) found in a recent survey that 
most of its members, including national tourist organisations, did not include CM in their 
strategic planning despite a 40% chance of a crisis occurring (Henderson, 1999).  
In short, Asian businesses, including those in Singapore and Hong Kong, have 
been frequently described as being complacent in CM and having a false sense of security.  
They were “slow” or “sluggish”, and “dragging their feet in preparation” (Cox, 1999: 3B).  
These behaviours were also attributed to some Asian countries’ cultural aversion to 
failure.  Retired United States diplomat, David Hitchcock (1998: 19) claimed bluntly, 
“Asia's crisis is not only economic, but cultural.” 
However, Asia is not monolithic despite some similarities among its countries in 
cultural values and business practices.  Over the past several years, many comparative 
studies have been made in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, in which the same 
Chinese-based cultural values and heritage are believed to be dominant.  Those studies 
investigated, compared and contrasted managerial values and human resource practices, 
marketing and consumer perceptions and behaviours (Cheung and Chow, 1999; 
McDonald and Kan, 1997; Harrison, 1994; Paik et al, 1996; Siu, 2000; Tai and Tam, 
1996; Taormina, 1998).  Interestingly, those studies show significant variations in the 
perceptions, values and practices of business development and management, human 
resources development and management, consumer perceptions and behaviours and 
marketing strategies and approaches across the different regions.  Therefore, it is one of 
the present study’s objectives to find out whether the Chinese-based cultural influences 
prevailing in Singapore and Hong Kong will again produce significant identical or 
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different outcomes in terms of crisis preparedness and CM endeavours among business 
companies in the two places. 
 
2.2 Crisis management in Singapore and Hong Kong 
In this section, I examine the general situation regarding crisis preparedness and 
CM practices in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
 2.2.1 Singapore 
Singapore is a small island-nation situated on the southern tip of the Malaysian 
Peninsula.  It possesses a total land area of about 648 square kilometers and a population 
of about four million consisting of four major demographic groups: Chinese (76.7 per 
cent), Malay (about 14 per cent), Indian (7.9 per cent) and Eurasian and others (about 1.5 
per cent) (Yearbook of Statistics Singapore, 2002).  It was a British colony for about 140 
years before it joined the United Nations and achieved full independence in 1965.  Since 
then, the city-state has successfully achieved a tremendous and sustained economic 
growth, turning itself into a “miracle economy” as described by the World Bank (Haas, 
2001: 68) and ranking with South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong as the four newly 
industrialized economies or the commonly known as “Four Little Dragons” in Asia (Lee, 
et al., 2000:35).  
Despite its economic success, Singapore has always perceived the marked 
constraint deriving from its small size and dearth of natural resources.  However, instead 
of being handicapped by its innate weaknesses, it has remained a dynamic and major 
economic force in the region.  It has since the early 1980s succeeded in attracting a large 
number of foreign investors, including the largest industrial companies around the world, 
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into its pillar industrial sectors such as manufacturing and services. As of the end of 2000, 
international companies operating in Singapore had amounted to as many as 6000.  Half 
of them have regional operations and headquarters functions (Website of Singapore 
Economic Development Board: http://www.sedb.com).  Today, Singapore has become a 
major regional hub for international business and trade and a regional financial centre.  It 
is also among the busiest trading ports in the world.  On the other hand, the strategic 
importance of the local small and medium enterprises has not been neglected and the 
government has in recent years stepped up its effort to call on the local entrepreneurs to 
make bold moves developing their businesses at home and abroad.  
 
2.2.2 Crisis management in Singapore 
There are two opposite views about the crisis management and culture in 
Singapore. On the one hand, Singapore is often thought of as being more prepared for 
crises than other neighboring countries, as evidenced in its being least affected in the 
1997-98 Asian financial crisis.  The city-state was also recently praised by a senior World 
Health Organisation (WHO) official for taking a “far sighted approach” to preventing 
lifestyle diseases through measures like health screening for its people (The Straits Times, 
March 28, 2000, p.2). Indeed, the government has attached much importance to 
preparations for responding to and handling any emergency situation.  According to a 
report from The Straits Times (March 23, 2002), the government in 1994 set up the 
National Emergency System, or Nest, which is made up of more than two dozen 
government agencies and statutory boards.  The country-level Nest is meant to ensure 
that the nation’s infrastructure will still function should any crisis strike.   
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Singapore is also among the countries with the highest rate of personal savings 
and the highest foreign reserves per capita (Tai and Tam, 1996). This may probably be 
seen, in some way, as a wide consensus or consciousness, both among the general public 
and in the government, about the necessity and importance of making proactive 
preparations today for any unexpected tomorrow. 
Another classic example can be seen from the crisis reaction and handling by 
Singapore Airlines (SIA), after one of its airplanes, Flight SQ006, crashed on October 31, 
2000 on the runway of Chiang Kai-shek International Airport in Taipei, resulting in the 
death of 83 out of the 179 passengers and crew and injury of some others.  The 
company’s quick reaction to the disastrous accident and skillful and appropriate handling 
of various stakeholders as shown on news media remarkably impressed the public in a 
way favourable to the corporation.  Despite the disastrous accident, SIA nevertheless has 
reportedly managed to increase its annual revenue in the financial year.  With the massive 
and exhaustive coverage of the media, people can see clearly the company’s sound crisis 
preparedness has enabled the organisation to turn the crisis into a unique occasion to 
mend and even enhance its reputation.  
On the other hand, other observers describe Singapore companies as being 
sluggish in CM. For example, Henderson (1999) found in her qualitative study of 10 
organisations in the tourism industry in Singapore that none of the organisations involved 
had an official CM strategy or a specific plan to cover the adverse circumstances of the 
recent financial crisis. Some managers even believed that crisis planning was irrelevant if 
management was fast on its feet.  Probably, these managers are not alone in holding such 
a belief, and there is no reason or evidence to infer that many managers in other industrial 
sectors might think otherwise.  Interestingly, the finding by Henderson echoes with the 
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mentality of many business managers in other parts of Asia as revealed in MacKenzie’s 
(1994) article in an Asian Business issue mentioned earlier.  Henderson reported that 
there was a feeling that companies had been rather slow to react, failing to realise the 
magnitude of the crisis. 
 
2.2.3 Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is now a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).  Like Singapore, Hong Kong was colonized by Britain in the 
19th century and remained under its rule for as long as 145 years before it was reversed to 
the PRC on July 1 1997.  Located in the southern part of the Chinese mainland, Hong 
Kong covers a land area of about 1,098 square kilometers and boasts a population of 
about 6.97 million as of 2000 (Pritchard, 2001:101), of which 98 per cent are Chinese 
(Taormina, 1998).  The long history of the British rule and its geographical adjacent to 
the Chinese mainland and its overwhelming majority of the Chinese residents have 
resulted in its prominent and unique mix of Chinese culture and British bureaucracy 
(Cheung and Chow, 1999). 
Given its special historical background, Hong Kong is now different from the 
mainland China in many ways.  As a special administrative region of China, it is in fact 
under a different social, economic, legal, and political system, all of which were 
established over the long years of the British colonial period and could regarded as 
mostly Western style.  Over the past more than three decades, Hong Kong has always 
been under the spotlight of the world for its rapid and steady economic growth up to 1997, 
when it was hard hit by the Asian financial crisis.  Because of its geographical 
convenience, Hong Kong has long functioned as the southern entrance for organisations 
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from all over the world to do business in the mainland China.  More than 3000 
international companies were using Hong Kong as a regional headquarters or office as at 
June 1, 2000 (Website of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region government: 
http://www.gov.hk/info/sar4/eview.htm).  Ranked with Singapore among the “Four Little 
Dragons” in Asia (Lee, et al., 2000:35), Hong Kong’s economy has long been labeled as 
dynamic, liberal and competitive and has meanwhile remained as a major economic force 
in the region. 
Hong Kong’s remarkable economic development in the past has often been 
attributed to several factors including the existence of the free port and free trade, the 
favourable location and good communications, the hard work and entrepreneurial 
instincts of the population, high flexibility of the market mechanism and numerous small 
and medium enterprises, and, above all, the government’s well-known positive non-
intervention stance towards industrial and economic development (Yeung, 1998:20).  
 
2.2.4 Crisis management in Hong Kong 
In the past, precious little study has been attempted of the CM in the dynamic 
economy of Hong Kong and, consequently, only a very limited literature on the CM 
among business corporations is available.  However, the past several years have 
witnessed Hong Kong undergoing a historic transition, in which its sovereignty was 
handed over back to China, and an unprecedented economic setback, when its economy 
was slashed by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.  Amid the unusual period of time in 
the most part of the last decade, Hong Kong was seen to “have been reeling from one 
crisis to the next” (Huque and Lee, 2000:6) and the inquisitive and somewhat 
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omnipresent media hardly failed to report each and every crises breaking out across 
various industrial sectors within the territory. 
Among those major ones covered and publicized by the media in recent years in 
Hong Kong are the intermittent industrial actions by Cathay Pacific Airway pilots and 
other employees, the accident of Taiwan’s China Airlines slipping into the sea amid a 
storm at Kai Tak Airport (1997), public transportation chaos arising from the operation 
license termination of a major bus company, China Bus (1998), horrific bird flu epidemic 
(between May and December 1997), operation chaos caused by computer system collapse 
of newly launched international airport cargo terminal (July 1998), etc., to mention just a 
very few of them here.  All those crises invariably ended up in splashing across the 
prominent positions of the news media in Hong Kong and elsewhere in the region and the 
world for a prolonged time, thus placing organisations or companies involved into an 
unprecedented predicament and severely affecting their images.  Meanwhile, they were 
likely to have left people with an unfavourable impression that Hong Kong is a crisis-
ridden place and companies there are ill prepared for crises. 
Amidst those discouraging coverage of the crisis events and incompetent reaction 
to the crises by those unprepared organisations, nevertheless, there are also some positive 
reports that indicate certain companies/industries in Hong Kong take the initiative to 
adopt proactive measures in normal times to prepare themselves for the expected crisis.  
For example, in the latter half of 1999, 22 local banks in Hong Kong participated in the 
worldwide computer system test so as to be prepared for any unexpected computer 
malfunction when the new millennium was approaching (Chow, 1999).  The territory’s 
flag carrier Cathay Pacific and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank were reported to have 
done well in their CM planning by setting up a sound back-up computer system to 
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prevent the disruption of their business operation and protect their data in time of 
emergency (MacKenzie, 1994).  Although positive reports about business companies’ 
good effort in CM and their active preparation for dealing with crises in normal time are 
quite limited in local news media, they nevertheless do serve as good examples indicating 
there are firms in Hong Kong that are aware of the importance of CM to the successful 
continuity of their business and the importance of making proactive preparations before 
any unwanted crisis strikes, which also attests to the Ruidl’s (1997) observation and study 
mentioned earlier.   
 
2.3 Culture and crisis management in Singapore and Hong Kong 
Numerous studies have already shown that business operation and management 
will invariably be influenced by some indigenous cultural factors prevailing in a 
particular environment in which the business operates.  This study attempts to apply the 
principles in public relations and corporate communications to examine CM practices 
among business companies in Singapore and Hong Kong since CM is an important aspect 
of public relations and corporate communications.  Kreps (1986) has defined CM as the 
use of public relations strategies and techniques to reduce as far as possible the harm to 
the organisation in emergency situations that could possibly incur an irreparable damage 
to the organisation.  Some scholars have speculated that CM practices differ as “cultures” 
change and argue it is “important to know these distinctions” (Ruidle, 1997). Culture may 
be considered to be a set of practicing theories held by members of organisations about 
how life works and recipes about how interactions are conducted. Consequently, culture 
is not and should not only be the domain of those studying nations, ethnicity and/or 
gender (Ruidl, 1997). 
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2.3.1 Crisis culture in Singapore 
Yuen (1998) suggests that in studies on the culture of overseas Chinese 
communities like Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, the conventional approach was to 
consider them as extensions of the traditional Chinese social and cultural heritage. 
However, she also observes that some argue that there is a distinct Singaporean 
identity/culture.  Clammer (1985) also comments that a culture organizes, integrates and 
maintains a system of values and pattern of characteristic behavior, and in this sense a 
distinctive, although still fluid, Singapore culture already exists.   
In Singapore, Yuen (1998) observes, there is a “permanent sense of crisis” and 
“today’s solution often becomes tomorrow’s problem” among Singaporeans. She 
(1998:134) cites the example of Singapore’s Changi International Airport which has for 
many years been rated amongst the best in the world.  In the early 1990s, the second 
Changi terminal was opened to increase the airport’s capacity to handle anticipated 
passenger traffic into the next century. A few months after the second terminal opened, it 
was announced that planning for a third terminal had already started and before too long 
the construction of it was under way.  On the other hand, it is interesting to note that, 
despite the sustained remarkable economic achievement, Singapore has a fairly high 
saving rate (namely, 46 per cent) and the world’s highest foreign reserves per capita (Tai 
and Tam, 1996).  Koh (1996, quoted in Ramakrishnan, 1998:10) argues that the 
geography of the island state is crucial in understanding the dominance of kiasuism in 
Singapore:  
Because of the geographical make-up: a small island with no natural resources, 
there is perennial focus on the vulnerability of Singapore as encouraged by the 
government. Every aspect of life in Singapore can be explained, or justified, by 
the frailty of this slice of Earth. This is why Singaporeans feel that they have to 
work harder. (This perennial focus on vulnerability) also plays a valid and vital 
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role in reminding people here not to take anything for granted. (Thus 
Singaporeans have) a psyche founded on a sense of never quite belonging, never 
being safe and secure. The absorption in ephemeral concerns, even selfishness 
and kiasuism, may spring from the mentality of wanting to make hay while the 
sun shines. 
 
This widespread phenomenon of siege mentality has to some extent reflected 
people’s precaution against any unexpected Weiji, or crises, which may be a desirable 
element in the crisis prevention and planning. Given the prevailing mentality in this 
particular environment, it is reasonable to assume that there should be some positive 
consequence among various companies in Singapore in terms of their extent of 
preparedness for a crisis.  
 
2.3.2 Crisis culture in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong is usually known for having a large number of risk-taking 
entrepreneurs and a general speculative attitude among its people.  As mentioned 
previously, people in Asia are generally averse to thinking about failure or something 
ominous.  However, it does not prevent them from taking a risk in an attempt to gain a 
profit and it does not contradict their mentality or propensity for risk-taking, especially 
among entrepreneurs.  They recognise and acknowledge the significant rewards that may 
result from taking risks to start a new business (McGrath et al., 1992).  It is found that 
Hong Kong government’s minimal intervention coupled with a British-style legal system 
had enabled business people in the territory to adapt to and capitalise on a wildly 
unpredictable business environment (Leung, 1998).  Fortune (Saporito, 1994) once 
described Hong Kong residents as well equipped to seize the numerous opportunities 
unfolding before them.  They possess more of the entrepreneurial energy and speed than 
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mangers and dealmakers in the West.  In effect, people’s business aspiration and profit-
seeking enthusiasm could probably be attributed in some way to their particular 
environment in the long past. Yu (1997:57) notes that Hong Kong was a British colony 
for more than 150 years. Under the colonial administration, the top positions in the civil 
service had long been dominated by British government expatriates, and the local 
Chinese had little chance to move up along the political ladder to the top-decision posts. 
As a result, the blocking of upward mobility through official channels in a colonial 
society had enabled the Chinese residents in Hong Kong to use economic mobility, such 
as starting a business of one’s own, as the most viable alternative (Lau, 1982, as quoted 
in Yu, 1997). 
Given that historical past, Hong Kongers have mostly developed a pragmatic 
orientation that emphasizes survival and growth by pursuing material gains.  After China 
and Britain officially signed the Joint Declaration in 1984 on the handover of Hong 
Kong’s sovereignty to China in 1997, many people in Hong Kong felt uncertain about 
their future and worried that the much of the freedom they had enjoyed in the British-
ruled colony might not continue once the territory was reverted to China, even though 
China had promised to preserve the territory’s political stability and autonomy for the 
next 50 years.  Much on account of such anxiety about the future, many Hong Kongers 
have grown to be more materialistic and pragmatic and attempted to accumulate wealth 
before 1997 (Cheung and Chow, 1999).  Many people believe that what they could do is 
to lose no time seeking opportunities to make money and get rich ahead of others.  Given 
the special historical background and uncertain transitional situation, “Hong Kong has a 
long tradition in favour of profit-seeking” (King, 1987:59; as quoted in Yu, 1997:50).  
Business people tend to adopt a short-term outlook in the particular context of “borrowed 
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place and borrowed time” (Hughes, 1968; as quoted in Yu, 1997:57).  They have grown a 
propensity of looking for the maximum gain in the shortest possible time (Yu, 1997).  All 
this has also reflected people’s mentality of actively seeking chances to get rich quickly 
at certain risk as well as people’s entrepreneurial spirit in some way. 
Singapore and Hong Kong are both dominated by the Chinese population (about 
77 per cent in the former and 98 per cent in the latter).  As a result, they are heavily 
influenced by traditional Chinese cultures.  As mentioned earlier, Hofstede and Bond 
(1988), in exploring the major factors contributing to the sustained economic growth of 
the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) including Singapore and Hong Kong, 
placed them in the same cluster of Chinese-based cultural values associated with the 
“Confucian Dynamism (CD)”, which derives from the teaching of Confucius and “deals 
with the time perspective in a society for the gratification of people’s needs” (Hofstede, 
1991:164).  A high CD society is one that stresses, among other things, hard work and 
long-term orientation while a low CD society is one in favour of gratifying needs here 
and now and adopts a short-term perspective.  This dimension evaluates national cultures 
based on whether the time-horizon for decisions to yield results is long or short.  Based 
on the ranking by Hofstede and Bond (1988) on the CD dimension, Hong Kong is ranked 
rather high with an index of 96 while Singapore is ranked well below Hong Kong with an 
index of 48. 
On the other hand, based on Hofstede’s research and categorization of cultural 
dimensions, Singapore and Hong Kong (as well as Taiwan) are found to share similar 
cultural values, assuming general characteristics of large power distance, weak or low 
uncertainty avoidance, collectivism and modest masculinity (Paik, et al., 1996:22).  Low 
uncertainty avoidance may also suggest that people in both Singapore and Hong Kong in 
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general have a relatively high tolerance of uncertainties or risks. They are likely to take 
risks and able to cope with ambiguity.  Although Singapore and Hong Kong are often 
assigned to the same cluster of cultural similarity (Ronen and Shankar, 1985), past 
studies including those by Paik and his colleagues (1996), Tai and Tam (1996), Taormina 
(1998), and Wilkinson (1996) have respectively observed in their studies that there still 
can be significant variations – people in Singapore, Hong Kong or Taiwan could also 
have their own different perceptions, values and practices in a variety of areas like 
business development and management, human resource management, and so on.   
 
2.4 Role of the government 
 As we know, a company’s operation and development will invariably be 
influenced by some factors arising from the environment in which it is operating.  Among 
those major environmental factors, the government’s role is always influential and should 
never be underestimated.  It is observed that the government in Singapore and Hong 
Kong has respectively played a significant, unique but non-identical role in each of its 
economic development in the past decades.   Invariably, the government’s role in each of 
the two places might have influenced the business companies in one way or another in 
terms of their crisis perceptions, CM philosophy and practices and some other aspects.  In 
the following sections, an attempt will be made to examine how the governments in 
Singapore and Hong Kong have functioned respectively in their economic development 
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2.4.1 Government in Singapore 
Over the past decades, Singapore has greatly attracted the world’s attention for its 
rapid and sustained economic development.  Numerous studies have reached a similar 
conclusion that much of the credit for the economic achievement has to be attributed to 
the strong role of the city-state’s government, without which the country would not 
possibly have been able to obtain such an outstanding accomplishment.  Khan (1997:97) 
has described it in the following: 
The qualitative impact of government’s predominance can be felt everywhere.  
The government in Singapore has in fact played the roles of goal-setter, producer, 
regulator, and fiscal agent, in addition to its traditional roles as the custodian of 
the nation.  While the rules of market mechanism remains paramount in 
Singapore, the government has interfered in a big way so as to ensure that the 
fruits of economic growth are more equally distributed. 
 
In illustrating the necessity and importance of the government’s interventionist 
policy for Singapore’s economic development, former Deputy Prime Minister of the city-
state Dr Goh Keng Swee (1976; as quoted by Khan, 1997:96) noted in the following 
statement:   
 …the laissez-faire policies of the colonial era had led Singapore to a dead 
end, with little economic growth, massive unemployment, wretched housing 
and inadequate education.  We had to try a more activist and interventionist 
approach.  The roles of the government are not only to perform the 
traditional roles of a government – defense, law and order, and to provide 
infrastructure for private enterprises – but also to participate actively in 
economic activities as well as to lay down clear guidelines to private sector 
as to what they could and should do. 
 
Therefore, in different periods of time over the past more than three decades, “the 
government pursued an active policy of industrialization and intervened heavily in the 
process” (Weder, 1999:81).  Specifically, it would take the initiatives in designing an 
overall economic blueprint, directing and orchestrating the economic advancement of the 
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city-state and implementing a host of pragmatic strategies and policies to ensure that the 
focus of the economic development in each different period of time is both in line with 
the market mechanism and, above all, can best benefit the country in its long run.  Khan 
(1997:97) puts it well that “the policy makers in Singapore however did ensure that the 
government intervention did not ignore the disciplining functions of the market.  
Moreover, the government intervention led to the reduction of uncertainty and risks of 
business through overall policy stability." 
For example, the Singaporean government has made active and intense efforts for 
more than 30 years to promote industrial development, of which manufacturing sector 
has been given a top priority.  Subsequently, the share of it in gross domestic product 
(GDP) increased remarkably from only 20 per cent in 1970 to almost 30 per cent in 1980 
and then stayed around 27 per cent in the 1990s (Kwong, 2001:6).    
Singapore is short of natural resources and meanwhile faces rising competitors 
from its neighbouring countries in the region.  To sustain steady economic growth, the 
Singapore government has always attached particular importance to effectively dealing 
with the changes and challenges and adopted a number of strategies to do so.  One of the 
priority strategies has been placed on the training and developing of the skills of 
workforce in order to improve their competence.  The government sets up training centers 
and technology institutes to improve the average skills and knowledge of the labour 
force.  It also provides various special subsidies for training programmes run by 
companies.  For example, the Economic Development Board (EDB), a government 
agency, launched a scheme that provides financial assistance to MNCs sending local 
employees abroad for apprenticeship training.  Through a levy on firms, a skill 
development fund (SDF) was established in 1979 to subsidize company-run training 
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programmes.  In the financial year of 1998, the SDF committed more than S$88 million 
in training grants but collected only S$20 million1. 
To boost the continued development of the target industries like those of 
electronics and petroleum and maintain the sustained economic growth as the overriding  
objective for the city-state, the government has in the past respectively introduced a wide 
range of preferential policies and incentives to attract foreign investment and spur the 
development of the local enterprises.  Part of the preferential policies and incentives 
include2: 
(1) Tax incentives for companies pioneering in new technologies and engaged in 
new development and expansion activities and R&D activities, etc; 
(2) Research and product development grants ranging from “New Technology 
Initiatives”, “Research and Development Assistance Scheme” to “Innovation 
Development Scheme”, etc;  
(3) Small company grants ranging from “Local Enterprise Finance Scheme”, 
Local Industrial Upgrading Programme”, “Small Industries Technical 
Assistance Scheme”, to “ISO 9000 Certification” and “Enterprise 
Collaboration Forum”; and  
(4) Local Industry Upgrading Programme (LIUP) which aims at upgrading and 
developing a local enterprise from a total business perspective. 
 
                                                 
1 In a speech by Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the launch of Manpower 21 on 31 August, 
1999, at Suntec City, Singaore. 
2 For detailed information, please refer to Singapore Economic Development Board’s (EDB) website at 
http://www.sedb.com, and also refer to Kwong, K.  2001.  Singapore: Dominance of multinational 
corporations.  In Kwong, et al. (Eds).  2001. Industrial Development in Singapore, Taiwan, and South 
Korea.  Singapore: World Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, pp. 27-33. 
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Apart from the wide range of incentive and assistance programmes, the Singapore 
government has always reacted promptly and actively in times of economic adversity, 
allocating large amounts of extra funds with a series of special relief measures to help 
enterprises and public to tide over difficult times, as evidenced during the Asian financial 
crisis between 1997 and 1998 and the current worldwide economic downturn following 
the September 11 terrorist attack of New York.  For example, faced with the backsliding 
economic situation worse than that in the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, the Singapore 
government launched a US$6.3 billion off-budget package in October 2001 to help 
enterprises and people deal with the economic downturn, in contrast to the US$1.9 billion 
worth relief package provided by the Hong Kong government.  Furthermore, the senior 
civil service officers and members of the parliament (MPs) in Singapore take initiative to 
have their pay cut by 10 per cent for 12 months (Xiao, et al., 2001). 
All those government assistance policies and incentives as well as their 
extraordinary relief measures at the particular time of adversity may help in some way 
motivate business companies to step up their efforts in preparing themselves to cope with 
uncertainties and adversities as well as improve on their operation and management 
standard as a whole. 
Based on his study on Singapore government’s role in bringing about the 
remarkable economic accomplishments, Khan (1997) analyses the reasons why the 
Singapore government’s intervention is so successful.  He observes that it is not the 
government intervention per se that distinguishes the city-state from other less developed 
countries but it is the effectiveness of state intervention and quality of interventionist 
measures that made the crucial difference.   
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 Apparently, the Singapore government’s consistent and proactive intervention has 
worked successfully in transforming the city-state into a developed country today.  
Consequently, the government’s attitude towards the economic and industrial 
development and its wide range of preferential policies and incentives available for 
upgrading the management of companies might have to some extent influenced the way 
the companies operate in terms of their operation and management.  For example, given 
the relatively stable domestic social and political environment and the wide range of 
financial assistance schemes aimed at helping companies train their employees and 
upgrade their operation and management, many companies might possibly be motivated 
to proactively prepare for crises as they might find it not too difficult or expensive. 
 
2.4.2 Government in Hong Kong 
 As another of the “Four Asian Dragons” (Khan, 1997:88), Hong Kong is similar 
to Singapore in that it has also captured the attention of a large number of scholars, 
business people and policy makers worldwide.  In comparison, however, the government 
in Hong Kong has played a significantly different but unique role in its own economic 
accomplishment. 
Unlike the Singapore government with its consistently extensive interventionist 
role, the government of Hong Kong is nevertheless found to have chosen a “hands-off” 
approach, which has been proved over the past decades to be equally successful in 
ensuring the fast and sustained economic development of the territory in the past.  Based 
on his research, Kwong (2001) notes that the most important factor underlying the 
territory’s economic robustness is perhaps the flexibility of the market mechanism, which 
has spurred growth in the prosperous years, and prompted quick recovery in the 
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depressed ones.  Various studies haven come up with a similar finding that Hong Kong’s 
development pattern is characterized by a high dependence on small and adaptable 
entrepreneurs to find new business opportunities and a minimal involvement of the 
government in production and therefore may be described as the result of entrepreneurial 
capitalism (Pang, 1988, as quoted by Yu, 1997:55).   
Indeed, except in land and housing, government intervention in economic affairs 
of Hong Kong has been minimal in the past.  This philosophy has been described as 
“positive non-interventionism” by the former financial secretary of the territory, Sir 
Philip Friedman (1976, as quoted in Yu. 1997:5) as a classic illustration of the benefits of 
free market policy.  The intention of this positive non-interventionism was to allow 
people to pursue economic goals in a largely unfettered way (Yu, 1997).  On the other 
hand, Hong Kong is widely known for having a large number of risk-taking entrepreneurs 
and a general speculative attitude among its people, as mentioned and discussed earlier.  
They recognize and acknowledge the significant rewards that may result from taking 
risks to start a new business (McGrath et al., 1992, as cited in Cheung and Chow, 
1999:373).  
Some scholars observed that East Asian NIEs like Singapore, South Korea, and 
Taiwan have employed various instruments to channel capital for developing selected 
industries and effecting technological changes.  They “have redirected huge amounts of 
resources away from the market and into projects that were favoured by the government” 
(Kwong, 2001:236).  In laissez-faire Hong Kong, however, a higher than desirable 
proportion of the economy’s investment goes into quick-return speculative economic 
activities (Kwong, 2001).   
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Hong Kong is often described as a capitalist paradise and generally regarded as 
the last bastion of laissez-faire by free market economists (Rabushka, 1979; and 
Woronoff, 1980, as cited in Yu, 1997:58).  The traditional philosophy of the 
government’s public finance can be evidenced from the famous statement made by the 
former Financial Secretary of the Colony, Sir John Cowperthwaite (Hong Kong 
Government Secretariat, 1963, as quoted in Yu. 1997:58): 
Let money fructify in the pockets of taxpayers.  Government should not presume 
to tell any businessman and industrialist what he should do or should not do; 
attempts to frustrate the operation of market forces will tend to damage the 
growth rate of the economy.  
 
Consequently, the laissez-faire government in Hong Kong has mainly provided 
social stability and created an environment to facilitate the industrial development and 
enable business people to exploit opportunities.  Particularly in manufacturing industries, 
the government, unlike its Singapore counterpart that actively provides well-designed 
directive guidelines with various incentives, has played only “a catalytic role” for 
development by motivating the people to exercise their entrepreneurial spirit (Soon 
1994:144, as quoted in Yu, 1997:161).  In the early 1990s the territory’s per capita GDP 
surpassed that of her colonial parent Britain and at the time of the historic handover Hong 
Kong was the eighth largest trading economy in the world (Ellis, 1999).  
From the mid-1980s, Hong Kong witnessed a rapid decline in the role of 
manufacturing.  The process of deindustrialisation and industrial restructuring has 
gradually transformed the territory into a leading trading and financial center.  As a 
result, the share of manufacturing in the territory’s GDP dropped drastically from 34 per 
cent in 1978 to nine per cent only in 1996 (Kwong, 2001), which is in striking contrast to 
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the development trend of Singapore’s manufacturing sector.3  There was even more 
marked shift in Hong Kong’s employment patterns.  Jobs in manufacturing sector 
dropped from over one million in 1981 (41 per cent of the workforce) to 750,000 in 1990  
 (28 per cent) to 590,000 by 1993, while service employment increased from 47 to 79 per 
cent of the total workforce between 1981 and 1990 (Rowley and Fitzgerald, 1999).  The 
territory’s economy has nowadays become increasingly service-oriented.  Clearly, the 
flexibility of the market mechanism, not the government intervention, has made it 
possible for a smooth transition from a manufacturing economy to a service economy in 
the past decade.  “The market has served Hong Kong well.  Hong Kong has the 
foundation that allows free flow of resources and nurtures entrepreneurial activities 
(Kwong, 2001:238).”  
Regarding the actual role of government in economic development, Luedde-
Neurath (1988:103, as cited in Yu, 1997:160) identifies two kinds of government 
intervention, that is, promotional and directive.  The former aims to restore markets to 
their proper function.  It does well in creating a favourable environment and providing 
public goods such as infrastructure, education, etc., which cannot be supplied efficiently 
by private markets.  The latter aims to achieve predetermined results through conscious 
interference, along with market forces and selective application of incentives and/or 
controls.  Based on Leudde-Neurath’s categorization as well as the discussion above, 
readers can easily see the role of Singapore government appears to be more of “directive” 
while the Hong Kong government’s role is more of “promotional”.  The difference of 
government functions and roles in economic and industrial development will invariably 
                                                 
3 As mentioned previously, the share of manufacturing sector in Singapore’s GDP rose from 20 per cent in 
1970 to nearly 30 per cent in 1980 and then maintained at around 27 per cent in the 1990s (Kwong, 2001). 
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influence the way of business operation and management and, likewise, may influence 
companies’ perception of, preparation for and reaction to various crises.  
 
2.5 News media in Singapore and Hong Kong 
Media relations is a crucial and integral part of public relations and corporate 
communications, and good CM requires skillful application of principles and techniques 
of public relations and corporate communications in dealing with news media.  On the 
one hand, the media coverage is often one of the major factors transforming an incident 
into a crisis and therefore media are often blamed for the way they outbid one another or 
offer interpretations or value judgments and sometimes even quite simply for their 
description of reality (Ogrizek and Guillery, 1999).  Nelkin (1988) notes that the media 
frequently become highly influential interpreters of crises by filtering or framing their 
perspectives, with a tendency to reinforce existing public biases.  In terms of a company’s 
CM and corporate communications, news media serves not only as one of the important 
stakeholders or audiences, but also as a crucial instrument for the organisation to reach 
and communicate with its other stakeholders.  Effective communication with news media 
at normal times will definitely help an organisation at times of crisis to reduce 
misunderstanding from the stakeholders and also reduce the magnitude of damage and 
loss in several other aspects.  Therefore, proactive managers who are aware of this will 
probably take initiatives to establish and maintain a good relationship with them prior to 
any crises and make a good use of them during crises.  Such managers will also be 
sensitive to the different characteristics of the media in general across countries.  
On the other hand, the prevailing practices of the news media in a particular 
society may also in one way or another influence the business executives in their 
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perceptions of the media’s professional feature or style and subsequently influence their 
perceptions of and attitude towards the media’s roles for their organisations’ CM 
practices.  In the next section, I review the general characteristics and influences of news 
media in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
2.5.1 News media in Singapore 
Singapore’s infrastructure in media and communication technologies is well 
developed and among the most advanced in the region. People in Singapore have an easy 
access to a fairly wide variety of newspapers, magazines, radio and television 
programmes.  
At present, there are about 10 local daily newspapers in the four main languages 
including the English The Straits Times, Business Times, The New Paper, and the 
Chinese Lianhe Zaobao, Lianhe Wanbao, and Shinmin Daily News, with a total 
combined circulation amounting to nearly 1.2 million people (Foo, 2001:196).  The most 
influential newspapers are the English Straits Times and Chinese Lianhe Zaobao.  All the 
newspapers except Today are published by the Singapore Press Holdings (SPH), which is 
the only print media group, or a monopoly, with strong links to the government.  The 
SPH is currently operating and managing its newspapers in two major divisions: one for 
English and Malay newspapers and the other for the Chinese newspapers. Most of the 
newspapers provide their electronic version on internet. 
Apart from the local newspapers and magazines, readers can also find about 4,500 
foreign publications, journals and magazines (Singapore Yearbook 1998, 1999:243).  As 
of the end of 2000, there were 227 accredited correspondents and photographers/ 
soundmen based in the city-state representing nearly 70 foreign news and agencies, news 
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magazines, newspapers and broadcasting stations from countries throughout the world 
(Singapore Facts and Pictures, 2001:195). 
Concurrently, there are seven television channels run by the two local media 
players.  Media Corporation Singapore, or MediaCorp, is the biggest broadcaster in 
Singapore owning and operating five of the seven TV channels and publishing one 
tabloid Today.  Another broadcaster is MediaWorks, which is a relatively new subsidiary 
of SPH and operates the remaining two channels of TV programmes.  Apart from the 
seven local television channels, residents can also watch a few television channels of 
programming broadcast by its neighbouring countries like Malaysia and Indonesia.  
Meanwhile, residents can now subscribe to more than 40 channels of international 
programmes from StarHub, a Singapore-based info-communications company that 
provides a full range of information, communications, entertainment services over fixed, 
mobile and internet platforms.  In addition to television, there are about 20 radio stations 
operated by four local broadcasters, the biggest of which is MediaCorp running 11 local 
and three international radio stations. 
To cater to the audience from different communities, local radio and television 
programmes are broadcast in four languages – English, Chinese, Malay and Tamil, 
though a majority of the programmes are in English and Chinese.  Efforts have been 
made by the local media operators to maintain a balance of news, information and 
entertainment programmes to satisfy the needs of general public in a multiracial and 
multilingual society. 
As a whole, both television and radio programmes have a very high penetration in 
the city state, with 98 per cent of the population watching television on a weekly basis 
and 77 per cent of adults listening to radio on a daily basis (Stravens, 1996). 
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Generally speaking, news media are under close monitoring and control by the 
government with comprehensive and stringent media laws and regulations in force.  In 
addition to the government legislation, media organisations all have their own sets of in-
house rules to make sure that their journalists behave in accordance with the professional 
practices acceptable in the society.  Any attempt to use the news media to sensationalise 
ethnic issues in the multiracial society, undermine the social and political stability and 
national security, or cause misunderstanding between Singapore and its neighbours is 
seriously dealt with.  As a result, journalists in Singapore have generally found to be well 
self-disciplined, performing, well within the stipulated limits, their professional duties of 
informing, instructing and entertaining the general public in the small island country.  
Both individual journalists and news organisations have consciously exercised self-
censorship in their daily practices.  Consequently, unethical journalist activities such as 
paparazzi acts, fabrication or sensationalisation of news stories are rare.  Compared with 
their counterparts in Hong Kong that have often emphasized the freedom of speech and 
press and resorted to all means to outbid each other for an increase of readership and 
circulation, they may be seen by some observers to be relatively tame.   
 
2.5.2 New media in Hong Kong  
Like Singapore, Hong Kong’s media and communication infrastructure is also 
among the most developed in Asia.  However, its media have a greater variety in both 
number and content.  The territory has more than 70 daily newspapers, over 600 
periodicals, two private television companies broadcasting four channels, a subscription 
television service, an Asian regional satellite television service (i.e., Star TV) with five 
channels, one public or government-funded radio-television station with seven radio 
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channels and shared usage of all four television channels, and two commercial radio 
stations with six channels (Martin, 1996). 
In this territory of nearly seven million people with 98 per cent of the residents 
being Chinese, most of the newspapers and the many periodicals are in the Chinese 
language and English publications account for only about five per cent of circulation 
(Euromonitor Plc, 1994).  Of the Chinese language daily newspapers, 33 cover mostly 
general local and international news, three are chiefly financial news and the rest cover 
entertainment and gossip (Martin, 1996:62).  The most influential or popular daily 
newspapers include the Chinese Ming Pao Daily News, Sing Tao Daily,  Oriental Daily 
News, and Apple Daily, and the English South China Morning Post, Hong Kong 
Economic Times, and Hong Kong Standard.  The readership level in Hong Kong is high, 
with three out of four people reading a newspaper on an average day (Martin, 1996). 
Despite the high level of newspaper readership among the Hong Kong residents, 
television viewing is found to be the first choice for most people as leisure time activity, 
with 96 per cent of the residents tuning in during any 24-hour period (Martin, 1996:57).  
In fact, “the television penetration reached 98 per cent” as early as in 1980s (Chan et al., 
1997:465).  Most of the local television programmes are locally produced by Television 
Broadcasts (TVB) and Asia Television Limited (ATV).  All the television programmes 
are broadcast in English, Chinese and Cantonese, which is today still preferred as the 
most popular communication medium among the residents in the territory, though a 
majority of them are in Cantonese.  News and information are an important part of the 
programming on all channels (Martin, 1997:59), though entertainment programming is 
found to take up most of the time.  In fact, entertainment programmes are used by all 
broadcasters as a crucial means to expand and strengthen their audience share. 
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Apart from television, there are about 15 radio channels, as of 1996, broadcast in 
Hong Kong, including seven from Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) and three by 
Hong Kong Commercial Broadcasting Company (Martin, 1996:60). Radio programming 
has a coverage rate up to 47 per cent (Martin, 1996:57). 
Compared with most other countries in the region, Hong Kong enjoys media 
freedom and has been a major publishing centre in the region.  It is worth noting that the 
news media in the territory have continued to operate much the same way as they did 
prior to Hong Kong’s historic handover on July 1, 1997 and “freedom of press continues 
to thrive” ever since (Ching, 2000:154). 
On the other hand, Hong Kong’s media organisations are mostly privately owned 
and the competition among the mass media has been very fierce all the time.  The past 
decade has witnessed severe price wars a few times among the local newspapers, with 
birth of several new newspapers and the demise of quite a few others as a result.  The 
high competition among the media players with the government’s persistent laissez-faire 
approach in its administration seems to have given journalists much room to play their 
role in a much more bold or aggressive way, compared with the cautious journalists in 
Singapore.  Meanwhile, extreme commercialism is found to prompt some news 
organisations to resort to sensational reporting with the pretext of satisfying public’s 
needs (Chan, et al., 1997:463).  Meanwhile, paparazzi reporting practices as well as 
excessive sensationalisation of news events are not uncommon (Zhang, 2002).  
Consequently, the credibility of news media in Hong Kong has shown a decline over the 
past decade.  According to a recent opinion survey conducted by University of Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong Economic Journal, as quoted in Lianhe Zaobao, April 21, 2001, p.30), 
Hong Kong’s media are ranked lower than their counterparts in Singapore and Japan in 
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terms of the public credibility and sense of responsibility, though its media enjoy the 
most freedom among the Asian countries. 
 
2.6 Summary 
The status of Singapore and Hong Kong companies’ preparedness for dealing 
with crises has remained nebulous.  Although there exist opposite views regarding this 
central research issue, businesses in Asia as a whole have in the past often been described 
as not well prepared for dealing with crises primarily due to cultural factors.  Meanwhile, 
companies’ crisis perceptions and preparedness may possibly be influenced by some 
factors arising from the environment in which companies are operating and developing.  
Among other things, they may include the government’s role and media influence.  This 
chapter has examined and compared those relevant factors in each of the two places.  
Singapore and Hong Kong both have a high proportion of ethnic Chinese people and are 
therefore permeated with influences of traditional Chinese culture.  On the other hand, 
the government in each society has played an important but unique role in its prominent 
economic growth.  In the course of economic development, they have proved generally 
successful in reaching the same destination by different routes.  Moreover, the media 
differ in terms of aggressiveness.  All those relevant aspects in the environment are 
believed to be capable of exerting certain impacts on the companies in the two places in 








This chapter presents a conceptual framework for the current study and all the 
specific hypotheses associated with the general research questions brought up in the first 
chapter.  The proposed conceptual framework attempts to define the composition of the 
important construct of crisis preparedness and meanwhile propose its relationship with a 
number of possible explanatory or predicting factors which are associated with the 
organisational and environmental characteristics and the perceptions of managers in the 
organisation as well.  In effect, the proposed conceptual framework serves as the scope 
and focus of the current study. 
 
3.1 Conceptual framework 
As discussed in the first chapter, companies’ preparations for crisis can be gauged 
by some major indicators such as a general crisis management (CM) plan, a written CM 
plan ready as the action guideline, a CM team/unit or task force set up for coordinating 
and integrating the action across the organisation in time of emergency, and regular drills 
for staff/employees across the organisation at normal times to prepare them for handling 
crisis situations.  In fact, a company’s crisis preparedness can also be reflected to some 
extent from the top management’s perceptions and mentality regarding crises and CM 
(Reilly, 1987) and from the corporate culture that prevails across the whole organisation 
as well (Mitroff, 1990).  However, top management’s awareness and mentality regarding 
crisis and CM or the corporate culture of crisis would be very difficult, if not impossible, 
to operationalise and measure in a study because they very often rely heavily on 
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individuals’ perceptions and therefore could be very subjective or even personally biased, 
which could probably result in considerably disparity from one individual to another. In 
other words, different individuals in an organisation are likely to demonstrate very 
different perceptions of the same issue such as their organisational culture regarding 
crisis prevention and preparation or their top management’s attitude towards or mentality 
concerning crises and CM, because their criteria or benchmark for the issue may differ 
from one individual to another.    
Nevertheless, those specific and important indicators representing an overall level 
of crisis preparedness of an organisation are in fact capable of reflecting to a large extent 
both the top management’s perception and mentality of crises and CM and the corporate 
crisis culture.  This is because those specific organisational measures are difficult to come 
by or keep operational and updated without the continued support and direct involvement 
of the top management in an organisation (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993; and Remsik, 
1999).  Likewise, a conducive and desirable corporate crisis culture cannot be possibly 
cultivated or prevail without some specific prevention mechanism in place and regular 
preparatory practices and drills executed.  Therefore, it is not difficult to infer that behind 
those specific and crucial components of integrated construct of overall crisis 
preparedness there actually stand the indispensable support and involvement of the top 
management and also the favourable corporate culture for addressing the issues of CM. 
Based on the discussion in the first chapter and analysis above, four specific 
indicators, namely, a general plan for crises, a written CM plan, a CM team or task force 
and regular drills for employees, are therefore chosen in this study to comprise an 
integrated but measurable construct representing a company’s overall crisis preparedness. 
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Each component included in this integrated construct of companies’ overall crisis 
preparedness is explicit, concrete and observable.  The construct is integrated because it 
is composed of four individual elements and none of them seems to be able to outweigh 
the others distinctly in terms of the priority and sequential order.  The four crucial 
ingredients are frequently mentioned and emphasized by both academics and 
practitioners, as evidenced in the CM literature.  However, hardly any attempts are found 
to rank or prioritise them in respect to their importance in the whole CM repertoire.  This 
study takes the four integral components to represent the overall crisis preparedness in an 
organisation.  Therefore, the synthesized construct is to serve as the crucial dependent 
variable throughout the following sections and chapters of this dissertation. 
Earlier research has shown that the success of companies’ CM hinges on three 
categories of factors:  organisational, environmental, and human perceptions or attitudes 
(Barton, 2001; Mitroff, 1993; Pearson and Clair, 1998, Reilly, 1987; and Wisenblit, 
1989).  Specifically speaking, a company’s crisis preparedness may possibly be 
influenced by such factors as the organisation’s prior experiences with crisis, its size and 
operational length, ownership status.  Managers’ perceptions of and attitude towards CM 
issues also influence the CM in their companies.  Meanwhile, CM may also be affected 
by environmental or societal factors, the government’s policies towards industry, the 
news media’s reporting practices and approaches, and the prevailing culture. 
For this study, a conceptual framework indicating the possible correlation of 
companies’ overall level of crisis preparedness with a total of 10 of explanatory or 
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Figure 3.1  Conceptual Framework for Relationship Between Company’s Crisis 
Preparedness and Its Relevant Predicting Factors 
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3.2 Research hypotheses 
Based on the conceptual framework illustrated above and the analyses in the 
previous chapters, a total of ten specific hypotheses will next be deduced corresponding 
to each of those influential factors as shown in the figure. They are all associated with the 
first two general research question brought up in the first chapter. In addition, another 
two hypotheses associated with the third and fourth research question of this thesis will 
be proposed right after. 
 
3.2.1 Prior crisis experience 
Although past studies have revealed some contradictory implications as to 
whether a company’s prior crisis experience has a positive or negative impact on its 
present level of crisis preparedness, some studies do have indicated that “organisations 
which have experienced crisis in the past should exhibit greater readiness for future 
crises” (Reilly, 1987: 83).  Some past studies conclude that crisis experience enhances the 
organisation’s ability to both participate in the prevention process and responding to 
warnings as well (Mileti and Sorensen, 1987).  Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
prior experiences with crisis might likely help a company come to see more clearly the 
necessity and importance of making adequate preparations for crisis in advance, thus 
increasing the company’s level of crisis readiness as a whole.  This is primarily because 
crisis experiences, not necessarily direct encountering, may help people learn how 
damaging or disastrous a crisis could be to an organisation and also what it is really 
meant by adequate preparations for crises in a real situation.  A survey found that the 
Union Carbide disaster occurring in 1988 in Bhopal, India became an impetus prompting 
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many companies to develop crisis plans or improve on their earlier ones (Wisenblit, 
1989).  
The assumption that prior experiences help in CM also appears to be in 
conformity with the proponents of organisational learning, which asserts that an 
organisation coming through a crisis should have acquired knowledge about how to 
respond to new crises in future, thus improving on its level of readiness for future crisis 
(Argyris and Schon, 1978).  Therefore, prior experience with crisis is proposed as a 
significant factor in this study to influence, in a positive way, companies’ crisis 
preparedness no matter whether they are in Singapore or Hong Kong, and hence the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  Companies that have experienced a crisis in the past will appear to 
be better prepared for crisis than those that have never 
experienced any crisis before.  
 
3.2.2 Size of company  
A large proportion of the past research on the relationship between organisational 
size and various organisational outcomes including capability to cope with crisis also 
reveals conflicting implications regarding the dependence of a company’s crisis readiness 
on its organisational size (Reilly, 1987 and Wisenblit, 1989).  Some research suggests 
that increasing size may result in decreasing crisis preparedness (Reilly, 1987).  As we 
know, a company usually grows along with an increasing number of employees, 
expanding market shares, more variety of products, and more earnings.  At the same time, 
its growth and success may probably draw more attention from competitors and from 
customers and other relevant stakeholders.  When it is hit by a crisis, a large company 
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may probably produce a greater impact on its environment in many aspects than a small 
company. 
Nevertheless, a large organisation may in its path of development suffer from 
cumulative control loss (Williamson, 1975), which could considerably constrain their 
communication and information ability (Reilly, 1987) and also lessen its capability to 
respond to uncertainties.  Meanwhile, Hannan and Freeman (1977, as cited in Reilly, 
1987) argue that, in comparison with small firms, large organisations are more likely to 
display structural inertia; and thus be less able to respond quickly to an emergency 
situation.  Moreover, Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) notice that large companies are more 
likely to have a false sense of security, and harbour arrogant beliefs that they are so big 
and powerful that nothing could damage them. The arrogant belief “could nonetheless 
help to cause a crisis that will bring them down (Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990: 86).” 
In contrast, there is other research on the association of the size with various 
organisational outcomes suggesting that big organisations may be more prepared for 
crisis (Reilly, 1987).  Wisenblit’s (1989) survey of 166 firms in the United States reveals 
that larger companies have both the need and resources to be better prepared for crisis 
while smaller companies have the need but often lack the resources for the purpose of 
CM.  Apparently, the size and resources of a company affect its capability of dealing with 
crisis (Barton, 1993).  With those valuable resources, large companies may be able to 
have a better strategic planning and institutional preparations than small companies for 
coping with changes and uncertainties in their environment.  They may be more likely to 
come up with better organisational structures and operational procedures for a sound 
system of crisis prevention and management. Their advantages arising from the large size 
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coupled with more needed resources may enable them to enhance their capability for 
responding to crisis, thus increasing their standard of crisis readiness. 
In order to measure the existing relationship between companies’ overall crisis 
preparedness and their size in the two regions respectively, the following hypothesis is 
thus proposed: 
Hypothesis 2:  Companies’ crisis preparedness will differ due to their size in 
terms of employee number.  Large companies are better 
prepared for crisis than small ones. 
 
3.2.3 Age of companies 
It is reasonable to assume that the longer a company has been in operation, the 
more likely it is to either directly experience a crisis or closely observe others’ in an 
emergency situation.  Older companies may have more opportunities than younger 
companies to see the harmfulness from a crisis by direct experiences or others’ crisis 
encountering and thus put in more efforts for better preparations.  The organisation can 
presumably learn and also benefit from the relevant experiences for its better 
management and development.  Furthermore, in comparison with younger companies, 
older companies may acquire more advantages through their years of organisational 
learning activities, which may in turn enable their managers to take on a better position to 
find out and address their organisations’ vulnerabilities and potential risks related to their 
own business operation and development.  Consequently, it will enhance and/or raise the 
organisational capability to respond to a crisis as a whole. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
for the companies from Singapore and Hong Kong as follows: 
Hypothesis 3:  Older companies are better prepared for crisis than younger ones.   
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3.2.4 Ownership status 
Past empirical studies have suggested different types of company ownership may 
produce a certain impact on their managerial choices and they have also consistently 
demonstrated a positive linkage between uncertainties companies may anticipate and the 
proactive strategies they may adopt (Tan, 2002).  The positive impact of a large 
organisation in relation to its crisis preparedness as discussed above may also apply well 
in a multinational corporation (MNC) and tend to make people believe that an MNC, 
with its wealth and varied experiences, teams of professionals and talents and other 
needed resources, should be competent in dealing with uncertainties and risks.  
Moreover, management literature has shown that a multinational parent company can 
exercise effective control over the affairs of its overseas subsidiaries through several 
dimensions including financial controls, operating controls, procedures and policies, and 
executive appointment (Sethi, 1987). 
Barton (1993) points out that the managers of MNCs have had to grapple with a 
sharp increase in the number of threats targeting their operations in recent years.  The 
continual expansion of business across country boundaries may invariably result in 
exposing an MNC to the threats of more potential accidents and crises in different 
environments along its stretched fronts and amid its processes of business transactions 
and operations.  In comparison with non-MNCs, they have a special burden in the sense 
that crisis can cause a greater impact on the relationship of their stakeholders.  MNCs are 
generally perceived as bearing a heavier responsibility in society and also receiving more 
attention or pressures from its stakeholders, which might in turn prompt its top 
management to attach more importance to CM so as to ensure its smooth operation and 
management under all circumstances.  For example, Shrivistava and his colleagues 
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(1988) argue that chief executives of MNCs have a responsibility not only for coping 
internally with the technical and organisational problems of crisis but also with 
intercultural and international consequences.  All this may make the managers of MNCs 
realise all the more importance and urgency of building a sound system of CM.  In its 
nutshell, as Mitroff and Pearson (1993: 125) point out, CM requires the corporation to 
realise its moral and social responsibility to internal and external stakeholders, society, 
and even the global environment. 
No CM literature has been found specifically addressing the dependence of 
companies’ overall crisis preparedness on its ownership status or on the difference 
between MNCs and non-MNCs.  Nevertheless, it would be of special significance to 
explore and examine the potential association, if any, in this aspect.  Hence, the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4:  MNCs will show a higher level of crisis preparedness than local 
non-MNCs. 
 
3.2.5 Industrial sector of company 
Earlier research on CM found that companies’ crisis preparedness is associated 
with the industry in which companies operate, and a higher percentage of utilities and 
transportation companies were found to have CM planning and other relevant 
preparations than companies in other industries (Wisenblit, 1989).  In reality, the crisis 
potential of companies differs with the specific types of technologies the companies use 
and the nature of their products, services and customers (Shrivastava and Mitroff, 1987), 
and certain types of organisations have a higher probability of crisis risk than others 
(Barton, 1993).  For example, more crises have been found to befall companies in public 
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transportation and banking and financial sectors than in others sectors like, say, industrial 
materials and consulting service sectors (Wisenblit, 1989).  In other words, companies’ 
probability of encountering a crisis appears to be closely related to the very sector in 
which they are operating.  Oftentimes, the high degree of crisis probability is largely 
attributed to some special nature or characteristics of the particular industry, as often 
displayed in the products and/or services, and also the operation process. 
As a result, companies operating in an industry characterized by recurring threats 
or crises may naturally come across more chances of either direct experience of crisis or 
observed behaviour of their industry competitors undergoing crises situations, both of 
which may serve as a learning process for companies in that particular industry, thus 
probably prompting the organisations in high risk industries to make more preparations 
for responding to any crisis in an efficient way. 
Based on his long years of review and observation of several hundreds of crisis 
cases in the United States of America, Barton (1993 and 2001) has categorized 
enterprises and organisations across various industries/sectors into three major groups in 
terms of their susceptibility to organisational crisis.1   The three major industries or 
industrial sectors are labeled as “High Risk, Medium Risk, and Low Risk” indicating the 
different likelihood of crisis befalling the organisations operating in each of the three 
contexts.  In this study, the industrial sector was thereby operationalised for companies in 
Singapore and Hong Kong as an explanatory or predicting variable with three discrete 
scales each corresponding to one of Barton’s three risk category groups.  
                                                 
1 Please refer to Appendix A for the 43rd question in the 6th section of the questionnaire.  The question was 
designed based on the risk category classification table listed by Barton (1993: 65-66).  
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In order to examine whether and how the overall crisis preparedness of companies 
in both Singapore and Hong Kong is associated with the particular industrial sector in 
which it operates, it is thereby hypothesised that: 
Hypothesis 5: Companies’ crisis preparedness will differ due to the industrial 
sector in which they are operating.  Companies in a higher risk 
sector will appear to be better prepared than those in a lower risk 
sector.  
 
3.2.6 Managers’ perceived likelihood of crisis 
Past research has looked into the links between business executives’ perceptions 
of crisis or risk and their organisations’ CM preparations (Pearson and Clair, 1998).  
Mitroff and Pauchant (1990) once noted that how senior business executives thought 
about and reacted to the possibility of a major crisis happening to them and their 
organisations could provide a valuable channel for the CM studies.  In many cases, 
perceptions of top management determine cultural beliefs in the organisation about the 
value and need for CM (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992).  It has been argued on the basis of 
rational organisational behaviour assumptions that an organisation which perceives a high 
likelihood of encountering a crisis would react to it by deploying relevant resources to 
prepare for the unwelcome event, thus increasing its crisis preparedness (Reilly, 1987).  
As managers, they are supposed to scan and monitor the environment closely and 
evaluate the relevant environmental factors in a timely manner so as to manage and 
ensure the smooth operation and steady development of their organisations.  When 
managers come across a situation in which they perceive a high likelihood of crisis 
occurrence, they may, driven by their duties and responsibilities, and/or even human 
instinct, tend to take action attempting to make some necessary preparations for the 
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difficult situation.  This is because crises are often thought of by managers as occasions 
to demonstrate their competence, according to Kielser and Sproull (1982).  When 
managers react in an attempt to deal with a perceived imminent threat, their 
organisations’ crisis preparedness may be expected to increase as a whole, depending on 
how many resources they have available and how much effort they have actually made.  
From their interview with 350 business executives, Mitroff and Pauchant (1990:14) 
notice that if the individual executives are especially prone to accidents and crisis so that 
they are labeled “accident prone”, their organisations are mostly likely the same. 
To examine the possible relationship between the overall crisis preparedness of 
companies in the two regions under study and their managers’ or key executives’ 
perceived likelihood of the potential crisis, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 6:  Companies’ crisis preparedness level will be positively related to 
their managers’ perception of the likelihood of crisis occurring to 
their organisations.  The higher likelihood they perceive of a crisis 
occurrence, the better prepared their companies will be.   
 
3.2.7 Organisational people’s knowledge about their role in a crisis event 
In order for a company to be well prepared for crisis, the important task and 
responsibility should not be confined only to a certain functional department, unit, office 
or a particular manager of an organisation.  In effect, good CM should involve all the 
people throughout the organisation.  It is especially important to fully involve all of the 
top management in an organisation in order to make the whole CM system successful.  
Without being properly informed of the preparations for crisis responses, managers or 
other key employees will not be able to deal with the occurrence of unanticipated threats 
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and their efforts to respond to an emergency situation will be short-circuited by the lack 
of needed information (Reilly, 1987).  Ideally, it is only with the participation and 
dedication of the whole organisational members, top management and ordinary 
employees alike, can an organisation expect to build a high standard of CM system and 
maintain a really high level of preparedness for crisis all the time.   In other words, as a 
company develops its CM system and increases its crisis preparedness standard, it 
becomes imperative to account more and more on the support and participation of the 
whole staff, whether senior executives or ordinary employees, for its complete success.  
For example, a company that has only a general plan for crisis or written CM plan may 
not necessarily get the involvement of the whole staff so much as other companies that 
not only have the plans but also set up a CM team and moreover conduct regular drills 
among the staff.  Through the overall preparatory practices and measures as in the latter 
type of companies, the people across the organisation tend to have more opportunities to 
learn about their role and responsibility not only in a crisis event but also in the whole 
CM system.  In other words, as a proactive company substantially increases its 
preparedness level, not only those people specially in charge of the particular CM work, 
but also other people across the organisation, whether from the top management or from 
ordinary staff, tend to have more opportunities to familiarise themselves with their 
responsibilities and thus become increasingly knowledgeable about his role in a crisis 
situation, knowing how to react and behave properly amid an emergency event.  Based on 
the reasoning and analysis above, it is thus proposed: 
Hypothesis 7:   Companies’ crisis preparedness will be positively related to the 
level of their organisational members’ awareness of their role in a 
crisis event.  
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3.2.8 Impact of government’s role 
Business companies’ operation and development will be invariably restricted or 
affected by their environmental factors, of which government’s role is often counted as a 
critical one.  For example, a laissez-faire government might turn out to be helpful in some 
way to business companies in cultivating their entrepreneurial spirit and risk-taking 
propensity in their business management and development, as evidenced in Hong Kong.  
Companies under a laissez-faire government may perceive that the government’s policy 
towards crisis response and preparedness is “hands-off”. Given the unpredictable and 
inevitable nature of crises and the changing environment, companies may find it very 
costly and impractical to prepare themselves for crises. They may also give up on making 
any efforts in CM because there is no perceived support from external bodies, such as the 
government. They may become resigned and believe that it is beyond their control to 
prevent and prepare for any crisis.  Their business instinct and experience may often 
prompt them to calculate their expected profits with possible risks they can tolerate while 
neglecting crisis preparations.  On the other hand, a more interventionist government may 
spur companies to manage and develop their businesses in a more rational and/or 
conventional way and also lead them to prefer to a risk-averse approach for their business 
operation, thus often ending up in a lack of the much-wanted entrepreneurial spirit.  This 
is what has often been described about businessmen in Singapore.   
Ample evidence has shown that the role of government often exerts a far-reaching 
influence on the way a company makes its strategic planning and manages its daily 
operation and short- and long-term development.  One past study on the impact of 
government’s policies and regulations on managerial values in Singapore and Hong Kong 
has implied that government’s policies do have the potential to influence the Chinese 
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primal cultural values and business goals (Pearson, et al., 2000).  Likewise, it will 
presumably affect a company one way or another in terms of its perceptions of crises, its 
ways of handling CM, and its level of crisis preparedness in the normal time.  
However, except the only one study mentioned above, very little empirical study 
has been made before of the association between the influence of government’s role and 
companies’ CM and crisis preparedness.  Drawing from the relevant literature and 
discussion on the unique and crucial roles played by the government of Singapore and 
Hong Kong in the previous chapter, it may be reasonable to assume that the unique and 
prominent role played by the government in the two regions could possibly produce an 
different impact on the business companies across the two regions in terms of their 
perceptions of and preparations for crises, thus resulting in a different level of crisis 
preparedness among the companies in the two regions.   
In Singapore, the government’s protective and proactive interventions in guiding 
economic development and regulating and safeguarding the business environment may 
help in, among other things, stabilising the general environment for business operations 
and development, which may in turn increase managers’ confidence in preventing and 
preparing for crisis with their own proactive efforts and prompt them to put in necessary 
resources to improve their crisis preparedness and CM arrangement.   
According to the general concepts and principles of classic and new 
institutionalism, what has been valued and emphasised by a government in a society may 
produce an isomorphic pressure on various organizations as well individuals in that 
particular context to follow and behave similarly.  Likewise, Singapore government has 
been known for its consistent emphasis on proactive planning and preparations for any 
emergency situation or crisis prior to its occurrence.  The proactiveness of the 
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government may in one way or another exert isomorphic and normative pressures on 
business companies to adopt the norm and to behave similarly.  
In other words, government’s unique role may become a crucial environmental 
factor when managers come to evaluate their own strength and feasibility for crisis 
preparations and other CM endeavours.  Given the unpredictable and inevitable nature of 
crises, a protective and proactive government would probably be regarded by companies 
as a favourable condition adding to companies’ confidence in handling crises and 
motivation to prepare themselves for crises.  Therefore, under a government’s protective 
and proactive interventions, companies may be more confident and willing to invest 
needed resources for CM endeavours and preparing themselves better for crisis attacks 
than those under a laissez-faire government.  Hence, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 8:  Companies under an interventionist government are more 
prepared for crises than their counterparts under a laissez-faire 
government. 
 
3.2.9 Perceived media’s role for CM 
 Ogrizek and Guillery (1999: 65) point out that “the media love crises and 
corporations hate them.  …and journalists are looking systematically for sensationalism.”  
Media’s specific reporting practices and style could invariably influence managers’ 
perception of and attitude towards them and subsequently prompt them to react in a 
different way in terms of their media relations practices, which is an important part of 
CM.  Some managers may clinch a belief that “media coverage is one of the essential 
factors transforming an incident into a crisis” (Ogrizek and Guillery, 1999: 65).  
Consequently, many of them who fail to learn how to deal with media successfully may 
 74
Chapter 3    Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
grow a kind of aversion or phobia for the news media and try to stay away from them in 
an attempt to avoid any unexpected trouble arising from their unfavourable reportage.  It 
is particularly the case when their companies come across an unexpected trouble or 
emergency.   
 From the previous chapter, we know that news media in Singapore and Hong 
Kong operate in a unique way, somewhat different from each other.  Specifically, news 
media in Singapore are generally found to be under a more strict control and operate in a 
more restrictive way with journalists conscientiously and closely observing the 
professional codes.  In contrast, their counterparts in Hong Kong appear to be more 
aggressive, competing among themselves to win a wider circulation through different 
means including sensationalized reporting.  In respect to CM and crisis preparations, 
when a company comes to deal with the media that appear aggressive or hostile to crisis-
hit companies hit crises and tend to sensationalise an emergency encountered by any 
organisation, its initiative to make advance preparations for crisis is likely to be 
dampened and its CM practices and crisis preparedness may possibly be negatively 
affected. 
 On the other hand, some managers are conscious of the media’s influential social 
power and impact and learn to deal with them to benefit their CM work and corporate 
communications with their stakeholders as well.  They are aware that organisations 
generally held in public favour before a crisis will be allowed more latitude regarding 
their CM efforts, and those generally held disfavoured before the crisis will be judged 
with close scrutiny (Barton, 1993).  With the strategic CM objective in their mind, those 
proactive managers tend to take initiatives to maintain a good relationship with the news 
media and make a good use of their unique power in time of crisis.  Their effective 
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communication with media will enable them to have more chance of informing their 
stakeholders of the real situation amid a crisis event and therefore have more chance of 
turning an ordeal into a rare opportunity in favour of their companies’ reputation and 
image.  An exemplary instance can be seen from Singapore Airlines (SIA) following the 
tragic crash accident of one of its airplanes on October 31, 2000 at Taipei’s Chiang Kai-
shek International Airport. The way that local news media covered the various situations 
and occasions related to the accident was generally observed to be fairly professional and 
objective.  Meanwhile, the way that SIA dealt with the news media on different occasions 
such as at press conferences as shown on TV was also observed to be quite professional 
and understanding.  All this might not have happened without the consistent efforts made 
by the SIA in developing and maintaining an effective two-way communication with the 
news media in normal times. 
 The difference in managers’ perceptions and awareness of media’s role for the 
success of crisis communication and CM efforts may in turn affect their companies’ 
effectiveness and standard of crisis preparations.  That is because the media relations is a 
vital and integral part of effective CM repertoire and those who fail to realise the 
importance of it and manage to build ideal rapport with it cannot expect to maintain a 
really high standard of CM in their companies. 
 The different reporting styles of news media in the two places may have affected 
managers’ perceptions of the media in terms of their attitude towards companies 
encountered with crises and media’s importance and/or usefulness for the success of CM, 
which may in turn influence managers’ initiatives to deal with the media for the purpose 
of a sound CM system and in the end influence their companies’ preparedness level.  In 
order to examine the possible association between the companies’ crisis preparedness and 
 76
Chapter 3    Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses 
managers’ perceptions of the media’s reporting style and their special role in the effective 
CM system, it is thus proposed that 
Hypothesis 9:  Companies’ crisis preparedness level will be related to their 
managers’ perception of the media’s operating style and role for 
CM.  Managers who perceive the media as professional and 
objective and also understand the media’s role in CM tend to 
prepare their companies better for crises than managers who 
perceive the media as hostile and underestimate the media’s role 
in CM.  
 
3.2.10 Overall crisis preparedness in Singapore and Hong Kong  
It is known to all that CM has over the past twenty years remained an evolving, 
dynamic and prolific area in the West with numerous studies looking into the topic from 
a wide variety of perspectives.  The research findings may have presumably been 
incorporated into the practice of modern enterprises management, thus making managers 
more aware of importance of CM and meanwhile increasing the standard of crisis 
preparedness and CM among the Western enterprises as a whole. 
In contrast, the companies in Asia are very often assumed to be sluggish in their 
effort for good CM and hence low in crisis preparedness, though some studies have 
revealed that CM in Asia has been in development over the past two decades (Fienberg, 
1999).  As mentioned in the first chapter, many managers in Asia do not like to talk about 
or even think about crisis in the normal times, especially when business is good.  To 
those managers, for their companies to get caught in a crisis means their poor 
competency in management or bad management (Meyer, 1986).  A common cultural 
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aversion is often found among the Asian managers to think of crisis, as revealed in the 
past studies or media reports (Cox, 1999; Ruidl, 1997; and MacKenzie, 1994).  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is brought forth: 
Hypothesis 10:  Companies in Singapore and Hong Kong in general are not well 
prepared for crisis. 
 
By “well prepared for crisis”, it means a majority of companies under the study 
should appear to have already made specific preparations with such major indicators as a 
general plan for crisis, a written CM plan, a CM team and crisis drills for their 
employees. 
 
With all the hypotheses proposed and listed above, we can see clearly some of 
them are related to the organisational factors such as the first five hypotheses, some 
related to the perceptional factors of those relevant people involved such as the sixth and 
seventh hypotheses, while some others, such as the eighth and ninth hypotheses, are 
deduced from those factors arising from the environment or society in which the 
companies operate.  Among a total of ten hypotheses, only the first seven can be directly 
tested with those relevant variables generating from the survey questionnaire.  The eighth 
hypothesis, and the ninth in part, were tested by content analysis with replies to some 
open-ended questions.  The first nine hypotheses discussed above are expected to help 
respectively answer the first and second research questions brought forth for this study in 
the first chapter, while the last hypothesis, namely, Hypothesis 10, was supposed to help 
to answer the third research question of this study.  For the sake of a convenient review, a 
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list of hypotheses and their characteristics and related research questions are listed below 
in Table 3.1.   
 
 















Hypotheses 6 – 7 
 
 





1. What are the major factors 
associated with business 
companies’ crisis 
preparedness in Singapore 
and Hong Kong? 
  






2. What is the general level of 
crisis preparedness among 
business companies in 















4.1  Survey design 
 
This study aims primarily to look into the crisis preparedness among various 
companies in Singapore and Hong Kong, and therefore individual companies were 
investigated and examined as the unit of analysis.  To meet the objective, it is crucial to 
secure a good sample representing the whole industrial population for each of the two 
target contexts. The current study adopted the survey method, or a cross-sectional survey, 
to collect the desired data, investigating approximately 200 business companies 
respectively in the two places.  In fact, a total of 413 companies were surveyed 
representing business companies, operating in both Singapore and Hong Kong, of various 
sizes, industrial sectors, ownership status and period of operation or age. 
Among the various methodological instruments, the survey method was chosen 
on account of its obvious appropriateness and advantages as compared with some other 
research designs such as case study or laboratory experiments.  Some major advantages 
of a survey have been highlighted by Wu (1997: 67) as follows: 
(1) It can measure many variables, or collect much information, at a time for a 
reasonable cost; 
(2) It is systematic, fairly objective, and quantitative; 
(3) It is flexible in its execution of data collection; 
(4) The researcher can estimate characteristics of a known population; 
(5) The researcher can get information about behaviour which cannot be 
observed; 
Chapter 4    Methodology 
(6) It can be conducted in a realistic or natural setting, thus increasing its 
external validity; and  
(7) Data helpful to survey research already exist. 
There are three major methods of primary data collection in the survey design.  
They are mail survey, telephone interview and face-to-face, or personal, interview.  The 
mail survey, despite its obvious advantage of relatively low cost, is ruled out for this 
study because of such disadvantages as frustratingly poor return rate, no control over the 
target respondents, which is important for this study, and limitation of the desirable 
variables and data to be obtained.  Senior executives, who are the ideal target 
interviewees in our study, may not cooperate if they have to personally complete the 
questionnaire because they are busy. 
The telephone interview is also not suitable in this study because some questions 
requires only one answer from a long list of alternatives which may not be conveniently 
executable on the phone, the wide variety of issues included in the questionnaire may 
render the telephone interview too lengthy for the respondents, and some issues may 
probably be too sensitive for them to answer on the phone.  Another weakness is that, 
with the telephone interview, there is a very limited control over the target subjects.  
Sometimes it may be difficult to verify whether the respondent on the other side of phone 
call is really the target manager or senior executive or just their assistant or even a 
secretary. 
In comparison, the face-to-face interview is the most appropriate method of 
primary data collection for this study because of a few prominent advantages.  The first is 
that it enables the interviewer to have close observation of and favorable rapport with the 
target respondents, “to notice and correct the respondents’ misunderstandings, to probe 
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inadequate or vague responses, and to answer questions and alley concerns (Judd, et al., 
1991)”, which are what is needed in this study in obtaining the complete and value-
loaded data.    
Moreover, the face-to-face interview method will help ensure that the respondents 
are the desired managers or other appropriate executives in a position to address the 
issues of crisis planning and management/communication for their organisations.  
Another advantage of face-to-face interview is that it helps ensure no question will be 
easily skipped by the respondent unless there is a very good reason.  It also has the 
advantage of obtaining valuable in-depth information on sensitive or open-ended 
questions, which respondents may not reveal in mail survey or telephone interview. 
In the course of the over 350 interviews with top-level senior executives charged 
with overseeing crisis management for their organisations, Mitroff and Pauchant, (1990: 
xiii) have come to appreciate a vital point:  How senior business and government 
executives thought about, conceptualized intellectually, and even more significantly, 
reacted emotionally to the possibility of a major crisis occurring to them and their 
organisations revealed more about them than all the rational studies of management and 
organisations.  How people react to crises and/or extreme events, both real and imagined, 
provides one of the most powerful windows, if not the most powerful window, into the 
souls of people and their institutions.  Therefore, the face-to-face interview is deemed as 
the most appropriate method for collecting the primary data in this study and the target 
subjects are ideally those who hold a senior position in their organisations. Specifically, 
an ideal subject for the personal interview should be someone who holds the most senior 
position responsible for the crisis management/communication of the company. 
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4.2 Sampling and data collection 
  The execution of sampling and data collection is a vital and integral link to the 
successful fulfillment of this study’s objective since a good sample from the two places, 
as complete information as possible from the target respondents and furthermore an 
appropriate way of information gathering are all very crucial to a high-quality study.  As 
we know, the target subjects for the interviews are those managers or relevant senior 
executives, who usually have full daily schedules and, on the other hand, may not readily 
want to reveal their companies’ information or their personal views to any outsider.  It 
was therefore decided that the data collection task should be executed by the professional 
survey and research agency, ACNielsen, in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Specifically, ACNielsen was commissioned for the task execution based primarily 
on the following considerations and factors: 
(1)  ACNielsen is widely regarded as among the world’s leading providers of market 
research, information and analysis to a great variety of clients in various 
industries.  It is well known across Asia, especially in Singapore, as a professional 
survey agency with its rich experience and well recognized credibility for a wide 
variety of surveys; 
(2)  The professional agency has long built and accumulated a reliable and 
comprehensive network and commercial database of the business companies 
across various sectors in both Singapore and Hong Kong; 
(3)  It claims to possess a strong team of well-trained interviewers for tough 
interviews with busy executives. 
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(4)  The well-established professional agency has access to those busy and senior 
executives, who may otherwise likely decline a request for such an interview 
conducted by other people rather than those professional survey/research agents.  
In short, ACNielsen was entrusted with undertaking the important but somewhat 
tough interview execution primarily for the sake of practicability, accuracy, reliability, 
and efficiency of the data collection.  Their expertise is expected to help secure a good 
sample with quality data for this comparative study. 
According to the ACNielsen, a random sample of companies both in Singapore 
and Hong Kong were drawn from ACNielsen’s Commercial Database in the two places 
respectively.  The Commercial Database of ACNielsen in Singapore is compiled from 
major business directories like Singapore Top 1000, Kompass, and so on, while the 
database for the Hong Kong ACNielsen is based primarily on the territory telephone 
directory, as reported by the coordinator from the agency.   
In fact, the sample size of 200 companies in Singapore and 213 in Hong Kong 
was not generated out of any complicated calculation.  Rather, it was basically the size 
that the two research grants provided by the National University of Singapore could 
possibly afford and that was meanwhile believed to be parsimoniously sufficient for this 
kind of study.  The selected companies are of different sizes and ownerships across all the 
industrial sectors, capable of representing a relatively true picture of the business 
companies operating in Singapore and Hong Kong respectively. 
Before the personal interviews took place, telephone calls were made to those 
selected companies to solicit the willingness of target subjects to participate in the 
personal interview.  Once the appropriate person was identified through screening 
questions and his willingness of participation secured, an appointment was then made 
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with him.  As mentioned previously, the appropriate subject had to be someone holding 
the most senior position in charge of the crisis management/communication of the 
company.  If such a person could not be emphatically identified, the Public Relations 
Manager or Officer of the company (for a firm with more than 30 employees) or 
Managing Director (for a firm with fewer than 30 employees) was approached instead.  
In order to motivate the target subject’s willingness for the interview and thus secure their 
active participation, an offer was made to them as an incentive, when they were first 
approached, that an executive summary of the study results would be sent to them after 
the whole survey research is completed.  
The interviewees were told at the very beginning of the interview that their names 
would be kept confidential and no attempt to identify the respondents would be made in 
the following data processing and analysis.  The names of those respondents were still 
kept confidential from the author of this dissertation and his supervisor as a principal 
investigator for the project and there is no intention at all to uncover their identity in 
future.  This was emphatically highlighted to those interviewees so as to make them feel 
more at ease in revealing the expected information and expressing their personal views in 
a more frank and straightforward way, thus minimizing the negative effect of social 
desirability throughout the interview. 
Each personal interview proceeded according to a questionnaire designed by the 
researchers.  It usually lasted for about 45 minutes, depending on how much the subjects 
respond to those open-ended questions. 
The task of data collection was executed respectively in March-April 1999 in 
Singapore and in August-September 2000 in Hong Kong.  
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4.3 Questionnaire design 
As an instrument for collecting the data, the questionnaire for this study was in a 
semi-structured format consisting of about 50 questions, with a majority of them being 
close-ended questions and only a small part in the form of open-ended questions intended 
for further probing (See Appendix A for a copy of the questionnaire).  The questionnaire 
was designed with reference from those relevant concepts, questions and formats 
discussed and/or employed by some researchers in their earlier studies including Mitroff 
(1992, and 1993), Barton (1993), Nudell and Antokol (1988) and Ruidl (1997). Some 
necessary modifications were made in accordance with the focus of this study and the 
real situations in Singapore and Hong Kong.   
The main body of the questionnaire comprised the following six major sections: 
(1) Perception of crisis.  This section, as the subtitle denotes, was meant for 
collecting some basic variables regarding the subject’s perceptions of and views on a 
crisis and crisis management, his company’s direct crisis experiences, if any, and 
capability to handle a future crisis. Examples of questions in this part are “What kind of 
situations would your company consider as a crisis?”  “How likely do you think your 
company will face a crisis?” etc. 
(2) Planning for crisis.  This part intended to investigate whether the subject’s 
company has planned for any crisis and what kind of crises they were on guard against.  
It also asked about the attitude and knowledge of the people throughout the organisation 
regarding the crisis planning and how they involved in the anti-crisis preparations.  
Typical questions included “Do your company plan for crises?”  “What crises does your 
company plan for?” etc. 
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(3) Crisis management plan.  This section went further to examine the objective, 
scope, contents and extent of the CM plan and the whole CM practices in the subject’s 
company and the personnel involvement in the plan designing process.  For example, one 
question in this part asked if the company had already made a written crisis plan.  
Another question asked if the company’s crisis plan had specified the nine areas such as 
how to determine a crisis has occurred, how to judge the impact of the crisis on the 
company; a chain of command, crisis control centre, members of a crisis management 
team, and so on.1   
(4) Human resource issues in crisis preparation.  This section mainly aimed to 
investigate whether the subject’s company had set up a CM team, a very crucial indicator 
for effective crisis preparedness, what kind of people were selected into the CM team and 
who headed the task force team, and how it operated in a crisis event.   In addition, it also 
sought to find out how the subject’s company trained the employees to prepare them for 
responding to and dealing with crises.  Specific questions included some inquiring if the 
company had set up a crisis management team (CMT), how many members in the team, 
and which departments the team members come from or represent. 
(5) Public relations and communication during crisis.  This section, the largest one 
of all, attempted primarily to examine how the subject’s company viewed the importance 
of public and media relations for the success of CM and how in reality the company 
applied the relevant principles and techniques of public and media relations and of 
communication at a time of crisis and how it thought of cultural factors popular in their 
own society in relation to the crisis planning and CM as a whole.  A typical question in 
this part was “To what extent do you think the attitudes of the local news media would be 
                                                 
1 Please refer to Question No. 21 of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
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to a company like yours during a crisis?”  And a Likert-type 7-point scale ranging from 1 
meaning “Extremely hostile” to 7 meaning “Extremely understanding” was provided for 
the respondent. 
In addition to those five sections in the main body described above, there were 
two small but separate parts: Screener placed right in the front and Particulars of 
Company attached at the end of the questionnaire.  The former consisted of a few 
questions chiefly meant for screening for and identifying the right respondents in terms of 
their job title and position level in the organisation and their actual role in a crisis event 
while the latter comprised several questions intended for gathering some basic variables 
with regard to the subject company’s industrial sector, size, ownership status, age or 
operational length in years, etc. 
The closed questions are mostly in the Likert-type form of 7-point rating scales 
with descriptive words at the ends of each scale as well as category scales. This technique 
is widely considered by research authorities to be the most appropriate method of 
measuring the direction and intensity of perception and certainty of respondents 
regarding different concepts (Sudman, 1982).  The questionnaire also consists of a 
number of open-ended questions for clarification of and elaboration on relevant and 
interesting issues following some structured choices. Answers to these questions were to 
be first transcribed by professionals at ACNielsen and then further analysed by the author 
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4.4 Research variables 
4.4.1 Dependent variable for overall crisis preparedness 
Four questions, Questions 10, 19, 23 and 28 (see Appendix A), were designed to 
ask directly about whether the companies surveyed were specifically equipped with some 
corporate strategic planning and organisational preparations including a general plan for 
crises, a written CM plan, a CM team and/or regular drills among employees.  All these 
specific measures and practices are commonly regarded as vital indicators for good 
preparations for coping with unwanted crises by many crisis management researchers and 
practitioners, as evidenced in the CM literature.  Each of the four questions was mainly to 
have two types of replies – “No” coded as “0” and “Yes” coded as “1”, with only a very 
few “Don’t know” replies coded as “99”, which were left out in the analysis. The four 
variables were merged, i.e., the answers summed, to produce an additive index 
representing overall preparedness.  The reliability test was performed on the four 
component variables and their reliability Alpha (α) was above 0.75.  The correlation 
coefficients between the four component variables ranged from 0.30 to 0.59, which 
meant they were initially only moderately correlated.  The indexes contained in the 
synthesized dependent variable range from “0, 1, through to 4”, meaning a company has 
none of the component, only one of them or all the four components respectively.  This 
overall crisis preparedness index was used as the dependent variable in the one-way 
analysis of variance and multiple regression analyses. 
 
4.4.2 Explanatory variables 
  A total of 12 factors or variables, including a location variable used only in the 
combined sample of 413 companies from the two regions, were identified and chosen as 
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explanatory variables in this study.  The selection of the explanatory variables was based 
in part on the references from the CM literature and in part on the inference from other 
relevant management literature and also observation by the author of this dissertation.  
The explanatory variables were of three major types: organisational characteristics like 
the company size and ownership, organisational people’s perception and awareness such 
as managers’ perceptions of crisis likelihood for their companies, and environment 
related factors like government’s role and media’s impact. A summary of all the adopted 
explanatory variables with their brief definition and research methods applied for testing 
the relationship between them and companies’ overall crisis preparedness is attached at 
the end of this chapter (See Table 4.1).  
 
4.4.2.1  Prior crisis experience 
Company’s prior experience with crisis was operationalised as a dummy variable 
indicating whether the company surveyed had directly experienced any crisis in the past 
five years.  Companies that had directly experienced a crises were coded as “1” and those 
had never encountered any crisis were coded as “0”. 
 
4.4.2.2 Company size 
In this study, the variable of company size was defined as the total number of 
people employed by the particular company under study.  The total number of employees 
was taken as the definition of company size primarily based on considerations as: (1) 
Employee number is an intuitive measure of organisational size and has already been 
adopted in numerous empirical studies in management area; and (2) earlier studies of CM 
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were found to adopt employee number as the size variable in examining its impact on the 
organisation’s standard of crisis preparedness (Reilly, 1987 and Wisenblit, 1989). 
In this study, company size was operationalised as a categorical variable that 
grouped the companies drawn from Singapore and Hong Kong into three major groups: 
small-sized companies, medium-sized companies and large-sized companies.2  The three 
major groups are coded respectively as “1” for small-size; “2” for medium size; and “3” 
for large size.  
 
4.4.2.3 Age of companies 
Companies’ age or operational period since registration was actually 
operationalised as a categorical variable.  Companies that had operational periods of less 
than 10 years were coded as “1”; of 10 to 20 years were coded as “2”; and of more than 
20 years’ operation were coded as “3”. 
 
4.4.2.4  Ownership status 
   Ownership in this study was defined as the type of ownership or management  
                                                 
2 Based on the specific features of the economy and industries in Singapore and Hong Kong, ACNielsen 
provides a somewhat different definition of company size classification in terms of employee numbers for 
the two regions.  According to the coordinator from ACNielsen, the definition has commonly used by the 
professional agency in Singapore and Hong Kong for survey and research purposes.  In Singapore, the 
specific definitions are as follows:  Small-sized companies refer to those with employees below 50; 
medium-size refers to those employing 50 to 150 people while large companies are those with employees 
exceeding 150 people.  In Hong Kong, on the other hand, companies are first categorized into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries.  In manufacturing, small-sized companies: less than 20 
employees; medium-size: 20-99 employees; and large-size: 100 or more employees.  For non-
manufacturing, small-sized companies: less than 20 people; medium-size: 20-50; and large-size: above 50 
employees.   
      ACNielsen’s classification of company size is basically consistent with the specific conditions of 
Singapore and Hong Kong industries, as can be found in some relevant literature and official statistics in 
this regard (Chang, 1998; Vinayachangdra and Peterson, 1997; Yu, 1997; and Hong Kong Annual Digest 
of Statistics, 1999). 
     Therefore, this classification of company size as commonly used and also recommended by ACNielsen 
was adopted and observed throughout this study. 
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structure of the company.  Specifically, it primarily intended to differentiate companies 
between MNCs and local non-MNCs in terms of their crisis preparedness.  Companies 
were coded as “1” for local non-MNCs; “2” for local-owned MNCs; and “3” for foreign-
owned MNCs.  The three groups were tested by one-way analysis of variance first to find 
out the differences in means of companies’ overall crisis preparedness between the three 
groups.  Three dummy variables were derived from the nominal variable above: Variable 
A, coded as “1” for local non-MNCs and “0” for all other types of companies; Variable 
B, coded as “1” for local MNCs and “0” for all other types of companies; and Variable C, 
coded as “1” for foreign MNCs and “0” for all other types of companies.  Variables B 
and C were used in multiple regression models while Variable A was left out as a base 
unit. 
 
4.4.2.5  Industrial sector 
  The industrial sector was defined and categorized in relation to the probability of 
crisis occurrence.   As mentioned in the previous chapter, Barton (1993 and 2001) has, 
based on his long years of comparison and observation of several hundreds of crisis cases 
in the United States of America, classified enterprises and organisations across various 
industries/sectors into three major categories in terms of their susceptibility to 
organisational crisis.3   The three categories of industrial sectors are labeled as “High 
Risk, Medium Risk, and Low Risk” indicating the different likelihood of crisis that may 
occur to the organisations operating in each of the three environments.  Drawn from 
Barton’s list, therefore, the variable of industrial sector in this study was operationalised 
                                                 
3 Please refer to Question No. 43 of the questionnaire in Appendix A.  The question was designed based on 
the risk category classification table listed by Barton (1993: 65-66).   According to Barton (1993), the first 
17 items of the whole list are categorised as in the “High-Risk” sector, the items from the 18th to 34th are 
placed in “Medium-Risk” sector, while the items from the 35th to the 52nd fall into “Low-Risk” sector. 
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with three categorical scales. The three categories in this variable were respectively 
coded as “1” for Low-risk; “2” for Medium-risk; and “3” for High-risk.  
 
4.4.2.6 Crisis likelihood perception 
Crisis likelihood perception in this study was defined as respondent managers’ 
perceptions of the likelihood of a crisis in their organisations.  This explanatory variable 
consisted of three categories (or items) represented by three possible answers in the 
questionnaire.  The questions were designed to measure the manager respondents’ crisis 
perceptions.  Specifically, the responses to the three items were capable of reflecting how 
the manager and executives in the survey evaluated the likelihood of a local company’s 
encountering a crisis in comparison to an average company in the United States and how 
they perceived the likelihood of their own companies’ being hit by a crisis within a 
specific time frame.4  Responses to the relevant question were grouped into three scales: 
Much less than 50 per cent chance, coded as “1”; for about 50 per cent chance, coded as 
“2”; and for more than 50 per cent chance, coded as “3”. One-way analysis of variance 
method was used to test the differences in means of companies’ overall crisis 
preparedness among three groups in each of the three categories (or items).  
Subsequently, responses for two of the categories regarding subject managers’ perceived 
likelihood of their companies being hit by a crisis within the following one year and three 
years were next merged, as a new integrated variable or category,5 and then, together 
with the remaining category regarding subject managers’ comparison of crisis likelihood, 
were used in multiple regression model testing the possible association between 
                                                 
4 Please refer to Questions No. 4 and No.6 of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
5 The reliability test performed on the two items showed their reliability Alpha was about 0.75. 
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companies’ crisis preparedness and the overall perceived likelihood of a crisis occurring 
to their companies.     
 
4.4.2.7   Organisational members’ awareness of their role in a crisis event 
This variable was defined as the level of knowledge or awareness possessed by all 
people from the organisations surveyed, from top management through to the base-line 
staff, regarding their role or responsibility in a crisis event.  Similar to the previous 
variable, this variable also comprised two categories (or items) which were represented 
by two possible answers in the questionnaire.6  The two corresponding questions were 
designed to find out to what extent the top management and average employees in the 
respondent’s company respectively were knowledgeable about their role in a crisis event 
faced by their organisation. They were each operationalised as a 7-point rating scale 
ranging from “1” for “Not at all knowledgeable” to “7” for “Extremely knowledgeable”.  
In the subsequent testing processes using one-way analysis of variance and multiple 
regression model, seven possible answers were regrouped into three new categories by 
combining the “1” and “2” of the original 7-point scale as the group for “Not 
knowledgeable” and “6” and “7” of the original scale as the group for “Knowledgeable” 
and the remaining “3,” “4” and “5” out of the original scale as a group standing in the 
middle. The primary purpose for such regrouping is to make the contrast between or 
among three categories more prominent or meaningful, as this study is primarily aimed to 
find out whether overall crisis preparedness of the companies in the survey moved 
significantly from one side or end of the scale to the other side or end of the scale instead 
of identifying the specific and minute differences in crisis preparedness between 
                                                 
6 Please refer to Question No. 15 of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
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individual scale points of the variable/s under study.  Similar ways of collapsing were 
applied to a few other relevant variables, which will be mentioned below. 
 
4.4.2.8   Government’s role 
Government’s role here was defined primarily as government’s administration 
approaches and measures and policies concerning the operation, development and 
management of business and economic sectors in the particular context.  In this study, 
this variable was tested by the method of content analysis examining and measuring the 
responses to those relevant open-ended questions meant for probing why the companies 
planned or did not plan for crisis and how the manager respondents evaluated their 
perceptions of likelihood of crisis that may occur to their companies.  The respondents’ 
replies were first coded by the author of this dissertation under different categories.  For 
example, after responding to the fourth question about how they perceived the crisis 
likelihood for their companies in comparison with companies in the United States, the 
respondents were further asked to give the reason for their replies.7  Among those 
respondents who perceived lower crisis likelihood for their companies, their responses 
were coded as “1” if they highlighted the government’s good efforts, proactive role, 
policies and regulations as the reason; coded as “2” if they cited favourable environment 
as the reason; and coded as “3”, “4” or “5” respectively if they cited culture, sufficient 
preparations or small companies size as the reasons.  Their responses were then computed 
to measure their frequency distribution and percentage and means among the various 
                                                 
7 Please refer to Questions No. 4 and No. 5 of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
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companies in each of the two regions.  Subsequently, the outcome was further compared 
between the two samples, that is, those companies in Singapore and Hong Kong. 
 
4.4.2.9  Perceived media’s role for CM 
This variable was defined as the media’s attitude towards those companies 
encountering a crisis and their importance for companies’ effective CM, which were both 
perceived and expressed by the respondent managers.  Again, the factor embodies two 
items, one in 7-point scale and the other in 9-point-scale as included in the questionnaire, 
designed primarily to let the manager respondents evaluate the local media’s attitude 
towards a company caught in a crisis and rate media’s importance as a major target 
audience during a crisis event faced by their companies. 8  By using a 7-point scale 
ranging from (1) “Extremely hostile”, to (7) “Extremely understanding”, the first item 
aimed to find out how the respondent managers/executives rated the media’s attitude 
towards a company like theirs when encountering a crisis.  The second item was to find 
out how the media was rated as a major audience during a crisis situation faced by the 
respondents’ organisations, using the form of 9-point scale anchored by (1) for “Least 
important” through to (9) “Most important”.  The responses were able to reflect in some 
way subject companies’ overall perceptions and awareness of the media’s influence to 
their organisation’s crisis preparations.  Ultimately, the hypothesis was intended to 
examine and find out whether the characteristics of the news media unique in one society 
may produce any significant impact on the managers’ perception and awareness of the 
media’s important role for effective CM, and whether that impact may eventually 
influence their companies’ overall level of crisis preparedness in the end. 
                                                 
8 Please refer to Questions No. 32 and No. 39(8) of the questionnaire in Appendix A. 
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  With regard to this variable, the current study was aimed primarily to find out 
whether companies’ overall crisis preparedness was influenced in general by the different 
perceptions of those managers or executives in the interview in terms of the media’s role 
for the effective CM.  In other words, given the objective and nature of this study, it 
would be sufficient to detect whether there were any significant differences in terms of 
companies’ crisis preparedness between the companies whose managers viewed the news 
media in their society as “hostile towards a crisis-hit company”, or “important as one 
major audience during a crisis event” and other companies whose managers believed 
otherwise. In fact, it was not an ultimate objective of this study to find out the specific or 
minute differences between individual points on the whole range of relevant variables.  
Therefore, in an attempt to make the contrast more prominent and meaningful in the 
subsequent testing processing by the adopted quantitative techniques, seven possible 
answers to the first item (or question) about the companies’ rating of news media’s 
attitude towards a crisis-hit company and nine possible responses to the second question 
about the companies’ perceived importance of news media as a major target audience 
during a crisis event faced by the company in the survey were again regrouped into three 
new categories respectively.  Specifically, the responses to the first item were now in 
three groups, coded as “1” for “Hostile”, “2” for “Neutral”, and “3” for “Understanding”.  
As for the second item, the responses were now classified into three new groups, coded 
as “1” for “Not important”, “2” for “Somewhat important”, and “3” for “Important”. 
 
4.4.2.10   Location 
Location in this study referred to Singapore, coded as “1”, and Hong Kong, coded 
as “0”.  To test the hypothesis about the differences of location effect in this study, cross-
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tabulation was used to examine and compare the companies in Singapore and Hong Kong 
in terms of some major indicators for crisis preparations, thus revealing whether and to 
what extent they made any specific preparations for dealing with crisis and how the 
companies between the two regions addressed the central issue of crisis preparedness. 
This location dummy variable was used in the multiple regression model only 
when the two samples of Singapore and Hong Kong companies were combined.  The 
purpose of using the location variable in the regression model was to measure and 
determine how it effected for the differences, if any, between the two regions.   
 
4.5 Data analysis methods 
After the surveys were completed and data with first round of coding handed over 
to the writer of this thesis, frequency distributions and percentages were first computed to 
clean the relevant variables in the database. Several major research methods including 
one-way analysis of variance, cross-tabulation, content analysis and multiple linear 
regression were employed in different stages to test and find out the specific relationship 
between companies’ overall crisis preparedness and those proposed influential or 
explanatory variables and also the differences between the two regions in terms of 
companies’ crisis preparedness.9   
The proposed hypotheses (except the one about government’s role, measured by 
content analysis) were subject to two stages of measuring and testing.  In the first stage, 
the explanatory variables were analysed using one-way analysis of variance to test and 
identify the differences in means of companies’ crisis preparedness between two or three 
                                                 
9 Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used for the quantitative research methods applied in 
the data processing and analysis of this study.   
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groups of each explanatory variable.  Nevertheless, the bi-variate statistical analysis 
could not rule out nor adjust for the potential confounding effects resulting from the 
correlations of the relevant explanatory variables in the analysis with a third variable.  
Therefore, along with the testing by one-way analysis of variance, chi-square test was 
performed, where necessary, to measure and look out for any strong correlation existing 
between relevant explanatory variables and also to help facilitate the interpretations of the 
final results.  Meanwhile, cross tabulation was constructed and Chi-square test performed 
separately for companies in Singapore and Hong Kong, exploring the relationships 
between different characteristics of companies in each of the two regions.  The results 
were compared between the two samples from Singapore and Hong Kong. 
In addition, the first stage also included a content analysis that was performed on 
the variable regarding the impact of government’s role.  Those who cited the 
government’s role, efforts, laws, regulations and policies as the reason for their responses 
regarding crisis perceptions and preparations were highlighted and coded as “1” and 
those who cited other reasons were coded as other numbers respectively. The primary 
object of doing so was to identify any possible relationship between companies’ crisis 
preparedness and the impact of government’s role in Singapore and Hong Kong 
respectively.  The measurement was based on those verbatim records in response to the 
open-ended questions in the personal interview with the manager/executive respondents.  
Multiple linear regression was performed in the second stage.  Multiple regression 
analysis was applied to test most of the hypotheses listed in Table 4.1 below, exploring 
the dependence of companies’ overall crisis preparedness on their relevant characteristics 
including past crisis experience, industrial sector, company size, ownership pattern, and 
so on among companies in Singapore and Hong Kong.  Simultaneously, multiple 
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regression analysis was also used to test the location effect on companies’ crisis 
preparedness adjusting for other variables like company size, operation length, etc. 
The specific procedures of regression analysis were performed in two stages:   
(1). Multiple regression analysis was computed on the Singapore and Hong Kong 
samples separately following the regression model below: 
Y = α0 +  ∑αi * Xi                                                                                   
The Y in the model represents companies’ overall crisis preparedness while Xi stands for 
all individual explanatory variables used in the regression model.  This regression 
analysis determined and measured the dependence of companies’ overall crisis 
preparedness on the relevant explanatory variables in each region;   
(2). Samples from the two regions were combined and tested with the multiple 
regression model again as shown above.  After that, the location dummy variable was 
added into the same regression model to see how it effected in causing any differences, if 
any, in the combined sample.  The result of the location variable was actually able to 
represent to some extent certain differences, if statistically significant, between the two 
regions.  
In the next chapter, the major results of the survey data processing by ways of the 
research methods described above through the SPSS computation will be presented, 
together with some necessary discussion and analysis of the findings.  The specific 
procedure for the analysis and discussion is planned as follows:  In the first stage, the 
relationship between companies’ overall crisis preparedness and each of those proposed 
factors or variables will be examined and discussed based primarily on the results from 
the t-test or one-way of analysis of variance.  In the second stage, further examination of 
the relevant relationship will be conducted again and conclusion be made about the 
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hypotheses according to both the results from multiple regression analysis and t-test or 
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Table 4.1  Summary of Explanatory Variables for Companies’ Crisis Preparedness 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 Variable      Hypothesis             Brief                               Type of 
   Name Number                   Definition                                    Measurement       
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Prior      H1  Company’s direct experience  One-way ANOVA; 
    Experience        with crisis in the past   Multiple Regression 
 
2. Size     H2  By employee numbers, in 3 groups:   As above 
       Small-, medium- and large-size 
 
3. Age      H3  Operational periods since registration  As above 
     
 
4. Ownership    H4  In 3 groups: Local non-MNCs, local  As above 
    MNCs, and foreign MNCs 
 
5. Industrial    H5  By probability of crisis occurrence,   As above 
    Sector        in 3 groups: High-, Medium-, and 
         Low-Risk 
 
6. Crisis     H6  Managers’ perceived likelihood of crisis  As above 
    Perceptions        that may occur to their companies. 2 items 
    included: (1) Crisis likelihood in comparison 
    with US companies; and (2) Crisis likelihood 
    prediction for own companies.  
     
7. Awareness     H7   Organisational members’ awareness of their  As above 
    of One’s Role   role in a crisis event.  2 items included: 
(1) Average employees’ awareness; and 
(2) Top management’s awareness. 
 
8. Government’s    H8  Government’s administration approach Content Analysis,  
     Role          and relevant policies and influence  Frequency/percentage 
 
9. Media’s    H9  Media’s role for effective CM as    One-way ANOVA, 
    Role for CM       perceived by companies. 2 items included:  Multiple Regression 
(1) Media’s perceived attitude; and  
(2) Media’s importance as one major 
audience during a crisis event.  
 
10. Location    H10  Singapore coded as (1) and   Cross-tabulation 








RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
 This chapter presents the results generated from the various analyses and 
examines the relationship between each of the proposed explanatory variables and 
companies’ overall crisis preparedness.  The objective of this chapter is to examine the 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3 and also measure and compare whether and how each 
of those relevant explanatory variables impacts on companies’ crisis preparedness across 
the two regions. Thus, this chapter describes some realities of business companies under 
the current exploratory study across Singapore and Hong Kong with regard to their crisis 
preparations and other CM endeavours. 
 
5.1 Basic characteristics of respondents interviewed and their companies 
5.1.1 Brief profile of respondents interviewed 
Table 5.1 provides brief information regarding the respondents’ position level and 
job title in their organisations and their roles in a crisis event.  As mentioned previously, a 
total of 413 subjects, 200 in Singapore and 213 in Hong Kong, were interviewed, each 
representing a company operating in either of the two locations.  A majority (about 68 per  
cent) of those respondents participating in the personal interviews were found to hold 
senior positions in their companies and less than one third of them held middle and junior 
levels of management positions in their companies.1  
                                                 
1 A senior position in this study refers to such job titles or positions in a company as Managing Director 
(MD), Chairman, Chief Executive Officer (CEO), General Manager (GM)/Assistant General Manager, 
President/Vice President, and the like.  It can also be the owner or head of a company, usually a relatively 
small one.  The respondents in this category are usually on the top management level of the organisation.  
A middle level position refers to those in charge of a relevant functional department or office in a large- or 
medium-sized company, oftentimes with such a job title or description as manager, director or head for a 
particular department or office like public relations, corporate relations, corporate communication, etc.  It 
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Hong Kong 
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Total 
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Role in a Crisis Situation 
1) I make the final decision 
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2) General Manager 
3) Director/Vice President 
4) Treasurer/Company Secretary/ 
Controller 
5) Manager 


































                                                                                                                                                 
can also be a senior administrative officer in a company’s general office or a senior executive and so on.  A 
junior position on the other hand means a lower level management position in a relatively large 
organisation and can refer to a supervisor or head of a work team or group, or even a senior professional 
position holder with a few subordinates.  It is possible that the same job title such as manager can actually 
end up representing a different level in different companies due to their sizes.  A classification of company 
sizes will be addressed in the next section regarding the overall profile of the companies. 
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With regard to their actual role in a crisis situation likely to be faced by their 
companies, all respondents interviewed were found to be in a position to play a critical 
part, though the number of the respondents who self-defined themselves in a position for 
making the final decision in a crisis event in Hong Kong is double that in Singapore (See 
Table 5.1).  This may probably be attributed to the difference of the sample 
characteristics in terms of the company size between the two places.2  In other words, an 
overwhelming majority (about 96 per cent) of the Hong Kong companies surveyed were 
found to fall into the relatively small and medium categories of companies and those 
respondents who assumed a company head title and engaged in the personal interviews 
were more likely to command the top position in their firms for decision making in most 
events including a crisis situation.  Despite the differences between the Singapore and 
Hong Kong samples in their self-defined role in the crisis situation, all the respondents 
were in a position to address the central issue of this study - crisis preparedness and other 
CM efforts and practices in their companies. 
 
5.1.2 Overall profile of the companies surveyed 
An overview view of basic characteristics of the companies drawn for this survey 
research can be seen in Table 5.2, which summarizes the companies in Singapore and 
Hong Kong in terms of their ownerships, industrial sectors, age and size. 
Of the total of 413 companies from the two places, slightly over one third (33.7 
per cent) are locally owned or foreign-owned multinational corporations (MNCs), while 
nearly two thirds (66.3 per cent) are local ordinary companies, or local non-MNCs.  In 
                                                 
2 The size distribution of the companies surveyed in Singapore and Hong Kong will be reported right in the 
next section regarding the overall profile of the companies.  Please also refer to footnote No. 2 in Chapter 4. 
 105
Chapter 5               Results and Discussions 
comparison, the percentage of MNCs in the Singapore sample is higher than that in the 
Hong Kong one (i.e., 49 per cent versus 19.3 per cent).   
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As a whole, about 45 per cent of the total companies belong to the industries of 
high crisis prone category based on the listing included in the survey questionnaire 
(See Appendix A attached at the back of this dissertation).  Nearly 55 per cent of the 
companies fall into medium and low crisis prone categories of industrial sectors though 
the companies belonging to the latter take up a higher percentage of the two.3
In terms of their age, or operational length, more companies from the Singapore 
sample (43.5 per cent), in comparison with 15 per cent of the Hong Kong sample, have 
operated for over 20 years since their registration while a higher proportion of Hong 
Kong companies (57.3 per cent) take up the category for those below 10 years.  From the 
viewpoint of combined sample, more than half (nearly 58 per cent) of the companies 
have operated for over 10 years.  Moreover, among those 174 companies in the category 
for less than 10 years of operation, 79 companies, or 45 per cent, had run for more than 
five years since they were officially founded.  That seems to suggest that most of the 
companies had gone through their initial start-up periods and come to a fairly mature 
stage with their operation and management. 
                                                 
3 If viewed from another perspective - their actual industrial sectors, which were not examined in this study 
for their actual association with the company’s crisis preparedness standard, the companies in the two 
samples come from two main segments: manufacturing and non-manufacturing segments.  In Singapore, 21 
per cent (or 42 firms) of the 200 companies were actually selected from the manufacturing segment, while 
the rest were drawn from the non-manufacturing segment.  In reality, however, the firms in the 
manufacturing segment took up only 10 per cent of the whole universe in 1999, according to the official 
statistics provided by the ACNielsen.   
     In Hong Kong, on the other hand, out of the 213 companies surveyed, 31 per cent (or 65 firms) were 
selected from the manufacturing segment while the remaining firms were drawn from the non-
manufacturing segment.  In reality, nevertheless, companies in Hong Kong’s manufacturing segment 
accounted for only eight per cent and the companies from the non-manufacturing segment took up 92 per 
cent in 1999, based on the figures released from Hong Kong’s Census and Statistics Department in 2000, as 
cited by ACNielsen. 
    Obviously, the firms representing the manufacturing segment in both Singapore and Hong Kong were 
oversampled.  Such an outcome was basically due to the consideration to ensure a sufficient sample base 
for the data analysis, as claimed by the professional survey agency of ACNielsen. 
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 With regard to their size in employee numbers, the table shows that two thirds or 
67.6 per cent of all companies surveyed fall into the small-sized category while about one 
third of the total companies belong to the medium-sized or large-sized categories, which 
is in general consistent with the industrial situation.4  The sample obtained from Hong 
Kong consisted of small-sized companies (nearly 90 per cent).  The coordinator from the 
professional survey agency of ACNielsen claimed that, in respect to the size and 
distribution of industrial sectors as well as other relevant aspects, the sample was 
basically a reasonable representation of the whole industrial population of business 
companies in Hong Kong.5  The specific composition of the sample could also help 
explain in some way why more respondents in Hong Kong than in Singapore claimed to 
be in the position for making the final decision in a crisis situation, since most of those 
holding a senior level position in Hong Kong were actually the head of their small firms 
and therefore commanded the top authority for the decision making in all kinds of 
situations including a crisis event. 
 
5.2      Overall crisis preparedness 
This study found that many companies across Singapore and Hong Kong were not 
spared from crises in recent years.  Specifically, more than one third (35 per cent) of the 
companies surveyed in Singapore and nearly a half (48 per cent) of those in Hong Kong 
reported that they were hit by a crisis in the past five years.  From Table 5.3 below, 
                                                 
4 Please refer to the footnote No.2 in the previous chapter for the classification of company size. 
5 The Hong Kong sample was in fact consistent with the official statistics released by the responsible 
government department in Hong Kong.  According to the official statistics released by Hong Kong’s 
Census and Statistics Department for the year of 1999, companies with less than 20 employees account for 
89.96 per cent of the total manufacturing establishments and 95.63 per cent of the total companies in non-
manufacturing industries (excluding banking and financial establishments) (Also See Hong Kong Census 
and Statistics Department’s Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics.  1999 Edition. Pages 69 and 84). 
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however, it is surprising to see that companies across the two places were far from 
preparing themselves well for dealing with crises with such common but crucial measures 
or practices as having a general plan for crisis, a written CM plan, a CM team and 
training employees for dealing with crises.   
 
Table 5.3  
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   Note: For each category in the three columns above, where the percentage from “Yes” 
and “No” does not add up to 100 per cent, there is a very small proportion that was 
left out representing those respondents who chose to respond with “Don’t know” in 
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In particular, a majority, or over two thirds, of the companies across the two 
regions failed to make such specific and substantial preparations as getting a stand-alone 
written CM plan ready and setting up a CM team, though the companies in Singapore as 
a whole appeared to perform better than their counterparts in Hong Kong, as indicated in 
Table 5.3.  In other words, more companies in Singapore than in Hong Kong were found 
to have planned for crises.  More than three fourths of companies (76 per cent) in 
Singapore claimed they planned for crises while only a little more than one third (about 
36 per cent) of the companies in Hong Kong admitted they did the same.  Furthermore, in 
terms of the availability of a written CM plan and CM team, over 40 per cent of the 
companies surveyed in Singapore claimed to have them in place while only a trivial 
proportion of the companies in Hong Kong admitted having them ready.  Specifically, 
only four companies (or 1.9 per cent) and nine companies (4.2 per cent) claimed to have a 
written CM plan and CM team in place respectively.  That reveals a striking contrast 
between the companies from the two regions.  In comparison, Table 5.3 above seems to 
suggest that the Hong Kong companies in particular appeared to be rather slack in taking 
specific measures for crisis preparations, even though statistically more companies were 
hit by crises in the past five years than their counterparts in Singapore (48 per cent over 
35 per cent). 
 On the other hand, an examination of the means in companies’ overall level of 
crisis preparedness (i.e., as represented by the index construct) reveals that the mean 
score for the companies in Singapore is 2.16 while for the companies in Hong Kong is 
only o.79, at 0.1 per cent significance level, which once again suggests there may exist a 
considerable difference of overall crisis preparedness among companies’ overall 
preparedness level between the two regions in general.  
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 Nevertheless, although companies in Singapore statistically scored higher in 
general than their counterparts in Hong Kong in each of the four benchmark indicators as 
shown in Table 5.3, there still remained much room for further improvement before they 
could eventually reach the standard of being well prepared for crisis, as evidenced 
particularly by the fact that less than half of the companies in Singapore surveyed failed 
to get a written CM plan and a CM team in place.  Based on the results listed in Table 5.3 
and also from the means comparison between the two samples, it seems reasonable to say 
that companies in either Singapore or Hong Kong were, on the whole, not well prepared 
for crisis.  Therefore, it could be concluded here that Hypothesis 10 was supported. 
 
5.3 Organisational variables and crisis preparedness 
Table 5.4 reports a comprehensive list of results from t-test or one-way analysis of 
variance comparing the differences in mean scores of overall crisis preparedness between 
two or three groups in each of the five proposed organisation related factors or variables 
about the companies in the Singapore and Hong Kong samples respectively.  Next, a 
close examination of each of them is to be made, along with some necessary discussions 
and analysis regarding the results listed in the table. 
 
5.3.1 Prior crisis experience and crisis preparedness 
There appeared to be no statistically significant relationship in either Singapore or 
Hong Kong between companies’ prior crisis experiences and their overall preparedness 
for crisis, although companies in both regions assumed a similar trend as predicted (See 
Table 5.4).   In other words, a company that has been hit by a crisis in the past may not 
necessarily improve its current level of preparedness for crisis.  This is basically  
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Crisis Preparedness Mean Scores  
Company Variables 
Singapore 
(N = 200) 
Hong Kong 
(N = 213) 
1. Prior Crisis Experience
    (a)   No 
    (b)  Yes 
 
 
2.11 (n = 129) 
2.26 (n = 66) 
F = 0.45 
      P = 0.502 
 
0.73 (n = 100) 
0.92 (n = 95) 
F = 1.99 
P = 0.160 
 
2. Size
    (a)  Small-Size 
    (b)  Medium-Size 
    (c)  Large-Size 
Post Hoc 
 
1.61 (n = 85) 
2.18 (n = 57) 
3.02 (n = 53) 
F = 17.76 
P < .001 
 
a < b*; b < c** 
 
0.72 (n = 180) 
1.21 (n = 14) 
1.63 (n= 8) 
F = 5.54 
P < 0.05 
 
a < b; b < c; c > a** 
3. Age
  (a) Below 10 Years 
  (b) 10-20 Years 
  (c)  Above 20 Years 
 
 
1.94 (n = 49) 
2.11 (n = 57) 
3.02 (n = 53) 
F = 1.09 
P = 0.339 
 
 
0.72 (n = 113) 
1.00 (n = 59) 
0.67 (n = 30) 
F = 2.20 
P = 0.113 
 
4. Ownership
   (a) Local Non-MNCs 
   (b) Local MNCs 





2.07 (n = 102) 
2.65 (n = 17) 
2.17 (n = 76) 
F = 1.15 
P = 0.319 
 
0.75 (n = 165) 
0.97 (n = 32) 
1.20 (n = 5) 
F = 1.304 
P = 0.274 
5. Industrial Sector   
    (a) Low-Risk 
    (b) Medium-Risk 
    (c)  High-Risk 
Post Hoc 
 
1.60 (n = 45) 
2.16 (n = 43) 
2.38 (n = 98) 
F = 4.43 
P < .05 
 
a < b; b < c; c >a** 
 
0.79 (n = 75) 
0.98 (n = 46) 
0.68 (n = 72) 
F = 1.47 
P = 0.223 
 
a < b; b > c; c < a 
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consistent with the finding of Reilly’s earlier study (1987).  Such a finding could possibly 
be accounted for by several explanations.  One major possible explanation is, just as 
some researchers have already observed, organisational actions are often characterised by 
rigid underlying assumptions that are difficult to change (Reilly, 1987).  The finding 
about the relatively low level of overall crisis preparedness among the companies across 
Singapore and Hong Kong, as reported previously, may serve as good evidence 
suggesting that managers’ general attitude towards and awareness of the importance of 
crisis preparations and other CM practices and efforts still had much to be improved.  
Their neglect or ignorance of the CM importance may restrain them from committing 
necessary efforts and/or resources to prepare their organisations for crisis in advance, 
even after encountering with that some companies.  On the other hand, a substantial 
proportion of companies that were found to have failed to prepare any CM plan claimed 
it was no use or no need making such a plan because crises may occur beyond their 
control and in a great variety of forms and crisis preparations were often too costly.6  This 
kind of so-called “resignation” mentality or assumption may probably have outweighed 
the positive effect of organisational learning from prior crisis experiences and have 
affected or influenced many organisations, whether or not having encountered a crisis 
before, in their attitude towards and handling with CM work. 
In order to examine whether the relationship under discussion might be intervened 
by the age of organisations, a correlation test and chi-square test were performed on the 
two variables of companies’ past crisis experience and operational years.  The result 
reveals no statistical evidence to suggest that an older company has higher probability of 
                                                 
6 Out of the total companies that failed to make any CM plan, 57 per cent in Singapore and 41 per cent in 
Hong Kong articulated such a stance.  For more detailed discussion, please refer to Section 5.5 in this 
chapter. 
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experiencing a crisis than a younger company.7  The results from the table, together with 
the relevant tests mentioned above, seem to suggest that companies’ overall level of crisis 
preparedness was not associated with their prior experience with crisis in this study. 
 
5.3.2 Company size and crisis preparedness   
Table 5.4 reveals a statistically significant and positive relationship of companies’ 
crisis preparedness level with their size in terms of employee numbers among the 
companies respectively in each of the two regions, and the significant association was 
more prominent in Singapore than in Hong Kong.  In other words, the results suggested 
that a company’s overall preparedness in general appeared to be closely and positively 
related to their size in a significant way.  The larger a company, the more prepared it 
appeared to be for crisis. Apparently, the general superiority of large companies in terms 
of expertise, experience and other relevant resources was reflected in their “capability of 
dealing with crises”, as observed by Barton (1993).  The outcome here is also in 
conformity with the findings from earlier studies by Reilly (1987) and Wisenblit (1989) 
in the United States, although their range of company size was much wider than that in 
this study.  Reilly’s company size ranged from 1-25 employees up to 10,000 employees 
while Wisenblit’s survey classified the companies under investigation into three 
categories: (1) up to 10,000, (2) 10,001 to 50,000, and (3) over 50,000 employees, with 
the large size taking up 88 per cent of the respondents.  They both found the prominent 
                                                 
7 For the Singapore sample, Pearson correlation = .076, not significant; N = 200.  For the Hong Kong 
sample, Pearson correlation = -.015, not significant; N = 213.  A chi-square test performed on the samples 
also shows no statistically significant relationship between companies’ crisis preparedness and their past 
experience with crisis.  Similar tests were also performed in the following between other organisational 
variables and a third relevant variable when the examination of their association with companies’ crisis 
preparedness was made, but the results of the test were to be omitted unless they were found to be highly or 
strongly correlated.  By “highly or strongly correlated”, it means that their Pearson correlation coefficients 
are above 0.70 at a significance level. 
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and positive correlation between companies’ size and their standard of preparations for 
crises.  Large companies demonstrated a higher level of awareness of the possibilities for 
a disaster that could befall them and therefore tended to gear up with more preparations 
(Wisenblit, 1989). A further examination by the way of Post Hoc Dunnett test reveals, 
however, such a positive and significant relationship in the Hong Kong sample was 
significantly apparent only between small-sized and large-sized companies, but not 
between small and medium groups or between medium and large groups.  The finding 
seems to suggest that the overall association of Hong Kong companies’ preparedness and 
their size was relatively weak.  One possible reason to account for this phenomenon 
could possibly be attributed to the feature of the Hong Kong sample, in which two thirds 
of companies surveyed fell into the small-sized companies and only a very small 
proportion of them belonged to the medium- and large-sized companies (i.e., about 7 per 
cent and 3 per cent respectively) and, furthermore, only precious few of them were found 
to have prepared a written CM plan or a CM team (See Table 5.3). This could in turn 
have led to the insufficient variation in the Hong Kong sample, hence the weak 
association between company sizes and their crisis preparedness. 
 Nevertheless, the overall significant outcome from both of the two regions made 
it reasonable to suggest that company size in both Singapore and Hong Kong could 
basically be regarded as a significant factor influencing companies’ overall level of crisis 
preparedness. 
 
5.3.3 Age of companies and crisis preparedness 
As shown in Table 5.4 above, separate tests of one-way analysis of variance on 
companies from Singapore and Hong Kong showed clearly that, in neither places, 
 115
Chapter 5               Results and Discussions 
companies’ age could be observed to have any significant impact on companies’ overall 
crisis preparedness, although the mean scores of companies’ preparedness for all three 
groups of the Singapore sample exhibited the predicted direction.  Here, the findings 
seem to suggest that the assumed benefits of organisational learning for those companies 
that had operated for longer years were not reflected in their efforts for the CM work.  
One possible explanation for such findings might be that although older companies may 
have had more opportunities of learning than younger companies, there still remains a 
question whether the former was able to really recognise the importance of CM and 
subsequently make efforts to prepare for crises.  In other words, despite that the learning 
opportunities that come with longer operational periods, companies’ crisis preparedness 
may be more closely related to how top management of the companies actually think of 
and address the important issue of CM instead of how long the organisation has existed.  
Oftentimes, business managers or senior executives working within a given organisation 
observe and adopt a preferred set of practices and norms that constitute a distinctive, 
organisational approach to problem-solving and performance (Kahneman, et al., 1982).  
The set of rigid underlying assumptions as held by the top management of those older 
organisations may be difficult to change.  People forget information when it does not fit 
their agenda or their plans, as noted by Stubbart (1987).   
In short, it might be due to the lack of sufficient awareness of the CM importance 
among the top management of those older companies that has resulted in their failure to 
show any superiority in crisis preparations to the younger ones. 
There could be still another possible explanation for the failure of those older 
organisations in benefiting from their long years’ operation in respect of crisis awareness 
and preparations.  It could be due to the poor institutional memories those companies 
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were reduced to have as a result of a high turnover of employees, especially when the 
economy is good, which encourages job-hopping.  Job-hopping was quite common 
throughout Singapore and Hong Kong up to the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis.  
According to the author’s observation, the turnover rate for an average company in 
Singapore during the boom time could easily go up to 25 per cent or above.  With the 
continuous departure of staff, the companies were likely to lose out the valuable 
memories they had learnt in the past. On the other hand, those managers who neglected 
the importance of CM might also tend to forget the lessons and information they 
subjectively deemed unfit into their agenda or plans. 
 
5.3.4 Ownership and crisis preparedness 
Similar to the previous finding for companies’ age and its association with the 
organisations’ crisis preparedness, Table 5.4 indicates that there again was no statistically 
significant relationship, in either of the two regions, between companies’ ownership 
status and their overall level of crisis preparedness.  It is interesting to note that, in both 
Singapore and Hong Kong, MNCs - whether locally owned or foreign-owned - did in 
general appear to score higher in crisis preparedness means than those non-MNCs, as 
predicted, though the relationship was not significant.   
It is possible that the success of an MNC might have made its top management 
complacent about their development and accomplishment in today’s status.  In many 
cases, senior managers of MNCs could be led by their past success and their present 
organisational strength to uphold some impractical belief about their organisation’s real 
capability to handle emergency situations.  “Too often successful companies are 
complacent, and management often reads about other companies’ disasters with an it-
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can’t-happen-here attitude (Wisenblit, 1989: 33).”  In other words, the success of an 
MNC in its past growth may possibly result in its top management’s sense of inflated, if 
not totally false, security generated from a fallacy of organisational and management 
success so much so that the corporation may neglect or slow down its continued pursuit 
of a better system for dealing with uncertainties and emergency. As a result, an MNC’s 
superiority in developing and sustaining a high standard of CM may be weakened and its 
strength for gearing up good preparedness standard for responding to any crisis may not 
be able to pay off as well as any non-MNC.   
 
5.3.5 Industrial sector and crisis preparedness 
Table 5.4 displays an inconsistent result between the two samples from Singapore 
and Hong Kong regarding the dependence of companies of crisis preparedness on the 
industrial sectors in which they operated.  Specifically, industrial sector in Singapore 
could in totality be observed to have a significant association with companies’ crisis 
preparedness given its significance level at a less than 5 per cent, whereas it was not the 
same case in the Hong Kong sample.   
A further test by Post Hoc (Dunnett’s T3) measurement, however, shows that the 
significant relationship existed only between group (c) and group (a) of the Singapore 
companies surveyed (see the 5th outcome row of Table 5.4), which seemed to suggest 
that the overall relationship pattern, though statistically significant, was not strong in the 
predicted way and only those companies in high-risk sector in Singapore appeared to be 
significantly better prepared for crisis than those operating in low-risk sector, while the 
relationships between the group (a) and group (b) and between group (b) and group (c) 
were not significant as predicted. 
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Apparently, the result in this regard was somewhat different from the finding of 
Wisenblit’s study (1989) and also from Barton’s research and observation (1993 and 
2000), which found that companies operating in an industry characterized with recurring 
threats or crises tend to prepare themselves better than those running in a lower risk 
industry.  In some way, the inconsistent result from the two samples may probably be 
attributed to some prominent characteristics of current environment in the two regions.  
For Singapore, the island state has over the past decade faced with increasingly fierce 
competition from its neighbouring nations like Malaysia and Indonesia.  The imposing 
pressure from the rising rivals in their own drives for industrialization and economic 
development could have in some way eased off the distinctiveness between different 
sectors in terms of their risk/crisis probability initially inherent with each individual 
sector in the city state.  For Hong Kong, on the other hand, China’s opening up to the 
outside world for its four-modernization drive over the past more than two decades has 
granted numerous entrepreneurs and businesses in Hong Kong a unique and convenient 
access to the vast market and also hinderland for their business operation and 
development.  The unique access has been made easier especially after the territory was 
receded to the sovereignty of China on July 1, 1997.  In the 1990s, large numbers of 
Hong Kong businesses were found to move their operation sites/bases into mainland 
China, mostly in the adjacent Guangdong province, in an attempt to make a good use of 
the abundant cheap labour and other resources in the vast market and also enjoy the 
preferential policies provided by the opening-up country.8  The massive relocation of 
                                                 
8 It was estimated that, by mid-1990s, about 25,000 Hong Kong firms were operating plants in southern 
China, hiring 4-5 million workers there (Husain, 1997).  In Hong Kong’s manufacturing, it is estimated that 
more than 30 per cent of it has moved to the mainland China.  For some industries, like electronics and 
plastics, the percentage totals up to as much as 70-80 per cent (Feng, 1998, as cited by Lee, 1999: 175).  
 119
Chapter 5               Results and Discussions 
business operation sites/bases could have considerably reduced the risks or crises initially 
inherent with different industrial sectors in the Special Administrative Region.  All this 
changing situational characteristics might have to a various extent contributed to the 
inconsistent result of association between companies’ overall crisis preparedness and 
their operating industrial sectors.  As a result, they may possibly have outweighed the 
differences initially inherent with industrial sectors pertaining to crisis/risk probability 
and thus made the proposed association between companies’ industrial sector and crisis 
preparedness standard less prominent or significant. 
 
5.4    Crisis perception and awareness and crisis preparedness 
5.4.1 Managers’ crisis perceptions and crisis preparedness 
Table 5.5 below provides an array of statistical evidence reflecting managers’ 
perceptions and awareness of crises for their companies and of their roles in a crisis event 
as well.  Although companies in Hong Kong lagged behind their counterparts in 
Singapore in making specific preparations for crises, as mentioned earlier, it is interesting 
to note that managers from the former perceived higher likelihood of their companies’ 
encountering a crisis within this year and the next three years respectively.  Nearly 63 per 
cent of the mangers interviewed in Hong Kong, in contrast to nearly 76 per cent of their 
Singapore counterparts, predicted less than 50 per cent chance for their companies to 
encounter a crisis within this year, while nearly 45 per cent of the managers in Hong 
Kong, in comparison with 74 per cent of the Singapore managers, expected less than 50 
per cent chance of their companies to be hit by a crisis within the next three years.  
                                                                                                                                                 
     According to the latest survey conducted by Hong Kong Industrial Federation, the Hong Kong firms 
operating in China’s Guangdong province were estimated to employ the local Chinese workers up to as 
many as 7-8 million strong (Lianhe Zaobao, December 13, 2002, p. 31, citing a report by Hong Kong’s 
Chinese daily newspaper Ming Pao). 
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Meanwhile, when asked to compare with average companies in the United States of 
America, more managers interviewed in Hong Kong than their counterparts in Singapore 
(40 per cent over 29 per cent) were found to perceive higher likelihood for a typical 
company in their own environment (i.e., in either Hong Kong or Singapore) to encounter 
a crisis (Also see Table 5.5 for their means comparison).   
 
Table 5.5   Means Comparison of Crisis Awareness and Perception 
 
    Perceptions of the                               Singapore           Hong Kong       
    Following Items                                   (N = 200)             (N = 213)         
1. Likelihood of facing a crisis 
    (i).  During this year                                   1.34                      1.44            
    (ii). Within next 3 years                              1.27**                  1.55**           
 
2. Likelihood of a typical firm in the  
    local to encounter a crisis in com-              1.97*                    2.17*             
    parison with the firms in the US 
 
3. Level of knowledge of …in your 
    firm about his role in a crisis? 
     (i)   Average employees                             4.45                      4.23               
     (ii)  Top management                                 6.06                      5.92               
 
    
  Note:   The means above are derived from the scales as denoted in the following: 
    a.  Items 1 - 2 range from 1 (Less than 50 per cent chance) to 3 (More than 50 per cent 
chance); 
    b.  Item 3 ranges from 1 (Not at all knowledgeable) to 7 (Extremely knowledgeable). 
         The asterisks ** and * indicate the level of significance at less than 1 and 5 per cent. 
 
All this seems to suggest that the managers in Hong Kong companies exhibited a 
statistically higher awareness or perceptions of crises than their Singapore counterparts. 
 On the other hand, the Singapore companies are found to have performed better 
than the Hong Kong firms in managing to let both average employees and top 
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management in their firm become more knowledgeable about their role in a real crisis 
situation, as shown by the third item in Table 5.5.  With regard to organisational 
members’ awareness of their role in a crisis event involving their organisations, mean 
scores from both Singapore and Hong Kong samples seemed to suggest that top 
management across the two regions generally did have statistically a higher level of 
awareness than their subordinates regarding their individual roles in a crisis event when 
their companies have to face. 
In terms of the relationship between managers’ crisis perception and awareness 
and their companies’ overall level of crisis preparedness, Table 5.6 below reports some 
statistical findings.  First of all, among the three items listed in the table, only the results 
for the first item for the Hong Kong sample, namely, the comparative likelihood of crisis 
as perceived by managers in Hong Kong, appeared to have a prominent significant 
association with companies’ crisis preparedness.   
In other words, when managers in Hong Kong perceived a higher likelihood of 
their companies to encounter a crisis in comparison with average companies in the United 
State, their organisations appeared to be better prepared for crisis than those companies 
whose managers perceived a lower comparative likelihood of crisis.  It is interesting to 
note that no similar or significant relationship was observed across the three groups in the 
Singapore sample for the same item. Moreover, there appeared to be a negative 
association of managers’ perceived comparative likelihood of crisis with their companies’ 
crisis preparedness, though such a direction opposite to that for the Hong Kong sample 
was not statistically significant.   
Secondly, the results for the next two items in Table 5.6 indicate that, whether in 
Singapore or Hong Kong, managers’ prediction for their companies’ likelihood of 
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encountering a crisis within the year or next three years could not be observed as a 
significant predictor influencing their companies’ level of crisis preparedness.   
    
Table 5.6    
Comparison of Crisis Preparedness Means and Managers’ Crisis Perceptions 
 
 






(N = 200) 
Hong Kong 
(N = 213) 
1. Comparative Likelihood   
    (a) Lower Likelihood 
    (b) Similar Likelihood 

















a < b**; b > c; a < c
2. Likelihood This Year 
   (a) Less Than 50% Chance 
   (b) 50% Chance 
   (c) More Than 50% Chance 











3. Likelihood in Next 3 Years 
   (a) Less Than 50% Chance 
   (b) 50% Chance 
   (c) More Than 50% Chance 














Note:  The first item in the table is meant to ask for comparing the crisis likelihood for 
average companies in either Singapore or Hong Kong with the average companies in 
the United States.  For the specific questions related to the three items listed in the 
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Finally, with regard to the generally significant association among the different 
groups for the first item in Table 5.6, a further measurement with Post Hoc (with 
Dunnett’s T3) test reveals that only the relationship between groups (a) and (b) in the 
Hong Kong sample was statistically significant, while such a significant link could not be 
found between other groups in Hong Kong.  The finding seemed to suggest that the 
comparative likelihood of crisis as perceived by the managers in Hong Kong, though a 
significant factor as a whole, was at most weakly related to their companies’ crisis 
preparedness only.  
In short, the outcome generated from the one-way analysis of variance test on 
those three relevant items in Table 5.6 seems to suggest that, in either of the two regions, 
managers’ predictions and/or perceptions of their companies’ probability of facing a 
crisis did not appear to serve as a good and reliable predictor for their companies’ crisis 
preparedness level.  Such findings also appear to be incongruent with the rational 
organisational behaviour assumptions as observed by some researchers (Thompson, 
1967; and Reilly, 1987). 
To account for this finding, one phenomenon should not be neglected.  The 
current study has found that a majority of the companies surveyed in both Singapore (86 
per cent) and Hong Kong (68 per cent) expressed their confidence in responding well to a 
crisis when faced with one.  About two thirds of companies in the Singapore sample and 
44 per cent in the Hong Kong sample claimed that it was within their companies’ control 
to prevent a crisis from happening.  However, let’s recall the findings listed in Table 5.3 
earlier, where about 57 per cent of the companies in Singapore were found to prepare 
neither a written CM plan nor a CM team and about 47 per cent of them did not hold 
drills for their employees, while in Hong Kong more than 95 per cent of the companies 
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surveyed were found to have no written CM plan or CM team and nearly two thirds of 
them failed to have drills for their employees. 
In addition, even among those companies across the two regions that had not 
experienced any crisis in the past, many of them were found to appear confident or 
optimistic in their companies’ ability to handle crisis well.  Specifically, of those 
companies that had not encountered any crisis before, nearly 76 per cent in Singapore, in 
contrast to nearly 60 per cent in Hong Kong, claimed it was within their companies’ 
control to prevent any crisis from happening.  In comparison, among those companies 
that had been hit by a crisis in the past, only 39 per cent in Singapore in contrast to 46 per 
cent in Hong Kong, expressed the similar confidence in their ability to prevent a crisis.  
Obviously, those companies that had experienced a crisis before may be clearly aware of 
the damage from a crisis and therefore rate their confidence and ability for dealing with a 
new one by a more strict and realistic criterion, whereas those companies that had not 
encountered any crisis before may likely base their confidence or optimistic evaluation on 
something subjective rather than specific and substantial preparations.  Such a kind of 
confidence based on subjective reasoning could in fact have an insidious impact on their 
organisations once a crisis breaks out in future. 
All the evidence and analysis above seem to point to a pervasive and worrying 
tendency of over-confidence or false security among the companies across the two 
regions.  This pervasive phenomenon of false security may probably help account in part 
for the non-significant effect of managers’ perceived crisis likelihood on their companies’ 
overall crisis preparedness.  Moreover, they may even be capable of accounting in some 
way for the non-significant relationship between companies’ overall crisis preparedness 
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and those relevant organisational factors such as prior crisis experience, age, ownership 
status and industrial sectors discussed previously. 
 
5.4.2 Organisational members’ crisis role awareness and crisis preparedness 
 As indicated in Table 5.7 below, there existed in both Singapore and Hong Kong 
a very prominent statistically significant relationship between the level of awareness 
possessed by a company’s top management regarding their role in a crisis event and their 
organisation’ overall crisis preparedness.  In contrast, no such a significant association  
  
Table 5.7  Comparison of Organisational Members’ Crisis Role Awareness 




Mean Scores of Crisis Preparedness 
 
 
Knowledge Level  
About One’s Role  
in a Crisis Situation Singapore 
(N = 200) 
Hong Kong 
(N = 213) 
1.  Average Employees 
    - Not knowledgeable at all 
    - Somewhat knowledgeable  
    - Very knowledgeable  












2.  Top Management 
    - Not knowledgeable at all 
    - Somewhat knowledgeable  
    - Very knowledgeable  






















Chapter 5               Results and Discussions 
was observed between average employees’ awareness of their role in a crisis situation 
and their companies’ overall level of crisis preparedness.   
In other words, the results appeared to suggest that companies’ overall level of 
crisis preparedness was significantly and positively associated with the awareness level 
of top management, rather than average employees, regarding their role in a crisis 
situation which their organisation may have to face.  The more the top management 
learned about how they should respond to an unexpected emergency situation, the more 
prepared their organisation appeared to be for crises.   
The finding here may be relatively easy for interpretation given that companies 
across the two regions did not appear to have a high standard of crisis preparedness as a 
whole, as shown in Table 5.3.  It also seems to suggest that top management, due to their 
position, authority and discretion, are able to do something regarding CM and thus 
become influential to the CM in their organisations whereas average employees are not in 
a position to do anything about it, even though they may be aware of the CM importance 
for their companies. 
To a large extent, it may be due to the lack of sufficient recognition of CM 
importance among the top management of companies and their sense of false security or 
over confidence that had prevented them from committing needed resources to training 
their ordinary employees and familiarise them with their roles in a real crisis situation, 
hence leading to the non-significant relationship between their organisations’ crisis 
preparedness and their ordinary staff’s awareness of their own role in a crisis event to be 
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5.5 Impact of government’s role on crisis preparedness 
An examination by content analysis of the respondents’ replies to the relevant 
open-ended questions reveals that there is no sufficient information to prove any direct 
relationship between the difference of government’s role and companies’ crisis 
preparedness level between Singapore and Hong Kong.  In other words, there is no 
sufficient evidence or information for drawing such a conclusion that the differences of 
government’s role will subsequently produce a significant impact influencing companies’ 
crisis preparedness in a particular context.  Therefore, the hypothesis (i.e., Hypothesis 8) 
could not be supported. 
However, some phenomena regarding the association of government’s role and its 
influence on business people’s awareness of crisis and perception of crisis likelihood are 
worthy of our attention.  As indicated in Section 5.4.1 earlier, managers in Hong Kong as 
a whole were found to exhibit a higher level of crisis awareness and perceive higher 
likelihood of their companies to encounter a crisis in near future than their Singapore 
counterparts, but the Hong Kong companies in the survey did not appear to be as well 
prepared for crisis as those Singapore companies investigated.  Results of content 
analysis of respondents’ replies to the relevant probing open-ended questions showed that, 
among several factors influencing their perceptions of and preparations for crises for their 
companies, government’s role was counted as one major factor. 
When asked to predict a typical local company’s probability of experiencing a 
crisis in comparison with average ones operating in the United States, Hong Kong 
managers displayed a higher level of perceived crisis likelihood than their Singapore 
counterparts.  Specifically, out of the 185 Hong Kong respondents who made the 
prediction, 42 (or nearly 23 per cent) said local companies were less likely to experience 
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a crisis, as compared with 54 (or 32 per cent) out of 169 respondents in Singapore who 
replied to the similar inquiry.  On the other hand, a much higher percentage of Hong 
Kong respondents than that in Singapore (i.e., 40 per cent over 29 per cent) believed that 
the local companies were more likely to be hit by a crisis in comparison with companies 
in America. 
Table 5.8 below summarises the reasons given by the respondents for predicting 
lower likelihood of crisis for local companies in comparison with average companies in 
the United States.  As shown in the table, nearly half (or 46.3 per cent) of 54 Singapore 
respondents who predicted lower likelihood of crises for local companies counted the 
government’s stable administration and proactive and supportive policies and measures 
as the reason for their assessment result while only 2 out of 42 Hong Kong respondents  
 
Table 5.8  Crisis Less Likely in Comparison With Average Companies in USA 
 
 
Crises Less Likely 








(N = 42) 
% 
 
1.  Government’s Policies and 
Administration 
46.3 (25) 4.8 (2)
 
2.  Conducive Environment 29.6 (16) 26.2 (11)
 
3.  Culture 11.1 (6) 4.8 (2)
 
4.  More Prepared for Crises 5.6 (3) 26.2 (11)
 
5.  Small in Size/Scale 3.7 (2) 9.5 (4)
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who perceived lower likelihood of crisis did the same.   
By government’s role, the manager respondents referred to the government’s 
proactive and supportive policies and efficient administration and efforts for the growth 
and development of country/territory economy, sound laws and regulations, well 
organised social system, etc. 
For instance, one manager said, “In Singapore, the government has done a lot to 
prevent crisis from happening.”  Another Singapore respondent replied, “Our government 
will minimize the risk of crisis that we were facing.”  Still another Singapore manager 
said, “The government has measures to control the situation.” 
Again, more Singapore managers interviewed than their Hong Kong counterparts 
(nearly 30 per cent over 26 per cent) counted the stable and safe environment as another 
major factor for their perception of lower probability of crisis for local companies.  Here, 
environment was included by respondents from both Singapore and Hong Kong as one 
major favourable factor because it was regarded primarily as safe and stable and 
equipped with sound and advanced infrastructure, having little natural disasters as 
compared with America, and having a free business market (especially for Hong Kong), 
etc.  Clearly, most of all these characteristics of favorable environment were in fact 
closely related to the government’s role and therefore could also be regarded, to a certain 
extent, as a positive result or impact of government’s administration efforts. 
 On the other hand, among those who perceived higher possibility of crisis hitting 
local companies, a much higher percentage of Hong Kong respondents than their 
Singapore counterparts (16.2 per cent over 4.1 per cent) blamed the government for 
failure to do enough to help businesses with the CM practices. Hong Kong respondents 
were quoted as saying, “Hong Kong government adopts laissez-faire system, and so it’s 
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easier for crises to happen.”  “Hong Kong government does not provide any help to 
small- and medium-sized firms.”  “The policies of government changes so much that 
companies in Hong Kong would face more challenges.” 
 Based on their responses, results from the content analysis reveal that respondents 
generally agreed that crises were inevitable to businesses, particularly in today’s rapidly 
changing environment and it was costly to make preparations for a crisis in advance.  
Moreover, a crisis could strike in too many forms, which makes it all the more difficult to 
prepare for a crisis.  All these factors often made managers grow a mentality of 
resignation, feeling like giving up the proactive efforts.  Among those companies that 
failed to make any CM plan, 73 (or 57 per cent) of the 129 Hong Kong companies and 19 
(or about 41 per cent) of 46 claimed that it was no use or no need making such plans 
since preparations often cost lots of resources in time, money, people and expertise, and 
crises may strike in a great variety of forms. 
 From the findings and analysis above, it is obvious that government’s role did 
exert a significant influence on business people’s perceptions of crises and also on their 
confidence in handling crises they may have to face, though there appeared to be no 
sufficient evidence or information exhibiting any direct or explicit relationship between 
government’s role and companies’ preparedness for crisis in either of the two regions.   
However, based on the finding and evidence above, it seems to be fairly obvious 
that, with the assistance of government’s proactive business policies, business people 
would certainly feel more secure about their business environment and subsequently 
increase more confidence in dealing with crisis by making necessary advance 
preparations.  Drawn from the relevant results and analysis above and from Section 5.4.1 
regarding managers’ crisis perception and their companies’ crisis preparedness, it seems 
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to be reasonable to infer that perceptions of higher likelihood of crisis tend to dampen 
managers’ confidence and initiatives in making advance preparations for crisis.  
Government could play an important role in creating and maintaining a stable and 
conducive environment, which may in turn influence managers’ perceptions of and 
confidence in dealing with crises.  Government’s proactive role in maintaining a stable 
business environment with a lower probability of crisis occurrence could in some way 
help build up managers’ confidence in dealing with crises and moreover motivate 
managers to make proactive efforts to prepare for some emergency events, which they 
might otherwise find too difficult and subsequently could give up totally.  
 
5.6 Impact of news media on crisis preparedness 
 An examination of managers’ perception and assessment of the news media’s 
attitude towards a company that is hit by a crisis reveals that there appeared to be not 
much difference between Singapore and Hong Kong.  In the former, the mean scores of 
media’s attitude was rated 4.19 out of the 7-point scales with 1 representing “extremely 
hostile” and 7 meaning “extremely understanding”, whereas in the latter, the media was 
rated 3.95 in average in the scale, which seemed to suggest that the difference between 
the two regions did not appear to be so remarkable as initially expected, given the 
apparent different characteristics of the news media in the two regions as mentioned in 
Chapter 2.  However, findings from the content analysis based on respondents’ replies to 
a probing open-ended question reveal that more Hong Kong respondents than their 
Singapore counterparts gave a negative comment about the reporting style or attitude of 
the media in their society.  The finding shows that 42 (or nearly 20 per cent) out of 213 
respondents in Hong Kong, in comparison with 31 (or 15.5 per cent) out of 200 
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interviewees in Singapore, claimed the media in their society were “hostile”, “love to 
exaggerate the news”, “keen on sensationalizing issues to impose a bad image on 
companies”, etc.  Table 5.9 reports the results generated from one-way analysis of 
variance measurement comparing the difference in companies’ crisis preparedness means 
among three groups in both Singapore and Hong Kong samples in corresponding to their 
perceived attitude of the media in their society towards the companies when hit by a 
crisis. 
 The results from Table 5.9 indicate that, whether in Singapore and Hong Kong, 
there appeared to be no statistically significant relationship between the differences in the 
means of companies’ crisis preparedness and their perceived media attitude in their own 
society.  In other words, whether the media was perceived as hostile or understanding 
 
Table 5.9   
Comparison of Companies’ Perceived Media Attitude Towards Their Companies 
When Hit by a Crisis Versus Their Companies’ Crisis Preparedness 
 
 




Perceived Media Attitude 
Singapore 
(N = 194) 
Hong Kong 
(N = 202) 
 
(a)  Hostile 
(b)  Neutral  
(c)  Understanding 
 
                   
1.98  (n =40)
2.12 (n = 77)
2.27 (n = 77)
F = 0.58
 P = 0.56
0.70 (n = 54)
0.87 (n = 99)
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towards a company encountering a crisis did not seem to produce any significant impact 
influencing the company’s level of crisis preparedness subsequently in either Singapore 
or Hong Kong. 
The survey questionnaire also included one item capable of reflecting the 
manager respondents’ perception or awareness of media’s role for the success of CM 
efforts. The question was meant to request for ranking the importance of media as one 
major target audience to the company during a crisis.9  Table 5.10 below reports the 
results based on one-way analysis of variance indicating that, in the Singapore sample, 
the differences in the means of companies’ overall crisis preparedness appeared to be 
positively related to the level of their managers’ perceived importance of media as a 
major target audience during a crisis event faced by their companies and such a  
  
Table 5.10   
Comparison of Companies’ Perceived Media Role Versus Crisis Preparedness 
 
 




Perceived Media Role 
Singapore 
(N = 195) 
Hong Kong 
(N = 213) 
 
(a)  Not Important 
(b)  Somewhat Important 
(c)  Important 
 
                   
Post Hoc
1.30   (n =27)
1.91  (n = 66)
2.55 (n = 102)
F = 10.19
 P = 0.000
a < b; b < c**; a < c***
0.84 (n = 81)
0.73 (n = 94)






                                                 
9 See Question No. 39 in the survey questionnaire in Appendix A. 
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relationship is also generally statistically significant between all the groups except groups 
(a) and (b).  With regard to the Hong Kong sample, no similar result and significant 
association was observed, as can be seen from the table.  
Such an inconsistent finding from Singapore and Hong Kong should not be too 
surprising given the marked differences of the media between the two regions.  One 
possible explanation for the non-significant association between managers’ perceived 
importance of the media in Hong Kong as one major target audience for the crisis-hit 
companies and their companies’ crisis preparedness could be owing to the relatively low 
credibility of the media in the territory.  Such a situation may have probably resulted 
from the propensity of some media in pursuing commercialism and sensationalisation of 
news events/stories at the expense of public benefits.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, a 
recent opinion survey revealed that Hong Kong’s media were ranked lower than their 
counterparts in Singapore and Japan in terms of the public credibility and sense of 
responsibility (Hong Kong Economic Journal, as quoted in Lianhe Zaobao, April 21, 
2001, p.30).  As a result, the media may not appear to be an ideal or reliable source or 
channel in the mind of many managers and/or executives in that particular context for 
developing and/or maintaining an image for their organisations.  
 
5.7      Multiple regression analysis 
So far, the relationship between all the independent variables and the integrated 
overall crisis preparedness of the company has been examined and measured primarily by 
the way of t-tests or one-way analysis of variance.  At the same time, Hypothesis 8 about 
the impact of government’s role on company’s overall crisis preparedness has also been 
examined, measured and analysed by means of content analysis.  As already indicated in 
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Chapter 4, these bi-variate statistical analysis could not rule out nor adjust for the 
potential confounding effects resulting from the correlations of the relevant variables in 
the analysis with a third variable.  For example, it was found that, by means of one-way 
analysis of variance, a company’s overall level of crisis preparedness was positively and 
significantly associated with the company size in terms of employee numbers.  The larger 
a company, the better prepared it would appear to be for responding to and dealing with 
crises.  However, those large companies, in comparison with small ones, might often turn 
out simultaneously to be the ones that have operated for longer years, or have become an 
MNC or experienced a crisis before.  As a result, the better preparedness of those large 
companies might in a certain way be attributed to the differences in terms of their length 
of operation or age, their ownership status, prior crisis experience, etc. 
To adjust for the potential confounding effects, multiple linear regression models 
were employed as a final measurement testing the relationship between the companies’ 
overall crisis preparedness and each relevant explanatory variable simultaneously in one 
model and determining whether each of those hypotheses under test could be ultimately 
supported or rejected.  As we know, the multiple regression method is capable of testing 
the dependence of companies’ preparedness on each of the independent variables in 
regression equation assuming all other independent variables in regression equation are 
held constant. 
Table 5.11 reports the outcome based on the multiple regression analysis, as 
introduced in Chapter 4, displaying the coefficients in the standardized form.  The table 
shows that the explanatory power of the regression model is 30.4 per cent and 16.2 per 
cent in accounting for companies’ overall crisis preparedness in Singapore and Hong 
Kong respectively.   
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Table 5.11  Results of Multiple Regression Analysis  
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    Coefficients (Beta) 
 Explanatory Variablea     
    Singapore     Hong Kong    Combined Sample  
          (A)     (B)  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
  
 Prior Experience  .114  .160+  .077  .103+ 
 Size    .303*** .130  .350*** .291***  
 Age    .003  -.011  .051  -0.005   
 Ownership 
    - Local MNCs  .096  .173+  .084  .085+  
    - Foreign MNCs  .026  -.055  .086  -.017 
 Industrial Sector  .145+  -.097  .058  .026   
  
Comparison with US -.071  -.008  -.026  -.025  
 Crisis Perceptions -.016  -.066  -.059  -.062  
 Average Employees’  
       Role Awareness  .038   .083  .060  .053 
Top Management’s  
     Role awareness  .177*   .231*  .175**  .178** 
 
 Media’s Attitude   .085  -.039  .044  .010 
 Media as Audience  .298*** -.028  .192*** .135*   
 Location (S’pore = 1)       .284***  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
                R2    0.304  0.162  .325  .366 
 Adjusted R2   0.240  0.074  .293  .334 




 a Due to the space constraint, a brief form for the variable is used, wherever necessary, to 
refer to those independent variables as defined and illustrated in Chapter 4 (also refer to 
Table 4.1). For example, “Comparison with US” refers to the variable of managers’ 
perceived likelihood of crisis for their company in comparison with the crisis likelihood 
for average companies in the United States; “Media’s attitude” refers to managers’ 
perceived attitude of media towards a company when hit by a crisis; and “Media as 
audience” refers to managers’ perceived importance of media as a major target audience 
during a crisis situation faced by their company. 
b.    The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate the level of significance respectively at less than 0.1 
percent, 1 percent and 5 percent.   
c.   The plus + indicates the level of significance at 10 per cent.  
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After the two samples were combined using the multiple linear regression model, 
first without and then with the addition of the location variable,10 we can see a different 
outcome as listed in Column A and Column B of Table 5.11.   The outcome exhibits that, 
with the addition of location variable into the regression model, the resulting explanatory  
power for the companies’ overall crisis preparedness was increased to over 36.6 per cent 
as listed in Column B from below 32.5 per cent as listed in Column A.  The results in 
Column B also indicate that the location variable appeared to function as a highly 
influential factor affecting companies’ overall crisis preparedness, which in turn seems to 
suggest that there may exist a considerable difference as a whole between Singapore and 
Hong Kong in terms of companies’ preparation for crisis. 
Viewed in totality, Table 5.11 shows that those 11 independent variables can 
jointly explain 30 per cent (i.e., R2 is 0.304) of the overall crisis preparedness among the 
Singapore companies, while they can jointly explain about 16 per cent (i.e., R2 is 0.16) of 
the overall crisis preparedness among the Hong Kong companies. 
Meanwhile, among those 11 variables placed in the regression model separately 
for the Singapore and Hong Kong samples, three variables appeared to be statistically 
significant for the former in contrast to only one appearing to be significant for the latter. 
In addition, only one of those 12 variables, that is, management’s awareness of 





                                                 
10 The location variable was coded as “1” for Singapore and “0” for Hong Kong, as described in Chapter 4. 
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5.7.1 Effects of organisational factors on crisis preparedness 
First of all, with regard to the association of companies’ prior crisis experience 
with companies’ overall crisis preparedness, the results of regression analysis in Table 
5.11 show that prior experience in either Singapore or Hong Kong appeared to be a 
statistically non-significant independent variable in affecting companies’ overall level of 
crisis preparedness, which seemed to suggest that, in both Singapore and Hong Kong, 
whether or not companies had encountered a crisis in the past did not produce any 
significant impact on their subsequent status of overall crisis preparedness.  In other 
words, companies that had been hit by a crisis before were not found to have well drawn 
the hard-earned lesson and become better prepared for future crises than those that had 
never before met any crisis.  The results generated from the regression model here are 
similar to those from the t-test measurement, as discussed in Section 5.3.1 previously.  
Moreover, the finding here is also consistent with Reilly’s earlier study conducted in the 
United States (1987).  
As mentioned previously in Section 5.3.1, managers’ failure or even reluctance to 
attach sufficient importance to the CM efforts and practices for their companies’ steady 
operation and development may well be attributed to such a non-significant relationship 
in this regard.  Furthermore, the mentality or attitude of resignation as found among many 
managers and executives in addressing the inevitable businesses crises, and concurrently 
the pervasive mentality of false security or over-confidence among managers and 
executives in their actual ability to respond to and cope with crises may also have in some 
way contributed to such findings. All these factors might have to a various extent 
hindered those companies hit by crises before from really benefiting from drawing 
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valuable lessons from their learning experiences, subsequently failing to make any 
change for improvement in crisis preparations in the end. 
Based on the findings from both t-test measurement and regression analyses, 
therefore, the hypothesis about the association of companies’ overall crisis preparedness 
with their prior crisis experience (i.e., Hypothesis 1) was not supported. 
With regard to the explanatory variable of company size, Table 5.11 shows an 
inconsistent outcome respectively for the Singapore and Hong Kong samples.  While it 
was highly significant in the former (i.e., at the 0.1 per cent significance level), it was not 
statistically significant at all in the latter, which is also somewhat different from the 
results from one-way analysis of variance, as illustrated in Table 5.4 previously. The one-
way analysis of variance testing performed on the Hong Kong sample revealed that 
company size was on the whole a significant variable capable of influencing the 
companies’ crisis preparedness, though such a significant association was actually found 
to be rather weak, as evidenced by the result of a Post Hoc test. 
One possible explanation for the failure of company size to appear as a significant 
variable from the multiple regression analysis for the Hong Kong sample might possibly 
be due to the obvious characteristics of the Hong Kong sample, with only a very limited 
number of medium and large firms, as mentioned in Section 5.3.2.  Furthermore, only a 
very small percentage of the companies in Hong Kong were found to have prepared a 
written CM plan (about 2 per cent only) or CM team (4.2 per cent), which might probably 
have resulted in an overall low crisis preparedness means among Hong Kong companies, 
as shown previously from those tests by one-way analysis of variance. All these could 
have caused an insufficient variation in the Hong Kong sample and in turn led to a non-
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significant association between Hong Kong companies’ crisis preparedness and their size 
and many other factors under study, or only a weak association only. 
However, companies’ crisis preparedness, or the dependent variable in this study, 
is an index variable made up of four factors (See Table 5.3).  Although very few 
companies in Hong Kong were found to have a written CM plan or CM team, a good 
number of them were found to have planned for crisis and conducted drills for their 
employees, which would make the dependent variable valid and reliable for the testing 
and analysis in this study.   
Still another possible explanation for the inconsistent outcome regarding the 
relationship between companies’ crisis preparedness and their size could be due to the 
different definitions and operationalisation of company sizes for the two different 
regions.11
Given the inconsistent outcome from the two regions, a conclusion could 
probably be drawn that the predicted positive relationship between companies’ overall 
crisis preparedness and company size is true only in Singapore but not in Hong Kong, 
and therefore Hypothesis 2 about such a positive association could not be supported on 
the whole.  In other words, it was supported only in the context of Singapore.   
From Table 5.11, it is found that companies’ age, whether in Singapore or Hong 
Kong, did not appear to be statistically significant in accounting for companies’ overall 
crisis preparedness.  The findings here are consistent with those from one-way analysis of 
variance measurement, as illustrated in Table 5.4.  As mentioned previously, such results 
could possibly be caused by the high turnover of the employees, thus resulting in the loss 
                                                 
11 Please refer to the second footnote in Chapter 4 for the definitions of company sizes for Singapore and 
Hong Kong. 
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of the so-called institutional memories and the valuable lessons. Also it could be 
attributed to the rigid perceptions and attitude among the top management of the 
organisations, especially for those that have fortunately been spared with any crisis 
encounters before.  For example, one senior manager from Singapore who was confident 
that a crisis was unlikely to occur to his company said, “Never in my 30 years have I 
experienced a crisis”.  A similar attitude was also found among some other manager 
respondents in both of the two regions.  To them, a crisis was something that happened to 
other organisations.  These managers had their perceptions supported by luck, which may 
in turn justify their neglect or downgrading of the importance of crisis preparations for 
their organisations and prevent them from drawing from other companies’ crisis lessons.  
On the other hand, a lack of sufficient awareness of CM importance, resignation, or over-
confidence, could also have contributed to this outcome.  A number of other managers 
held that crises were due to external factors beyond their control and there was nothing 
they could do to plan about it.  They seemed to believe in a fate for their organisations 
and themselves regarding the chance of crisis encountering.  They demonstrated an 
attitude of resignation when addressing the issues of crisis and CM.  Such belief or 
attitude could have made the managers adhere to their own preferred set of practices and 
norms that constitute a distinctive, organisational approach to problem-solving and 
performance, as noted by Kahneman and his co-researchers (1982). Subsequently, the 
benefits of organisational learning, if any, from their longer years of operations could 
well be ignored and wasted. 
Based on the results generated from both one-way analysis of variance 
measurement and the regression model as shown in Tables 5.4 and 5.11, the hypothesis 
about companies’ age or operational years in relation to their crisis preparedness (i.e., 
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Hypothesis 3) for both Singapore and Hong Kong companies alike could not be 
supported.   
In terms of companies’ ownership versus crisis preparedness, the regression 
results in Table 5.11 are basically consistent with those results generated from one-way 
analysis of variance as listed in Table 5.4, though the former also indicates that the 
ownership in Hong Kong was in some way statistically related to companies’ crisis 
preparedness between local MNCs and local non-MNCs.  That is, local MNCs in Hong 
Kong appeared to be more prepared for crises than local non-MNCs, but such a 
relationship was found at the 10 per cent significance level, which was often regarded by 
some researchers as a moderately significant relationship.  From a rigorous and 
conventional perspective, nevertheless, MNCs in both Singapore and Hong Kong, be they 
locally owned or foreign owned, were not observed to have any statistically significant 
superiority in terms of their organisations’ overall crisis preparedness (in comparison 
with the local non-MNCs as the base group in the model).  In other words, ownership was 
not observed as a significant predictor capable of influencing companies’ overall crisis 
preparedness, as shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.4 alike. 
As discussed in Section 5.3.4 earlier, possible major reasons for this unexpected 
finding could include the complacent or inflated security mentality that was often held 
among business managers/executives of successful or large companies, as observed by 
some researchers (Boulas, 1998; Cox, 1999; Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990; and Wisenblit, 
1989).  Complacency and over-confidence among managers and/or senior executives of 
large companies may have well prevailed among the MNC managers/executives, which 
have in effect resulted in their neglect of the importance of CM endeavours and crisis 
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preparations and meanwhile dampened their initiatives for making a good use of their 
organisations’ superiority for crisis preparations. 
Given the results from the regression analysis in Table 5.11 above and also from 
the one-way analysis of variance shown in Table 5.4, therefore, the hypothesis about 
company’s ownership versus the organisation’s crisis preparedness for both Singapore 
and Hong Kong (i.e., Hypothesis 4) was not supported.  
Table 5.11 shows that industrial sector in either Singapore or Hong Kong did not 
appear to be a prominent significant factor in influencing companies’ crisis preparedness, 
although the sector variable in the sample of the former, given its significance level at the 
less than 10 per cent, is often interpreted by some researchers as having a moderately 
significant impact on companies’ preparedness level.  In line with the conventional 
benchmark observed throughout this study, the difference of industrial sectors in either of 
the two regions is interpreted as bearing no significant impact on companies’ crisis 
preparedness in this study. 
This finding, though consistent with the results from one-way analysis of variance 
measurement as discussed in Section 5.3.5, appears to be different from Wisenblit’s 
(1989) study regarding the association of companies’ crisis preparations with the specific 
characteristics and nature and crisis/disaster probability inherent with their industrial 
sectors and also inconsistent with Barton’s (1993 and 2000) research and observation.   
Possible explanations for such findings have been explored and discussed earlier 
in Section 5.3.5, which are closely related to the two regions’ history.  Those relevant 
factors as highlighted earlier should be taken into full consideration in the attempt to 
account for the findings in this regard.  For Singapore, the widespread “permanent sense 
of crisis” (Yuen, 1998) and “perennial vulnerability” (Ramakrishnan, 1998) caused by 
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the peculiar geographical make-up of the island state, as mentioned in Chapter 2, and, 
moreover, the escalating competition between the Republic and its neighbouring 
countries in the past decade could have considerably enhanced the sense of crisis in the 
mind of general public including managers and/or senior executives.  This could in some 
way help to account for the overall higher level of crisis preparedness among Singapore 
companies than that for their counterparts in Hong Kong, as shown in Table 5.3.  The 
perennial sense of crisis and the imposing pressure from the rising national rivals might 
have in some way outweighed the difference of industrial sectors in terms of their 
crisis/risk probability and prompted people to view all industries in quite a similar way.  
For Hong Kong, on the other hand, the past decade has witnessed the unprecedented and 
massive movement or relocation of operation sites from Hong Kong to mainland China, 
which should have in turn remarkably reduced the risks and crises originally inherent 
with the sectors when they were in Hong Kong and meanwhile increased the profitability 
in the new environment.  Moreover, the massive relocation of operation sites/bases may 
have also eased off the differences in crisis probability between various sectors.12  
Consequently, industrial sector has become an insignificant factor in accounting for 
companies’ crisis preparedness in either of the two regions. 
In addition, managers’ failure to attach due importance to CM efforts and 
practices, their over-confidence or resignation attitude or mentality as mentioned 
previously may also contribute in some way to the non-significant relationship between 
their companies’ crisis preparedness and the actual sectors their organisations were from.
 Based on the findings listed in Table 5.11 above and in Table 5.4, therefore, 
                                                 
12 Please refer to the 7th footnote in this chapter for relevant information and source. 
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Hypothesis 5 about the proposed association between companies’ crisis preparedness and 
industrial sector was not supported. 
 
5.7.2 Effects of organisational people’s perceptions on crisis preparedness 
Table 5.11 indicates that, whether in Singapore or Hong Kong, there was no 
significant relationship between managers’ perceptions of crisis likelihood and their 
organisations’ level of crisis preparedness, which is basically consistent with the results 
generated from the one-way analysis of variance as illustrated in Table 5.6.  Therefore, 
the hypothesis regarding the particular association (i.e., Hypothesis 6) was not supported.   
In the regression model, this hypothesis was tested with two variables, as listed in 
the table.  One is managers’ perception of comparative crisis likelihood for their 
companies.  That is, their perceived likelihood of crisis their companies may have to face 
in comparison with average companies in the United States.  The other variable is about 
their predictions of crisis likelihood that their companies may possibly encounter within 
the next one to three years.  Neither variable, across the two regions, was observed to 
have any significant impact at all on the organisation’s overall crisis preparedness.  Such 
findings could also be interpreted as whether managers perceived of any crisis looming 
for their organisations did not result in any significant difference in their efforts to 
increase their organisations’ actual capability for dealing with that imminent uncertainty.  
As already discussed in Section 5.4.1, the findings appear to contradict the normal 
assumptions of rational organisational behaviour as observed by Thompson (1967).  And 
one possible major reason to account for it could be due to the mentality of false security 
or over-confidence commonly held among the managers and executives across the two 
regions, as identified by some scholars in the context of Asia (Boulas, 1998; Cox, 1999).  
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This mentality does not only exist among senior business executives in Asia, but is also 
common among many organisations in the West, as observed by Mitroff and his research 
colleagues (Mitroff and Pauchant, 1990; Mitroff and Anagnos, 2001).  This kind of 
insidious mentality or attitude held among the top management of many companies in the 
survey could have made their organisations fall prey to an “illusion of invulnerability” 
(Janis and Mann, 1977: 130).  
Furthermore, in Hong Kong, the prominent propensity among many entrepreneurs, 
especially those for small- and medium-sized firms, for taking a short-term perspective 
and pursuing the maximum gains at a risk (Yu, 1997) may probably have been reflected 
in their addressing and handling of crisis preparations and other CM issues.  
Subsequently, the over-confidence mentality plus the risk-taking propensity may have 
jointly contributed to the non-significant association of managers’ perceptions of crisis 
likelihood and their companies’ overall crisis preparedness. 
With regard to the relationship between organisational members’ awareness of 
their role in a crisis event and the overall crisis preparedness of their organisations, the 
results from Table 5.11 above appear to be well consistent with the findings generated 
from the one-way analysis of variance in Table 5.7.  Therefore, it seems to be justifiable 
to conclude that the hypothesis about the positive association of companies’ crisis 
preparedness and all organisational members’ knowledge regarding their role in a crisis 
event (i.e., Hypothesis 7) was not supported.  Table 5.11 shows that average employees’ 
awareness of their individual role in a crisis event appeared to bear no significant 
association at all with their organisation’s overall crisis preparedness, in either Singapore 
or Hong Kong.  In contrast, the top management’s awareness of their role in a crisis 
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situation was found to have a highly significant impact in influencing their companies’ 
crisis preparedness in both Singapore and Hong Kong.   
The evidence here also highlights the special importance of top management’s 
support of and dedication to the CM efforts as an integral link to the success of an 
organisation’s CM repertoire, which has been emphasized by CM expert Mitroff and 
many other CM scholars and practitioners, was commonly received and shared by top 
management of business companies. 
As already discussed in Section 5.4.2, the non-significant relationship between 
ordinary staff’s crisis role awareness and their companies’ crisis preparedness could be 
possibly attributed to a reflection of ordinary staff’s actual influence in their 
organisations’ CM and, moreover, the neglect of CM importance among the top 
management of many organisations and their over-estimation of their actual ability to 
deal with crises.  The factors related to the top management may have well prevented 
many companies from committing needed resources to enabling their ordinary 
employees’ to learn more about their individual roles in a crisis situation. 
 
5.7.3 Effects of media factor on crisis preparedness 
Based on the results of the multiple regression model listed in Table 5.11, it is 
found that media’s attitude, as perceived and rated by the managers in this study, towards 
a company encountering a crisis did not appear to have any significant impact in 
influencing companies’ overall crisis preparedness in either Singapore or Hong Kong, 
which was consistent with the finding from the test of one-way analysis of variance, as 
illustrated in Table 5.9.  However, managers’ ranking of media’s importance as one 
major audience during a crisis faced by the company is found to produce a different 
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outcome between the Singapore and Hong Kong samples.  Specifically, in Singapore, 
managers’ perceived importance of media as one major target audience to their 
companies amid a crisis event was significantly associated with their organisations’ level 
of crisis preparedness, while in Hong Kong no such a significant link was observed 
among the companies surveyed.  All the findings here again are congruent with the 
results generated from the one-way analysis of variance measurement as shown in Table 
5.10.  Therefore, Hypothesis 9 proposing that companies’ overall crisis preparedness was 
associated with their perception of media’s operating style and media’s crucial role for 
the success of companies CM efforts and practices in both Singapore and Hong Kong 
alike was not supported, although companies’ perception level of media’s importance for 
the success of the whole CM repertoire was observed to bear a highly significant impact 
on companies’ crisis preparedness in the Singapore sample alone. 
As already discussed in Section 5.6, such a conclusion about the media’s 
perceived role for the success of CM across Singapore and Hong Kong should not be too 
surprising given the considerably different characteristics found in the news media across 
the two regions in terms of their professional approaches and activities, and values and 
philosophy they have all along emphasized and pursued. 
Singapore’s relatively controlled environment and regulations for media’s 
operation and activities could probably have made the media more conscious in 
disciplining themselves and functioning as a more reliable information source and 
channel for the general public in comparison with Hong Kong’s media, thus enabling 
business managers/executives to realise the media’s crucial role in the success of the 
whole CM efforts and practices and find them more approachable and reliable for 
entering into a healthy and effective communication link.  In contrast, the adamant 
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pursuit of press freedom and commercialisation in the name of the public’s interests by 
the Hong Kong’s media might have to some extent reduced their credibility, prompting 
business people as well as the general public to shun the media and suspect or 
underestimate their real effect for good CM.  Such a situation could prevent business 
people from well identifying and realising the media’s importance for a high standard of 
CM work in their own environment.  Consequently, a significant difference was found 
here between Singapore and Hong Kong in terms of managers’ perceived importance of 
news media’s role for the success of their companies’ CM efforts and practices.  
 
5.8   Summary 
This chapter has basically reported and discussed the results generated from 
several research techniques employed in an attempt to explore and examine the 
relationship between companies’ overall level of crisis preparedness and a number of 
proposed explanatory variables.  Except the variable regarding the impact of 
government’s role, all the variables were tested and measured with both one-way analysis 
of variance and multiple regression analysis examining each proposed explanatory 
variable in its capability to account for the variances in companies’ overall crisis 
preparedness and comparing their impacts on companies’ preparedness between the two 
regions. 
The outcome of the data processing and analysis from the two samples reveals 
that in general there appeared to be a considerable disparity between Singapore and Hong 
Kong in terms of companies’ overall preparations for crisis although on the whole 
companies in either Singapore or Hong Kong did not appear to have sufficiently prepared 
themselves for crisis.  Meanwhile, hardly any single explanatory variable under study 
 150
Chapter 5               Results and Discussions 
was found to be able to produce a similar and consistent impact significantly on 
companies’ overall crisis preparedness across the two regions.  Out of a total of 11 
explanatory factors or variables under study, only one factor, that is, the top 
management’s awareness of their role in a crisis situation, was found to be significantly 
related to their companies’ overall crisis preparedness in both Singapore and Hong Kong.  
In most cases, however, the same variables were found to produce a different impact on 
companies’ crisis preparedness from one region to the other.  For example, company size 
and managers’ perceived importance of media’s role for company’s CM appeared to bear 
a significant impact in influencing companies’ crisis preparedness in the Singapore 
sample, but the same relationship could not be observed in the Hong Kong sample.   
On the other hand, of the whole list of 11 proposed independent variables tested 
in the regression model for both regions, only one was found to have a significant 
association with companies’ crisis preparedness in the Hong Kong sample.  Such an 
unexpected outcome could possibly have been caused by the insufficient variation of the 
Hong Kong sample (i.e., only a very small proportion of firms in medium- and large-
sized categories).  Moreover, the generally low means of crisis preparedness for Hong 
Kong companies generated probably by very few firms having prepared a written CM 
plan or set up a CM team could also have, together with the possible insufficient variation 
in the sample, led to the non-significant associations of the most proposed variables and 
companies’ crisis preparedness in Hong Kong.   In addition, the outcome also seemed to 
suggest that companies’ crisis preparedness among Hong Kong firms may probably be 
influenced by other factors that have not been identified or captured for this study. 
Meanwhile, the results in this study have also revealed that the managers’ 
perceptions of crisis did not appear to bear any significant impact on companies’ CM 
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repertoire in Singapore and Hong Kong, and nor did the government’s role appear to 
exert any direct effect on companies’ CM practices and crisis preparedness level as 
predicted. 
The next chapter will attempt to draw conclusions from the findings of the current 
study as well as discuss the limitations of this study and potential areas for future 
research in the field.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 As one of the first few attempts of empirical research of CM in an Asian context, 
the primary objective of this study has, by means of personal interviews in two surveys 
with managers and executives from 413 companies in Singapore and Hong Kong, been to 
explore and ascertain some realities among the companies in terms of their current status 
of crisis preparedness.  In pursuit of its primary goal, the current study has made a close 
study of nearly a dozen selected factors or variables in respect to their potential 
association with the companies’ overall status of crisis preparedness, examining and 
measuring whether and how those factors bear any significant discrepancies in their 
actual impact on companies’ overall crisis preparedness in the two industrialized 
economies in Asia. 
Having reported the results from the data analysis and provided some necessary 
discussion and analysis for the interpretation of those results, this chapter intends first of 
all to draw a summary, based on the foregoing reports and discussions, of what could be 
possibly concluded as meaningful findings for this study.  After that follows a brief 
discussion on the limitations of the current study and suggestions for some possible major 
directions/areas of future research.  
 
6.1 Summary of major findings of the current study 
Major findings of this study are to be summarised below in a way that is in 
corresponding to the two research questions brought up at the very beginning of this 
dissertation. 
Chapter 6               Conclusion 
Concerning the first research question about the major factors that may affect the 
business companies’ overall crisis preparedness in Singapore and Hong Kong, the main 
findings of this study are summarized as follows: 
 
1. Top management’s awareness of their individual roles in a crisis situation faced 
by the company is considerably influential in ensuring an organisation to develop and 
maintain a high standard of preparedness for responding to and dealing with unexpected 
occurrence of crises, as this factor was observed in the current study to bear a consistent 
significant impact, in both Singapore and Hong Kong, in influencing the organisation’s 
overall level of crisis preparedness.  Therefore, it may be justifiable to emphasize, and in 
fact one can never overemphasize, that the CM work and responsibility should not be 
confined only to those people or managers directly involved in that function.  Instead, it 
is imperative for all the members of top management in a company to be clearly aware of 
their individual roles and responsibilities in an event when an unexpected crisis befalls 
their organisations.  Moreover, the top management should manage to familiarize 
themselves with their role and duty in normal times prior to the outbreak of any crisis. 
 
2. Managers’ perceptions of crisis likelihood differ considerably from one to another 
even in the same environment, but their perceived likelihood of crises which their 
companies may have to face in near future do not appear to significantly lead to any 
different result in their companies’ overall status of crisis preparedness in either 
Singapore or Hong Kong.  This could probably be attributed to the common mentality of 
false security, as already observed by a number of researchers in the CM field, and also to 
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the pervasive propensity of business people, especially in Hong Kong, in taking a risk for 
pursuing the maximum gains at a risk with a short-term orientation. 
 
3. There exists a common mentality of false security or over-confidence among 
managers/executives across the two regions about their companies’ confidence and actual 
capability to respond to and dealing with the attack of crises, whether or not their 
companies had experienced a crisis in the past.  Considering that the two surveys were 
conducted after the devastating Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998, in which many 
companies were badly hurt or affected, such a finding appeared to be both alarming and 
puzzling.  The pervasive mentality should indeed merit deep concern and sufficient 
attention as it may remarkably hinder new efforts for improvement on crisis preparedness 
and other CM repertoire among business people. 
 
4. The impact of government’s policies and administration in industries and 
economy is found in this study to have no direct impact on companies’ overall level of 
crisis preparedness, although it could be inferred from the results of content analysis 
discussed earlier that government’s role may be influential to managers/executives in 
their perception and evaluation of crisis within their own environment.  Although 
managers’ perception of higher likelihood of crises appeared to have no direct impact on 
their companies’ crisis preparedness, nevertheless, the results of content analysis seemed 
to indicate that it may dampen business people’s confidence in and initiatives for making 
advance preparations for crises.  The content analysis results seemed to suggest that 
government’s consistent and proactive interventions might help in some way make the 
business people feel more secure about their business environment, subsequently 
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increasing their confidence in and initiative for preparing themselves for the attack of any 
crisis in advance. 
 
5. The media’s attitude towards a company that is hit by a crisis is perceived in a 
slightly different way between business managers/executives in Singapore and in Hong 
Kong, but media’s attitude as perceived and rated by the managers and/or executives 
under study did not seem to produce any significant impact on companies’ overall level 
of crisis preparedness in either of the two regions. 
 
6. In Singapore, companies’ overall crisis preparedness is also found to be positively 
related to two other factors or variables in addition to the factor about top management’s 
awareness of their own roles in a crisis situation mentioned above.  These two factors are 
(a) company size, and (b) company’s perception of media’s importance for crisis 
communication.  Both factors appeared to have a very obvious significant association 
with their organisation’s overall status of crisis preparedness, but such a significant link is 
not found among the companies in Hong Kong.   
Specifically, in Singapore, large companies, with their superiority in respect to the 
needed relevant resources, appeared to be better prepared for crisis than small ones.  
When managers of companies are clearly aware of the media’s important role and take 
action to build an effective relationship with the media, their companies’ crisis 
preparedness standard could be affected positively.  However, similar significant 
association could not be observed among Hong Kong companies. 
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With regard to the second research question about the general level of business 
companies’ crisis preparedness in the two regions, the major finding of this study is 
concluded as follows: 
   
7. The overall crisis preparedness among business companies in either Singapore or 
Hong Kong, when viewed in totality, appears to be still far from a desirable standard, 
although companies in the former seemed to have performed better on the whole than 
their counterparts in the latter in terms of the four critical aspects, namely, a general plan 
for crisis, a written CM plan, a CM team, and drills for employees to prepare themselves 
for responding to crises.  In other words, business companies across the two regions are 
in general not sufficiently prepared for responding to and dealing with attacks of 
unexpected crises, which confirms to the findings of previous studies and observations. 
 
6.2 Limitations of the current study 
Despite strong intention and much effort to make this study, the first attempt of 
empirical and exploratory research to look into companies’ crisis preparedness in two 
Asian well-developed economies, a complete and successful one, a few limitations can be 
identified easily in the following. 
First of all, although reliability of the data collected from the personal interview 
respondents has been emphasized throughout this study, especially during the survey 
period, the extent of reliability of the information provided by the interviewees could 
have been much improved if there were two informers rather than one, from the same 
company.  Having two informers would have allowed for checks on the reliability of the 
information collected.  Such a practice might be especially desirable for those companies 
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that were represented by public relations or corporate communications managers or 
executives in the personal interviews. This is because those professionals, as some people 
may tend to believe, are often trained to provide information in favour of their own 
organisations.  However, the constraint of the research budgets has prevented such a 
consideration from going further into practice, resulting in the reliance of reasonable 
sample and quality data completely on the expertise and experience of the professional 
agency of ACNielsen. 
Secondly, this empirical study has focused on the companies’ existing status of 
overall crisis preparedness exploring and examining a total of 413 business companies in 
Singapore and Hong Kong at the same time.  The feature of those companies selected for 
the surveys in each of the two regions could, apart from being a reasonable representative 
of the whole industrial population, have intentionally been arranged in such a way that 
would make two samples more matching or comparable in terms of their organisational 
dimension including company size, ownership and industrial sectors, etc.  Subsequently, 
the samples from the two regions could have become ideally comparable for a 
comparative study and the comparison across the two regions could probably have 
become more meaningful. 
Thirdly, given a total sample size of 413 companies representing the whole 
industrial population of two of the most developed economies in Asia, it is rather difficult 
to expect all industries and categories of companies were equally well covered and 
represented in the current study.  Therefore, it may not be realistic to expect the findings 
of this study to have a high extent of generalisability in other similar contexts. 
However, despite its limitations as summed up above, this study could serve as an 
empirical research attempt providing some meaningful evidence and insights into the 
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central research topic, which should in turn be helpful to future research attempts in a 
similar context. 
 
6.3 Suggestions for further research 
Based on the current study, some suggestions for future research attempts are 
forwarded in the following: 
First of all, the findings of this study have indicated that all those explanatory 
variables or factors included in this study could jointly account for only a limited 
proportion of companies’ overall crisis preparedness, as evidenced by results of 
hypotheses testing as well as the R2 values in Table 5.11 respectively for the Singapore 
and Hong Kong samples.  This is equal to suggesting that companies’ existing status of 
crisis preparedness appeared to have been affected by a number of other factors currently 
still beyond the scope of this study.  In order to have a better understanding of 
companies’ overall crisis preparedness and its dependence on all the potential and 
influential factors, it requires further research to explore and identify those potential yet 
unknown factors.  The unraveling of the specific relationship between companies’ crisis 
preparedness and more specific and genuinely influential factors will certainly render 
new and significant findings and benefits contributing to the further development of the 
CM theory and literature and the expansion of practical management expertise and 
inventory. 
This study has found some companies are better prepared for crises than others in 
that they are equipped with more preparations.  Nevertheless, little is known about to 
what extent those well-prepared organisations can really respond to and deal with an 
unexpected crisis, especially when compared with other poorly or not at all prepared 
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organisations.  Therefore, it would be very meaningful and also necessary to have some 
longitudinal or case studies which focus on examining and comparing the actual effects 
and ability in copying with crises between those organisations in different status of crisis 
preparedness within a certain time frame.  Such studies will enable people to find out and 
further understand how well those commonly endorsed preparatory measures, 
mechanism, system and perceptions can protect organisations from the attack of crises. 
Given that conditions may vary considerably from one category of organisations 
to another, or from one industry to another, it might be more meaningful for some future 
attempts to narrow the focus down to a particular area at a time emphasising the research 
depth instead of the breadth in the area of CM.  For example, future research may want to 
look at only one certain type of organisations like large-sized companies, MNCs, or non-
profit organisations, to see how the CM issues are perceived and handled in that 
particular kind of organisations or industry.  The outcome of that kind of study could 
provide some findings more insightful and also relevant to other organisations in the 
similar context and help people, both academic and professional, gain some in-depth 
understanding of the CM in a particular context. 
 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
The current study explores and examines the crisis preparedness among business 
companies in Singapore and Hong Kong and its association with nearly a dozen factors 
related to the organisational and environmental characteristics, and perceptions of the 
managers or executives concerned. 
The results of this empirical research have revealed that Singapore and Hong 
Kong business companies’ overall level of crisis preparedness is on the whole not up to 
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the desirable standard, especially among the companies in Hong Kong.  Meanwhile, the 
current study also seems to have revealed a considerable disparity between the two 
regions in companies’ status of overall preparedness for crises and also in the specific 
effects of some factors under examination, which await further examination.   
Furthermore, consistent with what some researchers have earlier observed among 
the business managers and/or executives in the Asian context (Boulas, 1998; and Cox, 
1999), findings from this study also suggest that the managers and/or executives in the 
survey had false security or over-confidence about their organisation’s ability to respond 
to and deal with unexpected crises.  As pointed out earlier, this kind of mentality can be 
dangerous, especially to those companies that have never experienced any crisis before 
but have based their confidence and ability on the subjective reasoning rather than 
substantial preparations.  Therefore, the pervasive phenomenon should set both 
researchers and practitioners us pondering and also call for further research. 
It has widely been recognised that a crisis often carries double-edge implications 
for an organisation.  Almost every crisis contains within itself the seeds of success as well 
as the roots of failure (Augustine, 2000), as explicitly and vividly represented by the 
Chinese word of weiji, which simply comprises danger and opportunity as its 
components.  A crisis can serve as a rare good opportunity for an organisation in many 
ways but can also mean a nightmare for a company to have its existence at critical stake, 
largely depending on how the organisation addresses such an important issue of CM and 
prepares itself in advance.  Given that organisational crisis is inevitable, it is therefore 
imperative for each and every organisation to attach high importance to CM and try its 
best to prepare itself well for crisis prior to its occurrence, especially in the contemporary 
times when changes and challenges have become constant. 
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It is thus hoped this study will arouse more research interest and efforts among 
academics, professional consultants and practitioners in exploring the CM issues in the 
Asian context and meanwhile trigger a new wave of studies of the important issues in the 
area from more perspectives and approaches. 
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Good morning/ afternoon, I am ..............… (NAME) calling from ACNielsen, a 
market research company. We have been commissioned by the National 
University of Singapore to conduct a survey on crisis management in Singapore.  




Crisis is an event which will lead to threat/ injury/ loss/ damage to (of ) life/ 
safety/ property/ product reputation.   [Crisis can arise from loss of life, injury, 
kidnapping, threat to safety, tampering, contamination, fire, explosion, 
operational errors/hazard, environmental, medical, health, profits and 








IF THE PERSON WHO ATTEND TO YOU DOES NOT KNOW WHO YOU 
SHOULD SPEAK TO, THEN ASK : 
 
Can I speak to your ........................? 
MD/ Director/ General Manager (employee number less than 10) 1 
General Manager/ Manager (employee number 11 - 25)   2 
Admin Manager/ Human Resource Manager/ Public Relation Manager  
  (employee number 26-50)       3 
Public Relation Manager/ Operation Manager 









 INTRODUCTION :  WHEN THE RIGHT PERSON COMES 
Good morning/ afternoon, I am .................. (NAME) calling from ACNielsen, a 
market research company.  We have been commissioned by the National 







S1. May I know which one of the following describes your role in a crisis ? 
Please describe. 
 
I make the final decision in a crisis situation  1 
I vote on the committee in a crisis situation  2 
I influence the decisions made in a crisis situation 3 
None of the above      9 (GO BACK TO 
INTRODUCTION) 
 
IF RESPONDENT QUALIFIED: 
We would like to arrange to have an interview with you.  The interview would 
take about 30 minutes.  As a token of our appreciation, we can share with you 




First I would like to gather some general information. 
 










S4. How long have you been in this position? 
 
 _________ years 
 
 
S5. How long have you been with this company? 
 
 _________ years  
 
                                                 
♣ The word Singapore was to be replaced with Hong Kong when the survey was conducted in the latter. 
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S6. Would you classify yourself as ..............? 
 
 Senior level manager  1 
 Middle level manager  2 
 Lower level manager  3 
 
 
Perception of Crisis 
 
 
Q1. What kind of situations would your company consider as a crisis, that is, 








PROBE : What consequences must it bring about to be labelled as a 







Q2. Has your company had a crisis in the past 5 years? 
 
  Yes      1 
  No      2  GO TO Q3 
  Don’t Know   99   
 
 IF YES : 
 
i) How many crises? 
 ______________ 
 
ii) In what ways, if any, has your company learnt from these crises? 









 Q3. In your opinion, do you think it is within the control of a company to 
prevent a crisis from happening? 
 
  Yes       1 
  No       2 
  Don’t Know    99 
 
 SHOWCARD 
Q4. In comparison with the U.S., do you think a typical company operating in 
Singapore is likely to experience a crisis?  Is it ............? 
 
  More likely       1 
  Less likely or       2 
  Has about the same likelihood    3 
   Don’t know     99 
 
 








Q6. How likely do you think your company will face a crisis: 
  
i) During this year? 
ii) Within the next 3 years? 
 During this year Within the next 3   
years 
Less than 50% chance 1 1 
50% chance 2 2 
More than 50% chance 3 3 




Q7. Please rank the following list of crisis types from 1 (Most likely to happen) 
to 5 (Least likely to happen) on the likelihood of that type of crisis affecting 
your company: 
 
       Most likely         Least likely 
        to happen          to happen 
1. People (loss of life, injury, kidnapping)  1      2      3      4    5 
2. Product (safety, tampering, contamination)  1       2       3      4    5 
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 3. Process (fire, explosion, operational errors)  1       2        3      4    5 
4. Issues (environmental, medical or health, 
                profits and investment)    1       2        3       4     5 
5. Security (extortion, sabotage, theft of 
                property/databases)    1       2        3       4     5 
 
DROPCARD 
Q8. In your opinion, when would you say a crisis has been handled well, ranking the 
following from 1 (Not at all important) to 6 (Extremely important): 
 
       Not at all   Extremely 
       important   important 
1. Does not make the news headline for  
   too long      1    2 3   4    5    6 
2. Resumes normal operations quickly  1    2 3   4    5    6 
3. Has spent the minimal sum of money  1    2 3   4    5    6 
4. Does not lose market share during and 
             after crisis      1    2 3   4    5    6 
5. Increases morale of employees   1    2 3   4    5    6 




Q9. Please indicate the confidence level that you believe your company can 
respond well to a crisis. Would you say you are: 
 
     Not at all          Extremely 
    confident           confident 
    




Planning for Crisis 
 
 
Q10. Does your company plan for crises? 
 
Yes      1 (GO TO Q12) 
No      2 (GO TO Q11) 
Don’t Know   99 (GO TO Q15) 
 














Q13. Is the CEO /Chairman of your company involved in planning for crisis? 
Yes     1 
No     2 




Q14. What crises does your company plan for?  
People (loss of life, injury, kidnapping)     1 
Product (safety, tampering, contamination)    2 
Process (fire, explosion, operational errors)    3 
Issues (environmental, medical or health, profits and investment) 4 
Security (extortion, sabotage, theft of property/databases)   5 
 
 
      SHOWCARD 
Q15. On a scale from 1 (Not at all knowledgeable) to 7 (Extremely 
knowledgeable),  
 
(i) To what extent do you think the average employee in your 
company is knowledgeable about his or her role in a crisis? 
 
Not at all      Extremely 
 knowledgeable     knowledgeable 
     
 1       2       3       4       5       6         7 
(ii) To what extent do you think the top management in your company 
is knowledgeable about his or her role in a crisis? 
 
Not at all      Extremely 
 knowledgeable     knowledgeable 
    
  1       2       3       4       5       6         7 
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  SHOWCARD 
Q16. On a scale from 1 (Not very much) to 7 (A great deal),  
(i) How much time does your company spend on researching crises of 
other companies with similar or related business as your company? 
 
Not very         A great 
  much            deal 
      1       2       3       4       5       6         7 
 
 SHOWCARD 
           (ii) How much time on average do you think companies in Singapore 
spend on researching crises of other companies? 
 
Not very         A great 
  much            deal 
      1       2       3       4       5       6         7 
 
 




Q17. On a scale from 1 (Not very much) to 7 (A great deal), how important do 
you think a crisis plan is for your company? 
 
Not very         A great 
   much            deal 




Q18. Please rank the following general objectives of having a crisis plan from 1 
(Most important) to 7 (Least important) on importance: 
 
               Least      Most 
        Important    important 
1. Early identification of potential crisis      1    2   3   4    5    6 
2. Quick isolation of a crisis should it occur      1    2   3   4    5    6 
3. Efficient management of an occurring crisis   1    2   3   4    5    6 
4. Consistency of response across the company 1    2 3   4    5    6 
5. Clear delegation of responsibilities during crisis 1    2 3   4    5    6 
6. Assured continuation of business during crisis 1    2 3   4    5    6 
7. Limitation of damage done by crisis  1    2 3   4    5    6 
 




 Yes       1 (GO TO Q20) 
No       2 (GO TO 23) 
Don’t Know    99 (GO TO Q23) 
 
SHOWCARD 
Q20. Who designed this crisis plan? 
 
Outside consultant/s      1 
In-house department only      2 




Q21. Does your company’s crisis plan specify the following? 
 
           
                  Don’t 
               Yes No   Know 
1. How to determine a crisis has occurred      1  2    3 
2. How to judge the impact of the crisis on the company 1  2    3 
3. The sequence of steps to take under specific 
           circumstances      1  2    3 
4. A chain of command      1  2    3 
5. A crisis control centre      1  2    3 
6. Members of a crisis management team   1  2    3 
7. How to communicate the crisis to various stakeholders 1  2    3 
8. Media contacts       1  2    3 
9. A contingency plan for handling the disruption of 
     operations such as alternative manufacturing facilities 1  2    3 




Q22. How often does your company conduct crisis drills or simulation exercises 
based on the crisis plan? 
Once in more than 2 years    1 
Once every 2 years     2 
At least once every year    3 
Never       4 







 HR Issues in Crisis Preparation 
 
Q23. Does your company have a crisis management team (CMT)? 
Yes      1 (GO TO Q24) 
No     2 (GO TO 27) 




Q24. How many members are there in the CMT? 
Less than 5     1 
5-9      2 
10-14      3 
15-20      4 
More than 20     5 




Q25. Which of the following departments or areas do the team members 
represent? 
 
Corporate Communications / Public or Media Relations   1 
Security          2 
Production / Operations        3 
Legal           4 
Human Resource / Personnel       5 
Land / Property Management       6 
Finance          7 
IT Department         8 
Health & Safety          9 
Marketing & Sales       10 
Customer Service       11 
Logistics & Distribution      12 
Engineering        13 
Business Planning Group       14 
CEO         15 
External stakeholders e.g. government and key customers 16 
Others (Please specify: __________________________) 17 
 
 




 (i) Job designation 
 ________________________________________ 
 




Q27.If the designated Head is not available when a crisis happens, is there any 
back-up person to take over his duties and responsibilities? 
 
Yes     1 
No     2 
Don’t know  99 
 
 
Q28. Does your company train employees to prepare them for crises? 
 
Yes     1 (GO TO Q29) 
No     2 (GO TO Q30) 




Q29. How much time is spent in training the employees to prepare for crises, 
expressed as a percentage of the total time of overall training? 
 
Less than 5%          1 
Equal to or more than 5% but less than 10%    2 
Equal to or more than 10% but less than 20%    3 
Equal to or more than 20%       4 
Don’t know       99 
 
 
Public Relations and Communications During Crisis 
 
 SHOWCARD 
Q30. On a scale from 1 (Not very much) to 7 (A great deal), to what extent 
would a crisis affect the public image of a company in Singapore?  
 
      Not very           A great 
        much             deal 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 






Q32. On a scale from 1 (Extremely hostile) to 7 (Extremely understanding), to 
what extent do you think the attitudes of Singapore news media would be 
to a company like yours during a crisis?  
 
     Extremely         Extremely 
        hostile     understanding 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 








Q34. On a scale from 1 (Extremely hostile) to 7 (Extremely understanding), to 
what extent do you think the general public in Singapore would be hostile 
to a company like yours during a crisis? 
 
     Extremely         Extremely 
        hostile     understanding 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 









Q36. From the following list, rank from 1 (Least important) to 11 (Most 
important), the traits a communications member of a typical Singapore 
company crisis team should have? 
 
        Least            Most 
               important    important 
1.   Commanding credibility      1      2      3      4      5     6     7     8     9 
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 2.   Communicating clearly       1      2      3      4      5     6     7     8     9 
3.   Dealing with great ambiguity   1     2      3      4      5     6     7     8     9 
4.   Listening attentively            1     2      3      4      5     6     7     8     9 
5.   Working long hours            1     2      3      4      5     6     7     8     9  
6.   Being a good team player       1     2      3      4      5     6     7     8      9  
7.   Having an analytical mind       1     2      3      4      5     6     7     8      9    
8.   Having a sense of humour      1     2      3      4      5     6     7     8      9  
9.  Having a sense of sympathy for  
        victims                1     2      3      4     5      6     7     8     9  
10. Having the ability to stay calm   1     2      3      4      5     6      7     8     9  
11. Knowing what the media wants 1     2      3      4      5     6      7     8     9  
 
 SHOWCARD 
Q37. In your knowledge, what percentage of Singapore companies do you think 
have a trained spokesperson for crisis situations? 
 
Less than 10%    1 
10 –29%     2 
30-50%     3 
50- 100%     4 




Q38. Please rank the following communication principles, from 1 (Least 
important) to 9 (Most important), on their importance to a corporate 
spokesperson during a crisis: 
 
              Least             Most 
          important             important 
1.  Aware of  
     misinformation   1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
2.  Being proactive   1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
3.  Being visible   1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
4. Clarity    1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
5. Consistency  1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
6. Cooperative  1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
7. Factual    1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
8. Honesty    1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
9. Showing compassion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
10. Timely    1 2 3 4 5 6 7    8 9 
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  DROPCARD 
Q39. Please rank the following list of target audiences from 1 (Least important) 
to 9 (Most important) on their importance to your company during a crisis: 
 
              Least           Most 
           important        important 
1) Customers  1 2 3 4 5 6     7     8 9 
2) Employees  1 2 3 4 5 6     7     8 9 
3) Governmental  
            representatives 1 2 3 4 5 6     7      8 9 
4) Investors  1 2 3 4 5 6     7      8 9 
5) Key executives 1 2 3 4 5 6     7      8 9 
6) Labour officials 1 2 3 4 5 6     7      8 9 
7) Community leaders 1 2 3 4 5 6     7      8 9 
8) Media   1 2 3 4 5 6     7      8 9 
9) Suppliers  1 2 3 4 5 6     7      8 9 
 
 
Q40♠  Could you use a few sentences to describe the word Kiasu?  In other 






Q41♠. What do you think of the implication of the mentality of Kiasu for crisis 
management? Would you say it is ..................? 
 
Not at all helpful   1 
Not quite helpful   2 
Making no difference  3 
Quite helpful    4 
Very helpful    5 
 
 




                                                 
♠ From Questions 40 and 41, the Italic word Kiasu, used in Singapore only, is replaced by Mojupshie when 
the questionnaire is used in Hong Kong. 
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 Particulars of Company 
 
For an MNC, the company in question refers to the part of the organisational 
body operating in Singapore. 
 
 SHOWCARD 
Q43. Please tick the industry / sector which the company belongs in: 
High-Risk Category: 
1. Pharmaceutical and chemical 
2. Manufacturers 
3. Banks, financial institutions, credit unions, trading institutions 
4. Technologically sensitive firms e.g. software development, ammunition control and 
biotechnology 
5. Public transportation e.g. airlines, railroads, and bus and subway systems 
6. Hotels and motels, lodging houses, apartment buildings 
7. Nuclear power plants 
8. Food producers and distributors 
9. Nightclubs and casinos 
10. Government agencies 
11. Amusement parks, resorts 
12. Public personalities e.g. politicians, entertainers 
13. Soft drink and juice manufacturers 
14. Helicopter, raft, shuttle boat, and pleasure craft renting 
15. Real estate developers 
16. Public and private utilities and airports 
17. Builders, roofers, concrete suppliers and structural engineering co.s 
 
Medium-Risk Category: 
18. Universities, hospitals, nonprofit agencies, churches, museums 
19. Food and retail concerns 
20. Petroleum manufacturers and distributors 
21. Telecommunication co.s 
22. Household product manufacturers 
23. Packaging plants 
24. Computer manufacturers and distributors 
25. Engine and heavy metal manufacturers 
26. Elevator manufacturers 
27. Physicians, dentists and other medical professionals 
28. Aerospace interests 
29. Mall and shopping centre operators 
30. Health clubs, YMCAs, YWCAs, zoos, preschools 
31. Restaurants and fast-food chains 
32. Personal hygiene product manufacturers (tampons, lotions etc.) 
33. Harvesting interests e.g. fishing co.s and farming concerns 
34. Liquor, beer and wine, cigarette concerns 
 
Low-Risk Category: 
35. Insurance agencies 
36. Foundations, charitable trusts, special interest and community groups 
37. Radio, television and cable broadcasters 
38. Certified public accountants 
39. Photography and film manufacturers and distributors 
40. Apparel manufacturers 
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 41. Neighbourhood businesses  e.g. hairdressers, pet shops, video rental co.s, dry 
cleaners, travel agencies, real estate offices 
42. Newspaper, magazine and book publishers; commercial printers 
43. Repair shops for automobiles and consumer products 
44. Nurseries, plant and lawn businesses 
45. Law firms 
46. Fraternal, ethnic and social organizations 
47. Consulting firms 
48. Car rental co.s 
49. Mail order and catalog co.s 
50. International agencies e.g. UNESCO, World Bank  
51. Graphic design, interior decorating, architectural firms 
52. Research, data collection, survey, and demographics firms 




Q43. Annual pre-tax revenue: (S$) 
 
Under $100,000       1 
Between $100,000 - $999,999     2 
Between $1,000,000 – $9,999,999    3 
Between $10,000,000 – $49,999,999    4 
Over $50,000,000       5 





Q44. Total number of employees in the company: (Please tick one) 
 
Less than 25    1 
25 - 49    2 
50 - 99    3 
100 – 199    4 
200 – 299    5 
300 - 499    6 




Q45. Home base of organisation: 
 
Local (Singapore)   1 
Singaporean MNC   2 
Foreign MNC   3 





  SHOWCARD 
Q46. How long has the company been operating in Singapore (since it was  
registered in Singapore)? 
 
Less than 3 years   1 
  3 -  5 years    2 
  6 - 10 year    3 
11 - 20 years    4 
21 - 40 years    5 




- END OF INTERVIEW - 
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